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PREFACE
Over six years ago we approached the W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research with a simple proposal. We wanted to examine 
a series of cooperative and contentious labor negotiations to better 
understand negotiations at the extremes. Much has happened since 
then.
First, it became clear to us that the "extremes" were becoming the 
norm. The highly cooperative and highly contentious negotiations were 
increasingly common, while the traditional, arm's-length interactions 
were becoming the exception. As a result, we now see this study as 
speaking to the mainstream of labor-management relations.
Second, in examining these highly contrasting cases, we found our 
selves building on and extending the Behavioral Theory of Labor 
Negotiations, written by Walton and McKersie in 1965. We came to see 
the behavioral theory as a useful framework for understanding bargain 
ing processes. We added to the theory new thoughts about the ways 
that strategy and structure interact with process. Together, these 
insights allowed us to develop a theory of negotiated change in labor- 
management relations, which is presented in the book, Strategic Nego 
tiations: A Theory of Change in Labor-Management Relations, pub 
lished by the Harvard Business School Press (1994).
In Strategic Negotiations, we developed structured analysis based 
on a series of case studies cutting across three industries. This book 
features detailed presentations for twelve of the thirteen case studies of 
cooperative and contentious negotiations analyzed in Strategic Negoti 
ations. Thus, some of the individual quotes and vignettes presented in 
the theory of negotiated change are now presented here in the context 
of the full case studies. In Strategic Negotiations we also explored 
practical implications of the theory. In this book we build on those 
practical implications in order to offer additional tools and guidance 
for strategic negotiators traveling along various pathways to change.
This book should be a valuable companion and resource for readers 
interested in learning more about the cases upon which the Strategic 
Negotiations thesis was developed. To the extent possible, the cases 
have been updated to capture the longer-term consequences of the 
strategies that we first encountered in our field work during the late 
1980s and early 1990s.
Overview
The introductory chapter of this book addresses the threshold issue, 
"why change?" We conclude that major change is an almost inevitable 
objective for parties in traditional relationships who are wrestling with 
contentious issues at the same time that their common interests are 
growing. Further, we find that major change requires negotiations. To 
set the stage for presenting case studies of negotiated change, we draw 
on two key concepts from Strategic Negotiations: (1) the contrasting 
strategies of forcing and fostering change, and (2) the juxtaposition of 
substantive and relationship outcomes.
The following four chapters of the book feature our case studies. 
The cases are organized around distinct change strategies. Chapter 2 
features three cases involving forcing strategies, while chapter 3 fea 
tures three cases involving fostering strategies. Chapters 4 and 5 also 
have three cases each, focusing first on the sequence of forcing fol 
lowed by fostering and then on concurrent forcing and fostering. At the 
conclusion of each of the twelve cases, we highlight salient lessons.
The final two chapters summarize lessons that extend across the 
cases. Chapter 6 presents general lessons about the context for negotia 
tions over change, while chapter 7 highlights specific tools and tech 
niques to guide the strategic negotiator.
This book completes the first cycle of work in developing a theory 
of negotiated change and presenting supporting materials. Yet, in many 
ways, the concluding thoughts to this book represent the beginning of 
the next round of analysis. We see the principles of strategic negotia 
tions as generalizable to other contexts where change is the agenda. 
These include change initiatives in nonunion settings, as well as nego 
tiated change in the context of strategic alliances, joint ventures, cross- 
functional integration initiatives, and customer-supplier relations.
Like any major research undertaking, we find that our research per 
spective and agenda have changed as a result of the journey we have 
taken. We have just begun to grasp the potential for undertaking the 
change process from the vantage of strategic negotiations. In present 
ing the theory of negotiated change in Strategic Negotiations, com 
bined with the detailed cases and guidance for practitioners contained 
in this book, we are inviting our colleagues and strategic negotiators to 
join us in this new journey.
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Change is on the agenda. At negotiating tables around the world, 
parties are bargaining over fundamental changes. Sometimes the focus 
is on substantive changes revisions in existing contracts, agreements, 
or understandings. Sometimes the focus is on changes in relation 
ships ranging from the building of more cooperative relationships to 
changes that threaten the other party's legitimacy and even its very 
existence. In most cases, changes in substantive terms and changes in 
relationships are concurrently on the agenda.
Why negotiate over change? Why not act unilaterally? Parties often 
do. Other stakeholders, however, are usually prompted to respond. At 
that point, negotiations tacit or explicit are under way. Viewed 
through a negotiations lens, unilateral action and reaction represent 
early moves in an unfolding, back-and-forth process. The process may 
involve escalation and collapse on the part of one or both parties. The 
process may involve pressure and capitulation. The process may even 
involve dialogue and increased understanding reflected in joint deci 
sions and mutual agreements. Whether or not it intends to negotiate, a 
party taking unilateral action to drive change that affects others as well 
will almost inevitably find itself on a path of negotiated change.
Why negotiate over change? Why not act on the basis of consensus? 
Parties often do. Rarely, however, is the consensus complete. Subtle 
and even glaring differences usually emerge. At that point, negotia 
tions tacit or explicit are under way. Viewed through a negotiations 
lens, the cooperative overture is an early move in an unfolding, back- 
and-forth process. The process may be punctuated by the emergence of 
unexpected, divisive issues between the parties. And the process may 
surface splits within one or both parties. The process may even involve 
dialogue and understanding reflected in joint decisions and mutual 
agreements. Whether or not the initiating party explicitly planned to 
negotiate, the party seeking to act on the basis of consensus and team 
work will inevitably find itself on a path of negotiated change.
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Thus, where change is on the agenda, negotiations are certain to fol 
low. This is because change involves both initiating and responding 
parties. Whether the initiating party is acting unilaterally or inviting 
cooperation, change seldom looks the same to the initiating party and 
to the recipient. It is the interaction between their two perspectives that 
places parties on various pathways of negotiated change.
This book focuses on two contrasting change strategies forcing 
change and fostering change. It features a close look at a wide range of 
highly cooperative and highly contentious change initiatives both of 
which are pathways of change that build on the strategies. Studying the 
back-and-forth dynamics in these cases has revealed useful insights 
into why change initiatives succeed or fail.
Why Study Labor-Management Negotiations?
Our particular focus is on change initiatives in the workplace. Fur 
ther, we have only studied unionized workplaces. These collective bar 
gaining relationships are important to study. They account for almost 
one-sixth of U.S. employment, and their influence on the U.S. and even 
the world economy is substantial in both economic and social terms. 
Also, studying cooperative and contentious initiatives in the context of 
these formal, bilateral relationships has provided a rich terrain for sur 
facing new ideas and insights into the fundamental nature of negotiated 
change.
As background, it is important to understand that negotiations repre 
sent important events in labor-management relations. They present 
defining moments at which parties develop or revise the terms and con 
ditions of employment. Further, it is important to recognize that, even 
between rounds of formal contract bargaining, negotiations over griev 
ances and other aspects of contract administration also involve critical 
decisions made either by the parties or by labor arbitrators.
During certain eras in U.S. history, negotiations occurring within the 
time frames of contract bargaining and contract administration have 
assumed great historical significance. Not only were the negotiations 
important events for the parties during these eras, they were also key 
indicators and powerful influences on social relations more generally.
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For example, during the 1930s, conflicts over the representational 
claims of industrial unions reflected not just narrow economic strug 
gles, but a broader set of issues involving societal adjustments to the 
implications of mass production industries. Similarly, negotiations 
over health care, pension, and other fringe benefits in the 1950s and 
1960s reinforced the U.S. public policy emphasis of an employer-cen 
tered approach to extending various social benefits (in contrast to many 
other industrialized nations). The implications of these choices are par 
ticularly evident in current debates over health care reform and social 
security.
A core thesis of this book is that we are once again in an era where 
labor negotiations have broad social ramifications. The give and take 
between labor and management in the present era in collective bar 
gaining, grievance procedures, labor-management committees, and 
around various forms of worker participation reflects a broad social 
process of adjustment to international competition and technological 
change. In studying the interactions of unions, employers, and employ 
ees in this era, we find vivid and instructive illustrations of alternative 
pathways to change.
Why Focus on Cooperative and Conflictual Extremes?
There are still labor-management relationships where changes take 
place on an incremental basis through routine, arm's-length negotia 
tions. Recent evidence suggests, however, that these types of negotia 
tions are in the minority. Based on one sample of collective bargaining 
relationships, for example, they may only account for approximately a 
third of labor-management negotiations with fully two-thirds of col 
lective bargaining tending toward the extremes (Walton, Cutcher-Ger- 
shenfeld, and McKersie 1994, pp. 3 Iff). Although comparable data 
from earlier time periods are not available, there is enough circumstan 
tial evidence to suggest that a pattern of many relationships falling at 
the extremes is a recent phenomena. To make the point differently, a 
majority of unions and employers find themselves negotiating on new 
terrain, where traditional actions can generate unexpected results. This 
book is targeted for leaders at all levels who find themselves engaged
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in these strategic negotiations. We hope to offer useful insights and 
guidance.
Also, when negotiations tend toward either cooperative or conflict- 
ual extremes, key elements of the process are thrown into sharp relief. 
As such, we are better able to articulate general lessons about the pro 
cess of negotiated change. Many of these lessons have potential appli 
cability far beyond union-management relationships with 
implications for employment relations in nonunion settings and for 
parties seeking change in the context of joint ventures, strategic part 
nerships, cross-functional integration, and customer-supplier relations.
Guiding Principles and Frameworks
Three main guiding principles or frameworks will be helpful to 
readers of this book. First, we make a core assumption about employ 
ment relationships specifically, the mixed-motive nature of employ 
ment relations. Second, we utilize a particular framework for 
classifying change strategies into forcing and fostering, with a third 
strategy, escape, as a backdrop to the two primary strategies. Third, we 
make a key distinction around outcomes focusing both on substan 
tive and relationship dimensions. These guiding ideas all build on the 
analysis contained in Strategic Negotiations: A Theory of Change in 
Labor-Management Relationships.
A Mixture of Common and Competing Interests
We refer to labor-management relationships as "mixed-motive," 
reflecting the mixture of common and competing motives that parties 
bring to the employment relationship. [ While the mixture of common 
and competing interests is most salient between labor and management 
representatives, there are typically multiple stakeholders with distinct 
concerns within labor (for example, skilled trades versus production 
employees) and within management (for example, line versus staff 
support). As well, other stakeholders (such as external customers and 
government) bring a mixture of common and competing interests to 
their interactions with labor and management.
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All of our cases involve negotiations over fundamental (or poten 
tially fundamental) changes. The first lesson that emerges from these 
detailed cases stems from the mixed motive assumption. We find that, 
for a change process to have any chance of success, negotiations must 
attend to both the resolution of conflict and the pursuit of common 
interests. The point may seem obvious, but too many practitioners and 
theorists downplay or ignore the need for articulation and even synthe 
sis of these distinct elements.
The potential for labor-management relations to involve bitter, 
intractable conflicts is well established. In the decades of the 1980s and 
1990s the experiences at A. E. Staley, Phelps-Dodge, Pittston Mines, 
Greyhound Bus Lines, Caterpillar, and the New York Daily News to 
mention a few examples provide ample evidence of the conflictual 
nature of labor-management relations. For this study, we selected sev 
eral cases that typify pathways involving bitter, seemingly intractable 
conflicts. For example, the strikes at the International Paper mill in Jay, 
Maine, and at the AP Parts plant in Toledo, Ohio were both highly con 
tentious and widely perceived as almost unavoidable, given the con 
flicting interests at play.
A close look at these conflictual cases, however, reveals specific 
points at which the negotiations changed sharply and where the various 
tactics employed hampered efforts to repair relations. For example, the 
hiring of permanent replacement workers in the Jay, Maine case 
marked a sharp deterioration in relations, complicated relations after 
the strike, and ultimately set the stage for the decertification of the 
union.
In contrast, other cases we selected also involved bitter strikes, but 
the story line evolved along a very different path. Though these cases 
looked just as contentious at the outset, actions taken (or avoided) dur 
ing and after the strikes facilitated the restoration of constructive rela 
tions. For example, in Boise Cascade's DeRidder, Louisiana paper 
mill, the company forced deep concessions around work rules but did 
not press its advantage around wage concessions. This restraint proved 
instrumental to the subsequent repair of relations after the strike. Simi 
larly, the union at Adrian Fabricators helped temper hard feelings after 
an acrimonious strike by using its own funds to repair broken factory 
windows and other physical damage incurred during the strike.
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The potential for labor-management relations to be centered on 
cooperation and partnership is also well established historically. Dur 
ing the 1980s, considerable attention was paid to the key role of labor- 
management cooperation in the competitive resurgence at Xerox 
(Cutcher-Gershenfeld 1988). Similarly, the partnership structure at Sat 
urn broke sharply with traditional adversarial and hierarchical struc 
tures (Kochan, Rubenstein, and Bennett 1994). The interest in these 
cases reflects a broader awareness on the parts of labor and manage 
ment regarding the mutual benefits if ways can be found to increase the 
size of the proverbial economic pie.
We have selected several cases in this vein because they also feature 
initiatives designed to encourage joint planning and mutually benefi 
cial implementation of fundamental change. A close look at these path 
ways reveals a complex portrait of cooperative initiatives. For example, 
labor and management at Packard Electric worked together to promote 
flexible job assignments and cost savings in the context of a lifetime 
job security guarantee, a multitier wage system, and an increased man 
agement capacity to utilize temporary workers. In retrospect, the Pack 
ard Electric story may seem well planned and rooted in extensive 
labor-management cooperation. In fact, a closer look at the case 
reveals several interesting features: a major internal conflict within the 
union, a hard confrontation by the union with management over job 
security, and continuing contention over the use of temporary workers. 
Thus, the path-breaking cooperative achievements rested on a founda 
tion of complex, difficult, and constantly unfolding interactions  
many of them conflictual.
At CSX, the parties attempted to develop a collaborative structure to 
address common concerns. Despite the clear advantages of working 
together and coordinating efforts, the decision of one key union to 
withdraw from the joint effort highlighted the many areas of conflict 
that remained between labor and management in the system.
While each case is unique, the contrasting experiences with various 
tactics suggest that the individual choices of unions and employers 
matter a great deal along these various pathways to change. Choices in 
negotiations sometimes led to the collapse of relations and at other 
times set the stage for the repair of relations. Similarly, our cases 
involving joint change initiatives highlight the negotiated nature of 
cooperation. In some instances hard confrontations were instrumental
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in moving in a cooperative direction, while a breakdown in internal 
negotiations within a party could substantially reduce the scope of a 
joint, cooperative initiative.
Thus, the cases illustrate: (1) that change processes are character 
ized by stakeholders with both common and conflicting interests, (2) 
that pursuit of common interests and the resolution of conflicts are 
negotiated processes, and (3) that choice of strategies and tactics in 
these negotiations are central to the success of the change process.
The Distinct Strategies of Forcing and Fostering
During periods of stability, bargaining outcomes are primarily 
shaped by tactical choices and broad external forces such as the cycli 
cal economic swings characteristic of many industries. In the present 
era, however, we see the emergence of distinct change strategies that 
become powerful driving forces. These strategies may or may not 
begin as intentional change efforts, but they are identifiable after a 
series of patterned interactions. 2
We will concentrate our attention on the two primary strategies  
forcing and fostering and then various combinations. Escape, a strat 
egy of a very different sort, will also be analyzed. Before outlining the 
structure of the book, it is instructive to provide some guidance as to 
the essence of forcing and fostering.
The inherent calculus to accept change differs between the two strat 
egies. Simply put, stakeholders who are on the receiving end of a forc 
ing strategy agree to changes because one side (usually management in 
the present era) has the power to compel acceptance of the demands. 
The workers find themselves in an avoidance-avoidance predicament. 
On the one hand, they want to avoid changes or concessions, but they 
find themselves in a situation where the alternatives (e.g. strike or plant 
shutdown) are even more costly.
By contrast, a fostering process operates on the premise that solu 
tions can be found to common problems that leave all sides better situ 
ated. However, the expectation that there will be important gains can 
create difficulties when it comes to the ratification phase, as will be 
illustrated in one of our cases where leaders of a key union expected a 
proportionate share of the joint gains, and when this was not forthcom 
ing they voted against the new package.
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How do the parties themselves see the differences in these two 
change strategies? In answering this question, one executive summa 
rized his viewpoint as follows:
One way to view forcing versus fostering is to distinguish when 
you want to assume your major risks. Under the forcing approach, 
your risks are all up-front. Employee attitudes will deteriorate. 
The politicians will beat up on you. And, if a work stoppage 
results, you must anticipate suffering and erosion of traffic. How 
ever, if meaningful contractual changes are implemented, your 
cost structure will be lowered and your productivity structure will 
be improved. A rebuilding process can then begin, and both the 
company and the employees can begin to reap benefits.
In the fostering approach, your risks will come later. You certainly 
do not have the type of up-front risks associated with the forcing 
strategy. However, if the change process does not evolve beyond 
the talk stage, a few years down the road a company can find itself 
in a competitively disadvantageous position. This can be espe 
cially dangerous if your competitors already have implemented 
changes.
Clearly, the choice of forcing versus fostering hinges on dramati 
cally different preferences with respect to the desired timetable and the 
associated risks. Under the forcing approach, management sees some 
degree of risk, either that the relationship will deteriorate or that the 
changes may not be forthcoming. On the other hand, the fostering 
strategy, while it involves less risk, often takes considerably more time 
and for an extended period may not show any benefits. As we will see 
in a number of our cases, the parties can improve attitudes but nothing 
else seems to change.
Thus, the challenge that the parties face when embarking upon the 
fostering approach is to translate the potential that is present with bet 
ter attitudes into the realization of real changes in operating practices. 
Once changes are agreed upon via the fostering approach, then the 
implementation can be fairly straightforward, since the positive atti 
tudes lead to some measure of joint support for the new arrangements. 
In fact, in some instances labor and management will establish joint 
implementation committees to ensure that the spirit and not just the let 
ter of new agreements is observed.
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Both the forcing and fostering strategies work with the same two 
variables of behavior and attitude change, but the emphases are quite 
different. Simply put, the forcing strategy compels behavioral changes 
in the short run, hoping that attitudes will not deteriorate too signifi 
cantly. The presumption is that over the longer run, management will 
be in a position to attend to these consequences in order to derive the 
maximum benefit from the behavior changes realized in the short run. 
By contrast, the fostering approach emphasizes joint processes of prob 
lem solving and attitude change that lead to the design of new systems 
capable of commanding wide acceptance and new behaviors from the 
various stakeholders.
Organization of the Book
Three cases, which are included in chapter 2, feature strategies that 
unfold along a path that we have labeled "forcing." In each case, man 
agement was the moving party, and change initiatives went far beyond 
traditional distributive bargaining tactics. In each of the cases, labor 
matched management's tactics and forged its own forcing response. 
Sometimes the forcing initiative was part of a fully developed plan. For 
example, in the Guilford case, the changes sought in work rules were 
linked with a series of railway purchases and a restructuring of owner 
ship, all of which required considerable planning and preparation. In 
other cases, the actions of the parties took on increasing intensity as the 
conflict escalated, leading to an emerging strategy of forced change.
In another three of the cases, which are included in chapter 3, the 
parties were embarked on a path characterized by what we have termed 
"fostering" strategies. Again, management was the moving party. 
Many fostering initiatives evident today are part of larger, explicit 
change strategies aimed at increased flexibility, improved quality, 
reduced cost, and enhanced organizational effectiveness. In our three 
fostering cases, however, the strategy was more emergent and less visi 
ble at the outset. For example, the efforts at Bidwell began with a rela 
tively narrow focus on employee involvement, while the efforts at CSX 
began with a similarly specific focus on a multiunion, labor-manage 
ment committee. In both cases, the initial tactical moves were coopera 
tive in nature and suggested a larger fostering strategy, but the efforts 
were circumscribed by dynamics within labor and within management.
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The third case Anderson Pattern is a robust example where the fos 
tering proceeded without being undercut as it was in the other two 
cases.
In chapter 4, we present three of the cases containing multiple time 
periods in which the parties' path involved a sequence of distinct strat 
egies forcing followed by fostering. In two of the cases, Boise Cas 
cade's DeRidder Mill and Adrian Fabricators, the forcing included a 
bitter strike. In the third case, Conrail, forcing occurred in the context 
of a governmental restructuring of the railroad. In all three cases, the 
initial round of forcing had important consequences for subsequent 
fostering initiatives.
Finally, in chapter 5 we present three cases that feature a combina 
tion of concurrent forcing and fostering strategies, the most complex 
path in our study. All of the cases featuring combinations of forcing 
and fostering initiatives are at times sequential in character and at other 
times truly concurrent. For example, at the Budd Company, forcing 
around wage concessions occurred concurrent with fostering around 
employee involvement. Ultimately all of these cases matured to stages 
of predominant fostering, but each continued to include either episodic 
distributive confrontations or (in one case) a subsequent forcing initia 
tive.
Embedded in many of our cases is another strategy that has impor 
tant implications for forcing and fostering, as well as mixed strategies, 
namely, the strategy of escape. In some of our forcing cases, such as 
AP Parts, Guilford, and Jay, the intensity of the forcing battle was 
partly fueled by labor's perception that management aimed to go down 
the path of escaping from the labor-management relationship. In the 
Anderson Pattern case, which involved extensive fostering, escape 
issues were part of the larger context in that most of the unionized pat 
tern-making firms in the community had either gone out of business or 
experienced a decertification election. In some of the mixed cases, such 
as Budd and Packard Electric, management moved work out of exist 
ing unionized facilities to either southern nonunion plants or to loca 
tions in Mexico which was perceived by labor as a strategy of partial 
escape from the union-management relationship.
In all of these cases, it is clear that change strategies (whether 
explicit or implicit) adopted by the parties interact and powerfully 
influence the course of the negotiations. We find clear evidence that
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negotiations can be classified distinctly into forcing and fostering strat 
egies, with time periods when there is a mixture of forcing and foster 
ing, as well as a broader context that may include a strategy of escape. 
The various combinations of these strategies define somewhat (but not 
completely) predictable paths along which negotiations unfold. We 
address later the dynamics that can abruptly alter the pathway taken.
Substantive and Relationship Outcomes—Anticipating 
Unintended Consequences
There are two broad types of outcomes in labor negotiations (and in 
most other negotiations). First, there are substantive outcomes. These 
include agreements (or disagreements) on the terms and conditions of 
employment, as well as agreements about specific work practices. Sec 
ond, there are relationship outcomes. These include agreements (or 
disagreements) about the degree of joint activities, the amount of trust 
among the parties, and the directions desired for labor-management 
relations. One clear lesson from the cases is that the destination along 
these pathways to change includes outcomes that contain both substan 
tive and relationship dimensions. In some cases, management was pri 
marily seeking substantive changes and was not prepared for the 
degree to which relationship issues were also at stake. For example, a 
concessionary demand may be seen by management as a purely eco 
nomic matter, while labor may view the demand as part of the larger 
strategy to undermine the power and legitimacy of the union.
In other cases, management primarily sought improvements in rela 
tionships and was equally unprepared for the degree to which these 
relationship changes necessarily were linked to substantive changes. 
For example, management may have initiated a joint labor-manage 
ment participative process around employee involvement only to dis 
cover that continued union and worker support for the initiative 
depended on substantive issues such as gainsharing and job security. In 
all cases, labor was faced with the complex task of not only ordering its 
priorities on substantive matters, but also assessing its priorities around 
choices of whether to pursue labor-management cooperation or to view 
management's moves as a threat to the institutional stability of the 
union.
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Since in the United States there is no well-established tradition legit 
imatizing social compacts that affirm the status of unions and the legit 
imacy of broad strategic business decisions, adding these topics to the 
negotiations agenda introduces a substantial measure of uncertainty 
and ambiguity. Not only must the parties sort out their views on mat 
ters such as seniority, wages, and job classifications, but they must also 
assess the underlying values and intentions of each other regarding the 
institutional relationship itself.
As a result of these relationship issues, when unions responded with 
a forceful rejection of proposals for rollbacks, management in turn 
exhibited a reaction that was usually stronger than the union antici 
pated. Management was frustrated that the union would not acknowl 
edge the legitimacy of the competitive pressures facing the company. 
The result was often an unanticipated escalation into a protracted con 
flict.
Thus, the outcomes of negotiations can be measured against the 
objectives of both parties, but the negotiations also produce unintended 
consequences, and these have the potential to overshadow the desired 
outcomes. These intended and unintended consequences occur with 
respect to substantive outcomes, as well as the nature of the relation 
ship.
Conclusion
This chapter is entitled, "Why Change?" which is often the first 
response of a party confronted with a change initiative. Sometimes the 
question is answered by an attempt to demonstrate that change is in 
everyone's mutual interest. At other times the question is answered 
with threats about the consequences of resisting the change. Most com 
plicated of all, there are times when threats and mutual interests 
become interwoven.
We have seen in this chapter that whatever answer is provided, plac 
ing change on the agenda initiates a negotiation process. To help 
understand this process, a set of guiding principles and frameworks has 
been highlighted. These ideas set the stage for the presentation and 
interpretation of the cases featured in this book. The principles and
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frameworks should also be helpful for generalizing about the role of 
negotiations over fundamental change in other settings.
Our main point that change affecting multiple stakeholders inevi 
tably involves negotiations is deceptively simple. Change is not 
always seen as inherently involving negotiations. Occasionally, when 
one party can fully escape the relationships, prolonged negotiations 
may be avoided. Most typically, however, some form of negotiations is 
an inevitable outcome of interactions between a party desiring change 
and a party affected by the change.
To understand the nature of these negotiations, we make the key 
assumption that employment relations are inherently mixed-motive in 
nature. Again, this is a deceptively simple point. It might seem obvious 
to hold that all relationships involve a mixture of common and compet 
ing interests. In fact, however, many parties act as though employment 
relations are either entirely cooperative or entirely conflictual in nature.
The mixed-motive assumption sets the stage for forcing and foster 
ing strategies. The inevitable conflicts in relations often prompt forcing 
strategies, while the common concerns typically underlie fostering 
strategies. A fundamental challenge, as we will see in the later chapters 
of this book, is for the parties to find means for coordinating the two 
strategies.
The strategies take on new and deeper meaning when we broaden 
the focus to include relationships as well as substantive provisions as a 
critical matter at stake in the negotiations. Treating relationships as a 
subject of bargaining is not an entirely new concept. It is rarely pre 
sented in a systematic fashion, however.
We hope that the principles and frameworks will serve as useful 
touchstones for understanding the cases in the following chapters. The 
heart of the book, of course, is the cases themselves. Today, finding 
detailed case descriptions of change initiatives is all too rare. Yet, it is 
only by tracing the twists and turns in the change process that we can 
fully appreciate why the pathways to change are so complex and why 
unintended consequences are an inevitable part of a successful journey 
to improved economic performance and robust labor-management 
relations.
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NOTES
1. In contrast to the mixed-motive assumption, some scholars and practitioners operate from 
assumptions that employment relations are inherently and primarily conflictual in nature (with a 
primary focus on the economic, social, or legal implications of the conflict). Others operate from 
assumptions that employment relations are essentially cooperative (with a primary focus on build 
ing consensus, shared vision, and the most effective organizational designs). An exclusive focus 
just on conflict or just on cooperation will bring the risk of discounting the negotiated nature of 
change.
2. For a more detailed discussion of these strategies, see Walton, Cutcher-Gershenfeld, and 
McKersie 1994.
2 
Forcing
Hard Bargaining Over Fundamental Change
This chapter examines how managements in several industries have 
employed forcing strategies in an attempt to negotiate radical shifts in 
the patterns of wage and benefit settlements, as well as increasing man 
agement control over work assignments. Given a management judg 
ment that its objectives require an attempt to force change, how does it 
formulate its negotiating objectives? What negotiating processes and 
structures does it employ to support a forcing strategy? What union and 
worker responses do these management actions elicit? And, finally, 
how does management cope with the dilemmas it encounters along the 
forcing path?
We explore these issues in three cases in which the initial forcing 
began during the 1980s: (1) an auto parts firm (AP Parts), where man 
agement's campaign to reduce costs led to a bitter strike; (2) a labor 
dispute at several International Paper (IP) mills, focusing on confronta 
tions at the Jay, Maine facility during 1987 and 1988; and (3) a 
regional freight railroad (Guilford) that used a series of confrontations 
to restructure labor agreements and union representation.
Many labor-management negotiations today involve journeys down 
the forcing path. This chapter illustrates a variety of ways to travel 
down this path. Among the ways that management signaled forcing 
strategies in our cases are: beginning collective bargaining with 
demands for extensive changes, threatening and actually moving work 
from one location to another, emphasizing customer cost pressures, 
soliciting community support for its cause, utilizing replacement work 
ers during a strike, and unilaterally imposing a contract on a union. We 
also find instances of uncharacteristically tight supervision on the shop 
floor and direct communications with workers in effect bypassing the 
union. The cases illustrate the reduced effectiveness of the strike as a 
forcing tactic for unions, as well as the emergence of alternate 
responses available to unions, including not striking when it is
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expected, working to rule, soliciting community and government sup 
port, and mobilizing other locals and even other international unions.
The cases differ on a number of key dimensions as summarized in 
the following chart.
Key Aspects of Cases Featuring Forcing
AP Parts
Management 
Agenda
Union Actions 
at Deadline
Management Actions 
at Deadline
Status of Replacement 
Workers at Conclusion 
of Negotiations
Substantive Changes
Relationship with 
Union
Relationship with 
Workers
Reduce 
compensation 
costs
Work to Rulea
Replacements3
Terminated
Minimal
Restored
Restored
Jay
Reduce 
compensation 
costs; increase 
productivity
Strike
Replacements
No contract 
signed; 
replacements 
retained
Large
Decertification
Not clear
Guilford
Increase 
productivity
Strike
Replacements
Placed in reserve 
status
Large
One union 
established (UTU) 
for all craftsb
Deteriorated
a. At the deadline, the union did not strike; however, several weeks later a strike was called and
management brought in replacements.
b. Although eventually the various craft unions regained representation rights.
The three cases split on the approach taken to reducing unit labor 
costs, with two focusing primarily on compensation levels and one on 
productivity, e.g., work rules (though all of the negotiations involved 
some compensation and some productivity issues). At the deadline, the 
tactics adopted by the parties differed, though all the parties engaged in 
confrontation tactics that escalated to the point that relationships with 
the unions were severely ruptured. In the post strike period, however, 
the cases varied greatly in the extent to which working relations were 
restored.
Taken together, the forcing cases illustrate most of the hard bargain 
ing tactics common in the present era. They also illustrate the range of
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possible dynamics and outcomes-suggesting some of the complexity 
associated with forcing strategies.
THE UNFOLDING OF A FORCING STRATEGY 
AP Parts and UAW Local 14
The case of AP Parts (AP) begins in 1984 with management's initia 
tive aimed at forcing deep substantive changes. 1 The company was 
apparently convinced that it needed substantial concessions to meet the 
economic pressures of supplying the auto industry. Anticipating strenu 
ous resistance from the union, the company decided to recruit and train 
replacement workers. For its part, the union decided to throw manage 
ment off balance by conducting an in-plant strategy when the contract 
expired. Eventually, relations became so strained that the union struck, 
and only after a bitter seven-month strike were the parties able to sign a 
new contract.
Significant Features
The AP case illustrates many dynamics common to forcing strate 
gies.
  Each of the parties in the AP case came to believe that its organiza 
tional survival was at stake. Management's own economic analysis 
indicated it could not compete without concessions by labor. Labor 
saw threats to its survival in the ambitious and extensive nature of 
management's demands and the way in which they were 
"dropped" on labor accompanied by handbills distributed in the 
plant by supervisors.
 The AP company derived bargaining power from its ability to 
transfer operations.
  The union's response blunted the initiatives of management and 
ultimately led to the rehiring of the strikers.
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The dispute in this negotiation took on broader significance for 
management and unions elsewhere.
Community leaders offered their services, but their effectiveness 
was undercut when they came be seen by management as an ally 
with labor.
AP management failed to negotiate a plan for the implementation 
of the work cell structure it won in formal contract negotiations.
The acrimony associated with severe confrontational bargaining 
tactics continued to live on after the settlement.
The severity of the conflict made both parties eager to negotiate the 
next contract early and with minimal changes.
After the dispute the parties normalized the previous relationship, 
but did not embrace labor-management cooperation and worker 
participation.
Background
AP Parts has produced mufflers in the Toledo area since 1927. For 
most of its existence, the company has produced mufflers for cars and 
trucks in the aftermarket, as distinct from serving as a supplier to origi 
nal equipment manufacturers (OEM). Although the firm was under the 
guidance of its founder and owner, John Goerlich, for many years, it 
has been bought and sold at least three times in the last decade. In addi 
tion to its home manufacturing plant in Toledo, the firm operated facil 
ities in Michigan and North Carolina and, as of the early 1990s, was in 
a start-up phase for a facility in Indiana.
The stamped muffler produced by AP Parts represents an important 
and relatively recent technical innovation in the industry. While a con 
ventional automobile muffler typically has as many as seventeen pieces 
to be individually assembled, a comparable stamped muffler has only 
four pieces. More than the savings in assembly cost, however, the chief 
virtue of the stamped process is its flexibility. The company can 
quickly develop dies that are custom tailored to diverse applications.
UAW Local 14, an amalgamated local, incorporated the AP Parts 
bargaining unit and three other units, the largest of which is a General
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Motors drive-train plant. The local was established in 1938. The histor 
ical relationship between the AP Parts and the UAW was a traditional 
"New Deal" set of interactions with arm's length collective bargain 
ing and formal contract administration. The fact that the local also con 
tained a facility owned by an original equipment manufacturer 
(General Motors) helped ensure that the tone for the relationship and 
the substantive issues in collective bargaining were closely tied to 
negotiations between the UAW and the OEMs.
Inability to Adjust Within a Traditional, Arm's-Length 
Social Contract
During the two years prior to the 1984 strike, the facility came under 
increasing economic pressure and made a number of adjustments all 
within the rubric of a traditional, arm's-length social contract. In 1982, 
the firm lost a major customer Sears for whom it had been a sup 
plier of replacement mufflers. Subsequently, there was a round of con 
cession bargaining that included a 50 cents-per-hour reduction in 
wages. As well, a quality of worklife (QWL) process was initiated in 
1982. These two contrasting responses of contending and cooperating 
were conceived and implemented solely as incremental adjustments 
within the existing labor-management relationship. They were not con 
ceived as part of a change process leading to a new relationship with 
labor.
Both the wage reduction and the QWL efforts proved inadequate for 
the pressures facing the firm. The Toledo facility experienced further 
financial losses in 1983, creating pressure for yet further cost reduc 
tions. While the QWL program generated suggestions from some 
employees, it did not generate sufficient ideas for management to see 
this effort as a vehicle for addressing the competitive pressures. The 
union, which had mixed feelings about the QWL idea in the first place, 
concluded that management was not sufficiently committed to the pro 
gram, and it chose not to endorse the QWL concept. Instead, it 
remained neutral neither opposing nor supporting the process.
After the loss of the Sears business, management decided to move 
the aftermarket work to a smaller, nonunion facility in Goldsboro, 
North Carolina. The Toledo facility was then dedicated solely to pro 
ducing for OEMs, which represented the most competitive part of the
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industry. This placed great pressures on cost, quality, and delivery per 
formance. Thus, coming into the 1984 negotiations, the company was 
looking for broad changes in the collective bargaining agreement, 
while the union membership felt they had already made substantial 
concessions.
Dynamics of the Case
Building on the above history and context, our analysis of this case 
has been organized into two sections. In the first section, we examine 
the 1984 collective bargaining negotiations, which led to the collapse 
of the relationship. We trace the dynamics associated with a bitter, 
seven-month strike. By the end of this strike, fundamental expectations 
had been violated with respect to all stakeholders management, 
labor, the community, and customers and the traditional, arm's- 
length mode of interaction had been replaced by a form of armed war 
fare. Our analysis will be highly detailed in order to capture the micro 
process by which a contentious negotiation deteriorates. While there is, 
of course, a long history of contentious strikes in this country, the high 
profile of such strikes during the 1980s and the 1990s makes this 
examination pertinent.
Following the strike, the parties (with new faces on both sides of the 
table) entered into a process of reconstructing the relationship. For a 
variety of reasons, the parties ended up recreating a traditional, arm's- 
length mode of interaction. This set of relations provided a useful foun 
dation for subsequently negotiating an unprecedented five-year con 
tract and reestablishing a traditional process of give-and-take between 
labor and management on matters of contract administration.
As we present a prognosis in the final section, we note certain 
sources of tension associated with attempting to sustain a traditional 
arm's-length social contract in a context of severe competitive pres 
sures. These include issues associated with the greenfield facility in 
North Carolina, the management philosophy regarding labor-manage 
ment relations in the Toledo facility, and the turnover of leadership 
within the local union.
Forcing 21
The Collapse of a Relationship
The 1984 negotiations between AP Parts and the UAW involved 
deep conflicts over wage, work-rule, and benefit issues. But, as we will 
see, the interactions were more than a ritualized haggling over specific 
contract language. From the outset, basic expectations of all parties 
about the negotiations process were violated. Further, there were 
deeper interests at stake for both sides. For management, it was the 
very survival of the plant. For the union, its very institutional legiti 
macy was under attack. These violations of expectations and the result 
ing deeper undertones of conflict are critical to understanding how a 
traditional relationship deteriorated to the point of armed warfare.
The Company Takes the Initiative
From the outset, management signaled to the union that this negotia 
tion was going to be a departure from their past pattern of negotiations. 
Procedurally, the company broke from the familiar mode whereby the 
union makes most of the opening demands and the employer refrains 
from communicating directly with the union members. As one union 
leader characterized the opening of the 1984 negotiations:
It was at the opening meeting that they dropped the entire pro 
posal on us. We weren't expecting anything like that. At the same 
time they had supervisors in the plant passing out handbills stating 
that "we are committed to staying in Toledo."
Both the large set of initial employer demands and the active use of 
supervisors to communicate directly with employees violated tradi 
tional norms that had governed collective bargaining in past years. 
Management's ambitious proposals clearly surprised the union. 
According to a dismayed union official, the workers were faced with 
the following demands from AP Parts:
The company requested $5.84 in wage concessions, replacement 
of the individual incentive system with a measured day work sys 
tem, elimination of the thirty-and-out provision, freedom to sub 
contract, introduction of new job classifications, and the 
reorganization of the plant around work cells.
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This opening round of bargaining in effect represented a key pivotal 
event, where fundamental substantive changes were placed on the 
table, calling into question the social contract between the parties. With 
respect to the substantive demands, the bargaining was explicit and the 
potential change deep. With respect to the labor-management relation 
ship, the company was engaging in a tacit form of bargaining over the 
rules of the game. In effect, the company signaled that these interac 
tions would have to be different from the prior negotiations that had led 
to concessions and the QWL initiative.
The Union's Response: Counterforcing
By departing from the usual norms of interaction, the company was 
signaling the depth of the changes it needed. Whether anticipated or 
not, the effect of such departures is usually to put the other side off bal 
ance. The union attempted to interpret or make sense of the company's 
shifting behaviors as a way of reestablishing stability. Thus, every 
action taken by AP Parts was carefully studied by the union to assess 
whether the crisis was as severe as the company suggested or whether 
the severity had been exaggerated in order to wrest deeper concessions 
from the workforce and undermine the union. The fact that several 
other auto supply firms in other parts of the country were actively 
attempting to weaken or escape from collective bargaining provided a 
context in which this was a plausible interpretation. 2
The union considered the company's strike preparations a critical 
signal of the company's intentions. As one union leader recalled:
They erected a chain link fence around the plant on the same day 
that we sat down to begin negotiations. There had not been one 
prior to that. The company took down a sign outside the personnel 
office indicating there was no hiring and replaced it with a sign 
requesting employment applications.
Nuckles Security [a private security firm] brought in a van load of 
big, ugly men in uniforms. They tried to put fear in the guys, but 
our men were the wrong people for that. They got a reaction  
they got a lot of hate, but our people were the wrong guys for fear.
Once the union decided that its own institutional security might be 
at risk, it began counteracting management's initiatives. One union 
official characterized their strategy as follows:
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We played tit for tat. We reacted to what they did. If they sent a 
four-page letter to all employees, we would come back with a 
five-page letter.
By the contract expiration date of March 1, 1984, the drama was 
well established. The company wanted the union to take their final 
offer to the membership. The union refused to recommend this pack 
age. The company requested that a vote be held anyway, which 
occurred on March 5th. The package was rejected by a vote of 425 to 
30.
The Union's Surprise Tactic at the Deadline
When the contract expiration date arrived, the union anticipated that 
the company would be expecting a strike. It came to this conclusion on 
the basis of management's actions, such as installing a security fence 
around the property, advertising for replacement workers, and hiring a 
security firm associated with union decertification efforts in other loca 
tions. As a tactical response, then, the union instructed the workforce to 
show up for work, ready to continue working under the terms of the 
company's final offer.
Apparently, the union's decision caught the AP management by sur 
prise. When workers arrived for work, they reportedly found the secu 
rity guards hurriedly packing up food, cots, and other supplies that 
might have been used to sustain a replacement workforce confined 
overnight in the factory. This time, it was the union's departure from 
established norms that brought tactical advantage and that marked a 
second major pivotal event in the negotiations.
At this point, both sides clearly were pursuing forcing strategies. 
Each made choices at critical moments (the opening of the negotiations 
for management and the expiration of the contract for the union) aimed 
at gaining leverage via distributive bargaining and designed to increase 
uncertainty for the other party.
Increasing Tensions Under Counterposed Forcing Strategies
Although the union members continued to work, relations were very 
tense. For example, security guards regularly video-taped all activities, 
and workers responded with taunts. Additionally, the workers were 
paid at the rate of the company's last offer, which involved a cut in
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wages and benefits of $5.84 per hour and the imposition of new shop 
rules giving the company more freedom in its utilization of workers. 
During the first month, over 150 workers were laid off (bringing plant 
employment to 232), and disciplinary notices were given to over 80 
employees for violations of the new work rules. In all, over 200 repri 
mands were given to employees during the three-week period after the 
contract expiration.
In response to what it regarded as "surface bargaining" and other 
violations of the National Labor Relations Act, the union filed an unfair 
labor practice (ULP) charge with the National Labor Relations Board 
on March 22, 1984. 3 The NLRB response to the union's charge was 
delayed, reportedly because of the White House's failure to appoint an 
interim replacement for the board's general counsel. Still, on April 30, 
1984, the regional director of the NLRB rejected the union's ULP 
charge.4
The third pivotal event occurred when the union indicated it was on 
strike after learning of the NLRB's action. The employer then began 
bringing in workers to maintain production. Approximately 125 picket 
ing workers met 40 replacement workers as they arrived at the plant. 
After various episodes of punctured tires and broken windshields, a 
court order was issued limiting union picketing. At this point, the strike 
was fully underway with management seeking to run the plant with 
replacement workers and with the union intent on disrupting such 
efforts.
Each side sought to weaken the other. Management put pressure on 
the workers, while the union responded with further unfair labor prac 
tice charges. Both sets of actions further increased tensions. Continued 
escalation was not, however, inevitable. For example, a different deci 
sion by the NLRB might have set the stage for a different sequence of 
events. If the NLRB had ruled for the union, the company might have 
resorted to a lockout, or it might have taken steps to resolve the negoti 
ations without a strike.
Tactical Dynamics Contributing to the Deterioration 
of Social Relations
On May 12, 1984, a federal mediator brought the two sides together 
for the first time in two months. There was a news blackout for three 
days as the parties met. However, the parties did not come to agree 
ment and this initiative collapsed.
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Meanwhile, the conflicts between picketing employees, security 
guards, and replacement workers became even sharper. In addition to 
daily taunting, stone throwing, and other exchanges, the union staged a 
number of public demonstrations outside the facility. The largest dem 
onstration occurred on May 22, 1984, following a company announce 
ment on the previous day of a reward of $10,000 for any information 
concerning vandalism during the strike.
The demonstration involved approximately 3,000 people and turned 
violent when a group of demonstrators attempted to crash the plant 
gate with an eighteen-wheel semi truck. Tear gas canisters were used 
by the police to break up the protest, which in turn generated a public 
outcry (since some of the canisters had warnings on them that they 
could be deadly). One union official reflected on the experience and the 
overall strike as follows:
This was a war, full of wounds. Vietnam was easy compared to 
this. I was over there. This was like a goddamn tour of duty in a 
war. Imagine months and months with no income. We had suicide, 
alcoholism, and divorce.
The demonstration made vivid the degree to which the relationship 
(and hence a shared understanding of the social contract) had deterio 
rated, foreclosing any substantive discussions. Formal negotiations 
were officially broken off and the parties settled into a war of attrition.
The Parties'Inability to Reconstruct Social Relations
In mid-June, the company proposed to the union that secret talks 
begin at a site away from Toledo in Ann Arbor, Michigan. The com 
pany also changed law firms. The union agreed to the new initiative, 
despite its concern that the new law firm had a reputation for providing 
advice on union avoidance. Meetings began in Ann Arbor with a tone 
that was open and informal, signaled in part by the casual attire of par 
ticipants on both sides.
At the same time, however, the new law firm indicated that it would 
not honor any existing tentative agreements; the negotiations were to 
start from scratch. Such an approach served to exacerbate the distribu 
tive elements already dominant in the negotiations. For example, the 
company brought large binders with proposed contract language 
changes, each reportedly containing only small word changes from
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earlier demands. The union expressed resentment about the extensive 
time devoted at the beginning of each meeting to pulling out old pages 
and updating the binders with new ones. In response, the union handed 
out its own large binders full of its own proposed changes. The fight 
then shifted to a debate over whose binders would be the point of refer 
ence for discussions. By mid August, this new round of talks had come 
to a halt. It is not clear how serious the company was in seeking resolu 
tion at this stage, but certainly the tactics with the binders and related 
actions blocked communications and, hence, substantive discussions.
A Competition for Community Support
The growing tensions between the parties increasingly spilled over 
into the community. The Toledo community had seen its share of plant 
closings and industrial disinvestment, and its citizens had become con 
cerned about the deteriorating relations between AP Parts and the 
UAW. Each of the parties, early in the negotiations, sought ways to use 
community concern to its advantage in gaining leverage over the other. 
Thus, the company advertised in the local newspaper that it was com 
mitted to Toledo, and the union responded with full page advertise 
ments of its own, proclaiming "The Truth About the AP Negotiations."
Prior to the strike, but after the expiration of the contract, the parties 
continued their competition for community support. In public state 
ments, management representatives indicated that, without major con 
cessions, the company might have to close the facility. In response, 
Toledo's mayor, Donna Owens, called for a labor-management citizens 
committee, but the company indicated that it would be unwilling to 
turn the negotiations over to such a group. It did, however, send a long 
editorial on April 1st to the Toledo paper explaining its position.
In this piece, the company explained that there had been a 40 per 
cent reduction in exhaust industry production from 1973 to 1981, 
which drove the first round of concessions at AP Parts. AP Parts then 
explained the shift of its Toledo facility to production for the OEM 
market. It argued that this location was within 250 miles of 60 percent 
of all North American automobile assembly plants. Further, the com 
pany projected a loss of $10 million, which it explained as follows:
The hourly labor costs and the restrictive collective bargaining 
agreement are the two items most responsible for our predica-
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ment. . . . We are now faced, quite literally, with the question of 
whether the Toledo plant can survive. Survival is possible only 
after major surgery the total and complete overhaul of the wage 
and benefit package and a full rewrite of our collective bargaining 
agreement.
The director of UAW Region 2B, which included Local 14, 
responded on April 8 with an editorial that attributed the economic 
losses to start-up problems with a new assembly process, misquotes on 
bids, the slow development of new process controls, and the use of 
unsuitable steel. Further, he stated that AP Parts was departing from a 
forty-year history of collective bargaining in which "gains have been 
made painstakingly through honest, good-faith negotiations." He stated 
that: "It is not concessions that AP seeks here, it is the demolition of 
the union contract."
In the middle of the various exchanges, AP Parts was awarded a $20 
million contract to make mufflers for General Motors the largest con 
tract in the company's history. Production was scheduled to begin in 
January 1985. The company used this news in the battle for community 
support. It announced that its successful bid on the contract was based 
on the "terms of the new agreement at the Toledo plant." The company 
also held the GM contract up as evidence that it wanted to remain in 
Toledo.
In addition to serving as a potential partner on a partisan basis with 
one side or another, the community had its own independent interests 
(centering on labor peace). Highly visible violence and a festering war 
of attrition were directly contrary to the desired economic climate. 
Hence, after the mass demonstration on May 22, 1984, the mayor of 
Toledo appointed a five-member community committee, which 
included representatives from the Toledo Area Labor-Management 
Committee (a longstanding community organization consisting of 
many top local union and management leaders). In announcing the 
establishment of the committee, the mayor stated:in the paper:
We've reached the point where this is no longer a labor-manage 
ment dispute. We've been working hard to turn the image of the 
city around.
The entry of a potentially neutral third party frequently represents a 
pivotal event in negotiations. In the best case, the third party can be 
instrumental in bringing the bargaining process closer to a settlement.
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It is also possible, for the third party to become another vehicle for 
contention, which is what took place in this case. A union official 
described the situation as follows:
At one point the area labor-management group recommended a 
settlement. [The recommended settlement] had many of the com 
pany demands, but still was strong on cost-of-living and on the 
thirty-and-out pension. We instantly bought it we would take a 
chance on it. The panel consisted of many prominent people from 
labor and management in the community. Management turned it 
down. That helped our image.
The union's rapid acceptance and the company's rejection served to 
undercut the potential for the area labor-management committee to be 
an effective third party. Instead, their position became a new element in 
the parties' contest for partners as they battled one another.
The Management of Internal Differences During the Strike
The impact of the strike also rippled through the internal ranks of 
both the company and the union. Although public information on this 
point is scarce, at least one of the principal owners of the company sold 
his shares as a result of the festering conflict. As well, members of the 
management community in Toledo increasingly separated themselves 
from the management of this firm. For example, management as well 
as union members of the area labor-management committee expressed 
frustration over the rejection of their proposal. This division within the 
management community was consistent with the union's forcing strat 
egy it hoped to separate AP management from others in the manage 
ment community.
While management sought to similarly divide the union, the local 
was able to blunt such efforts by reaching beyond the region to the 
international union. In particular, the UAW's regional director (who 
was deeply involved in the negotiations) made the case to the interna 
tional union and the larger labor movement that the AP Parts strike was 
a bellwether in the region: if the UAW won, it would temper the 
actions of other employers; if the employer won, it would open the way 
for similar strategies in other locations. In response, union members 
from elsewhere in the UAW and from other unions all over the United 
States sent food and money to help the striking workers.
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Perhaps the most vivid example of the way the union sought to 
maintain internal solidarity took place in the late summer of 1984. In a 
coordinated move, UAW Vice-President Donald Ephlin and UAW 
Vice-President Stephen Yokich broke off their national negotiations 
with General Motors and the Ford Motor Company, respectively, to 
join the picket line in Toledo in front of the AP Parts plant. Needless to 
say, the move was not only instrumental in managing internal differ 
ences within the union, it was also a multilateral development in the 
sense that it brought the AP situation to the attention of two primary 
customers of AP Parts.
Resolution of the 1984 Strike
In September, the mayor again sought to bring the parties together  
but she quickly denounced the company owners for refusing to meet 
with her and, at the same time, not empowering their representatives to 
come to a settlement. On September 19, 1984, the company announced 
that the $20 million contract with GM would go to its nonunion plant 
in North Carolina due to the difficulties of expanding production in 
Toledo. Talks did not resume until the very end of October, when the 
union indicated a willingness to consider the company's demand for a 
work-cell concept. Amnesty for striking workers then emerged as a key 
stumbling block.
Throughout the months of November and December, talks would 
begin and then break off. At one point, in mid-December, the union 
presented the last company offer to the membership, which included 
amnesty for all but twenty-one union members. This contract was 
rejected in a vote of 225 to 5. The company charged that the vote was 
"a terrible breach of faith" and again broke off negotiations.
While the plant continued to operate during the strike, inventories 
became depleted and customers began to question AP Parts regarding 
its ability to make deliveries. Ultimately, however, the event that pre 
cipitated the end of the strike was a petition filed on January 31, 1985, 
by the Maritime Engineers Beneficial Association for a representation 
election. While it is hard to assess how significant this was to the firm, 
shortly afterwards the company did agree to a settlement with the 
union that included some wage and benefit concessions, the addition of 
a plant productivity bonus system, a two-year freeze on the cost-of-liv-
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ing increase, some work-rule changes providing more flexibility for 
temporary job transfers, language regarding the use of a team-based 
work-cell structure for welding, retention of holidays and retirement 
benefits, and an agreement that no worker would be fired for any 
picket-line activity. The replacement workers were terminated at the 
same time. This contract was ratified by a vote of 254 to 72.
The Reconstruction of the Relationship
The resolution of the 1984 strike marked the conclusion of a sus 
tained period of deterioration in the relationship between the UAW and 
AP Parts. It was, however, an ambiguous resolution. With respect to the 
social contract between the company and the union, there was evidence 
to suggest that the agreement reflected the successful application of 
union leverage in a context where each side had inflicted extensive 
harm on the other. There were no pronouncements regarding what kind 
of a relationship the company and the union desired each side just 
agreed to sign a contract. With respect to the relationship between the 
company and its employees, the situation was equally ambiguous. Any 
company claim to mutuality with its employees was undercut by its use 
of replacement workers. Within the union, the management of internal 
differences had forged a high level of internal solidarity, though here 
too there were many people who had suffered financially, losing their 
cars and even in some cases their homes. Thus, it was unclear what 
future claims the union might be able to make regarding its members' 
commitment to concerted activity.
De-Escalation and the Arrival of New Personalities
Reportedly, shop-floor relations remained tense for more than a year 
after the return to work. Incidents that took place in the heat of the 
strike did not immediately fade from memory. Little disagreements 
would apparently flare up, driven by feelings not far below the surface 
among those who had been involved with the strike.
For some workers and most of the supervisors, this tension was too 
much to take. Within a few years after the strike, the lower-level man-
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agement group had almost entirely turned over and many workers had 
left. As well, turnover occurred among some key higher-level manag 
ers, such as the plant manager and the personnel director.
Within the union, a new group of leaders was elected to office on a 
platform oriented around rebuilding labor-management relations. 
Thus, just two years after the strike, there were new faces on both sides 
of the table. As difficult as the strike had been, the arrival of new lead 
ers set the stage for an affirmative step toward the reconstruction of the 
relationship.
A Successful, Traditional Negotiation
In 1987, the relationship between the company and the union took a 
significant turn. As the current personnel director recalls:
March 1988 would have been the expiration of the contract. The 
plant manager and I contacted the local president to try to get 
early negotiations. We got together with the union and created an 
imaginary deadline. . . . We agreed, let's go for two weeks. If we 
don't reach it by then, all bets are off.
The company began the negotiations with relatively few demands, in 
contrast to the set of sweeping issues that it had placed on the table a 
few years earlier. As the personnel director commented:
We decided not to change any of the contract language. There was 
nothing there that either side could not live with. Negotiations 
basically revolved around economics. There were some minor 
language changes. We spent the first week on language and the 
second week on economics.
Within higher management, the approach of the new personnel director 
and the new plant manager was greeted with skepticism. As one man 
ager commented, "Our people downtown, who were intimately 
involved with the strike, did not think we could do it."
For the union, the entire tone of the negotiations stood in strong con 
trast to the experiences a few years earlier. One international union 
official recalled:
Last June [1987] the company approached us about opening nego 
tiations early. Ford and GM were pressuring them to have one 
year of inventory going into bargaining or they would pull all 
work. The company said, "Let's get an early agreement, with the
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incentive that the wage increase could take effect early." Here it 
was two years later and it was like old traditional bargaining. Each 
day we accomplished something. Since the settlement, employ 
ment has been up and new work is coming in.
Despite the contentious strike, in which many traditional norms of col 
lective bargaining were violated, both sides were apparently able to 
reestablish traditional modes of interaction just two years later. 
Undoubtedly, the change in the management ranks was a key factor, 
but so too was the willingness of the new individuals to engage in give- 
and-take.
The Elements of a Reestablished Traditional Social Contract
Even in the early 1990s, many years afterwards, the strike still cast a 
shadow over the company and the union. For example, one manager 
noted that:
The media will not let us forget about the strike. If we get in the 
newspaper for something good, the last two paragraphs of the arti 
cle will mention something about the strike.
A key question, therefore, was whether the parties had put those ten 
sions behind them, or whether they would resurface in some new way. 
Given that the parties appeared to have reverted back to a traditional, 
arm's-length relationship, what would prevent them from entering into 
another round of escalating conflict?
A close look suggests that certain aspects of the relationship were 
different from what they had been prior to the strike. For example, a 
union official reported:
The level of information sharing is much higher now. The union 
officials will often be called in to meet with customers, and they 
all go through the plant together. Of course, Ford and GM are 
demanding it. GM and Ford want to know how AP and the UAW 
are getting along.
Clearly, this reported change was primarily externally driven. Inter 
nally, the work-cell structure, which was a key issue during the strike, 
had not been fully implemented, primarily because the team-based sys 
tem was not in place.
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Indeed, many features of the case suggested little shift towards a 
new relationship. Consider, for example the way the personnel director 
characterized management's style:
Our plant manager and I hold that we should be running the com 
pany, not the union. I guess you would call it a more traditional 
approach. I've been through all those programs like zero-defects, 
management by objectives, quality circles, and on and on. They 
are all gone.
The traditional approach taking shape within management during 
the early 1990s was matched by developments within the union. The 
union leadership elected following the strike was replaced by a slate of 
leaders who advocated an arm's-length relationship with the company. 
Many of the new leaders had served on the bargaining committee dur 
ing the 1984 strike. Thus, both parties were moving more solidly into 
arm's-length, adversarial roles.
Analysis
An observer of the AP story would have to conclude that the yield 
for the parties was rather low, given all of the resources invested in the 
forcing campaign and the lingering resentment embedded in the social 
relationships. The outcomes are summarized in the following chart.
Thus, the AP Parts story affords a window into a classic deteriora 
tion and collapse of a labor-management relationship. Because each 
side had fundamental interests at stake, initial tactical moves took on 
great significance, and an escalation of conflict ensued. The escalation 
was fueled as each side sought to derive power by breaking from tradi 
tional norms of negotiations. The union's ultimate decision to strike, 
management's use of replacement workers, and the tit-for-tat tactics 
(e.g., around the binders), all afforded tactical advantage, but also 
served to erode any vestiges of a relationship upon which a settlement 
might be constructed.
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Significant Outcomes—AP Parts
Substantive 
outcomes
Two major rounds
of wage and benefit
concessions
Management- 
union relations
Movement from an
adversarial
relationship, to
armed warfare, to a
reestablished
adversarial
relationship
Management- 
employee relations
Limited
cooperation with a
QWL program
Complete collapse
of working relations
during the strike
(with the use of
replacement
workers)
Reestablished
management
control system
Other outcomes
Mutually costly
strike
Turnover of union
leadership and
management
personnel
Explanation for the Standoff
The best way to characterize the above balance sheet, in terms of 
short-run costs and gains, is that all sides lost. Basically, the stalemate 
can be explained in terms of a relatively balanced power equation. 
Management gained leverage by its ability to transfer work to a new 
union facility and to hire replacements when the union struck. For its 
side, the union was able to mobilize pressure more generally from the 
union movement and the community. Quite significantly, when the set 
tlement was finally reached the union was able to secure its demand 
that the strike replacements be terminated a position that the unions 
in the other two forcing cases (as we will see) were not able to sustain.
The question needs to be asked as to why the parties were not able 
to negotiate an accommodation to the new economic realities, espe 
cially given their joint efforts during the early 1980s. It should be noted 
that, similar to many companies that started to experience cost pres 
sures in the 1980s, AP Parts management set in motion several pro 
grams for closing the gap (for example, QWL and a round of wage 
concessions). Then, as the competitive standing of the company wors 
ened, management unveiled its proposals for a reduction in hourly 
compensation costs of almost $6.00, which may or may not have been 
designed to precipitate a confrontation with the union.
Significantly, the earlier concessions and QWL effort at adjustment 
did not pave the way for the round of hard bargaining that we exam-
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ined. Rather, the early adjustments apparently served to immunize the 
union leadership and the rank and file from accepting arguments about 
the need for additional changes. A response that "we have already 
given" often develops in labor-management relationships when man 
agement comes to the table with additional concessionary proposals. 
Thus, the stage was set for a showdown.
Alternate Scenarios
The question should be asked whether the parties in the AP Parts 
case could have arrived at a new platform for change without all of the 
turmoil inherent in unrestrained forcing. We attempt to answer this 
important question in terms of several key choices made by the parties.
First, should the company have presented a more modest proposal 
than the $5.84 reduction in compensation costs and other contractual 
changes as a way of easing into an adjustment program? Certainly 
making a credible case for such deep wage concessions would first 
require a justification of the company's strategic decision to shift from 
the aftermarket to supplying OEMs. The company saw this as an 
essential business decision, while the union considered it to be a power 
tactic. Under these circumstances, if management's business calcula 
tions were legitimate, then it must have felt that it had no choice but to 
open bargaining with an extreme demand. However, management did 
not provide the union with sufficient financial information to justify the 
claim, which led the union to interpret the bargaining position as a 
challenge to the legitimacy of the union.
Second, once the bargaining had begun, could the parties have 
altered their tit-for-tat sequence of tactics at any point (e.g., the battle 
of letters to employees, the one-upmanship of elaborate binders, the 
use of rallies by the union, and diversion of work by the company)? It 
is unlikely, given the political realities within the union and the esprit 
de corps within management that the leadership of either side could 
have backed away from an all-out fight.
Third, given the onset of what all sides saw as a holy war, was there 
a way for the parties to save face and end the hostilities? Possibly. 
When community leadership offered to mediate, it was probably a mis 
take for the company to dismiss the offer out of hand. Certainly, the 
company did not want to lose control or to have a settlement dictated
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by a third party, but it could have entered into discussions, and the 
agreement that eventually emerged might have been reached sooner. 
Similarly, there is evidence to suggest that the NLRB decision could 
have favored the union, which would have provided another opportu 
nity for resolution.
Throughout the escalating conflict, each side made assumptions 
about the motives of the other. Due to the strained communications and 
low levels of trust, these assumptions were rarely checked directly. 
Rather, related incidents were treated as corroboration, and each then 
felt even more justified in its forcing strategy. Since management was 
the moving party seeking dramatic concessions, the burden fell on 
management to persuade the union of the merits of its position. Mere 
claims of financial necessity were not effective a fairly dramatic quid 
pro quo involving real power sharing in exchange for concessions 
would have likely been required. Thus, management had two real alter 
natives in this case force dramatic concessions sure to alienate the 
union and its members (which is what occurred) or enlist the union 
(and/or its members) as full partners in facing a competitive crisis.
Future Possibilities
The first point to note is that the AP Parts/UAW relationship reverted 
back to a traditional pattern of interaction, and this occurred with sur 
prising speed. Instrumental in this reconstruction of the relationship 
was new leadership at the table as well as customer pressure for labor 
stability. Since the reconstruction occurred around a traditional rela 
tionship, however, it remained to be seen if this would be sufficient to 
meet management's long-term needs regarding cost and flexibility, as 
well as labor's long-term needs regarding employment security and 
institutional stability.
One aspect of the relationship, however, will be fundamentally dif 
ferent in the years to come. In the early 1990s, the company purchased 
and restored an auto parts facility in Indiana capable of producing muf 
flers. New employees were offered a benefit package and a participa 
tive system of work organization designed to maintain a nonunion 
status. While the company did not link this acquisition to the future of 
the Toledo plant, the presence of a nearby nonunion facility clearly was 
an ominous development for the union.
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Several other factors may be sources of instability-the parties face 
continued customer pressures on cost, quality, and schedule; manage 
ment has increased its strategic options with the above-mentioned 
greenfield facility; and the union has reemphasized its solidarity and 
willingness to confront management. Yet these same circumstances 
may also provide each side with the impetus to take each other seri 
ously. The question that remains is whether they will be able to attend 
sufficiently to one another's interests within a traditional social con 
tract.
Thus from a short-run perspective, the AP Parts story requires a 
sober recognition of the high costs. However, from a longer-run point 
of view, the possibility of more fundamental changes may be present. 
Certainly, the lesson has been learned by the parties that the process of 
adjustment to new economic realties has to be conducted in a manner 
different from their escalation saga of the 1980s.
A MUTUALLY COSTLY DISPUTE 
International Paper, Jay, Maine, 1987-1988
Contract negotiations between International Paper (IP) management 
and the two locals of the United Paperworkers International Union 
(UPIU) at Jay, Maine during 1987-1988 were characterized by an unre 
strained forcing campaign that was costly to both parties. 5 The negotia 
tions involved a seventeen-month strike, which ended in November 
1988 when labor abandoned its demands and accepted even less-favor 
able terms than it had voted down seven months earlier. In the first few 
months after the strike ended, only about 100 strikers returned to the 
Jay mill, filling only those positions opened by turnover of the perma 
nent replacements hired by IP during the strike. The international 
union appeared to be weakened and divided in the aftermath of the 
strike. The ultimate blow for the union occurred at a subsequent decer 
tification election in which the UPIU was defeated. As of 1994 the 
plant was still nonunion.
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Significant Features
The Jay case illustrates a number of facets that are often present 
when forcing takes on an unrestrained character, specifically:
  Despite pooling and linking of separate mill negotiations by the 
union, the company still had only a fraction of capacity tied up at 
the locations affected by the various strike and lockout actions.
  The corporate campaign represented a multifaceted asset for the 
union.
  The company's replacement tactic led some strikers to break ranks.
  The International union was unable to expand beyond the initial 
pool of locals willing to support the strike.
 Community, state, and national politics become entwined in the 
labor dispute.
  The resulting hostility on both sides contributed to an escalation 
that did not serve the interests of either side.
With respect to outcomes, the Jay case can be distinguished from AP 
Parts in a number of respects. First, the union, UPIU, lost out com 
pletely in the Jay mill as a result of the power struggle. Second, while 
the AP Parts hostilities were focused on just one plant, Jay was one of 
four IP plants involved in this episode of protracted conflict. Third, 
while at AP Parts the UAW exhibited considerable internal solidarity, 
the Jay episode was characterized by considerable division within the 
union. Our analysis will attempt to explain these contrasts as well as 
management's strategy, the union's strategic response, and the out 
come. We also describe the implementing tactics and the process 
dynamics.
Background
IP's Jay mill is located on the Androscoggin River in western Maine. 
In 1987 the mill employed 1,200 people in a 5,000-person town. This 
region is not the vacation part of Maine; western Maine's economy is 
depressed by the industrial decline of New England and largely
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untouched by the high-tech boom of the early 1980s. Although some 
observers liked to refer to "hardy, independent" Maine workers prone 
to strike, the last strike at IP's Jay mill, built in 1898, had occurred in 
1920.
Concerned about low profits in the late 1970s, IP management at the 
corporate level embarked on a belt-tightening program of familiar out 
line: shutdowns of unprofitable capacity and reductions in salaried 
workforce. IP managers also pursued two other standard avenues: they 
built a nonunion mill and they pushed for concessions in contract nego 
tiations in their union mills.
The UPIU, which represented a majority of IP paperworkers, 
responded to early attempts to gain concessions by hiring, in 1983, cor 
porate campaign consultant Ray Rogers. Rogers had founded Corpo 
rate Campaigns Inc. in 1981 to work with unions to pressure 
companies through veiled secondary boycotts and direct approaches to 
large customers as well as to members of their boards of directors. 
Before Rogers' general campaign against IP could be implemented, 
however, IP officers and UPIU representatives agreed to meet twice a 
year to discuss labor relations.
Pressures for Concessions Increase
In 1986, IP's profits were again rising, it had embarked upon a pro 
gram of acquisitions, and it was pushing aggressively for contract con 
cessions. The 550-member Natchez, Mississippi locals accepted the 
loss of Sunday premium pay in 1986; by December of that year the Jay 
locals had offered to renew their contract with neither a wage raise nor 
loss of Sunday premium pay. IP refused the Jay union proposal. Rela 
tions between IP and the UPIU then deteriorated rapidly.
Lockouts and Strikes
In March of 1987, a contract dispute resulted in an IP lockout of the 
1,200-member UPIU local at its Mobile, Alabama mill. In April, IP 
delivered an eighteen-item agenda to the Jay locals, including the elim 
ination of Sunday premium pay and 178 jobs. In June, the company 
made its final offer, softening the Sunday premium pay elimination 
into a three-year phaseout and job elimination with an attrition pro 
gram. The UPIU local refused the offer, and a strike began June 16.
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UPIU also initiated coordinated strikes against IP in DePere, Wiscon 
sin (300 workers) and Lock Haven, Pennsylvania (720 workers). In 
effect, the several UPIU plants that were negotiating at the time had 
formed a "pool" to coordinate negotiations with IP.
Strike Dynamics at Jay
IP hired permanent replacement workers soon after the strike 
started. Although the UPIU regarded this action as a deliberate insult 
and threat, industry observers pointed out that the scale of the simulta 
neous strikes against several IP mills would have made other manage 
ment strategies difficult (e.g., moving in supervisory personnel from 
other company mills). The mills' rural locations also made temporary 
hiring problematic because of high local tensions. Replacement work 
ers were recruited throughout Maine, some of them driving several 
hours each way every workday.
Industry observers also suggested that the outside hires were not 
part of a long-term strategy, and that both IP and UPIU leaders proba 
bly developed their strike "strategies" as they went along, reacting to 
unfolding events in the glare of publicity. Two presidential elections  
the United States and the UPIU contributed to intraorganizational ten 
sions as well. The Jay strike became a cause celebre among Demo 
cratic presidential candidates, attracting far greater public attention 
than might otherwise have been expected by corporate strategists antic 
ipating a strike. It was suggested, as well, that since UPIU President 
Wayne Glenn was facing a contested reelection, it was harder for him 
to advocate restraint in the multilocation negotiations than would have 
been the case in a nonelection year.
A bargaining session in September, held at the request of the Maine 
governor, lasted only a few minutes. By October, the Jay UPIU local 
president had asked UPIU international president, Wayne Glenn, to 
support hiring Ray Rogers to coordinate a corporate campaign against 
IP, and Glenn had agreed reportedly with some reluctance. Jesse 
Jackson appeared at a UPIU rally in Mobile in October. The Jay local 
also had been instrumental in instigating an investigation that led to an 
OSHA levy of $250,000 in fines for hazardous plant conditions, and
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both sides had filed unfair labor practice charges, sought injunctions, 
and subsequently filed charges of injunction violations. The town of 
Jay adopted UPIU-supported ordinances banning strikebreakers, 
restricting temporary housing, and appropriating funds for environ 
mental law enforcement under Maine statutes. Workers at the Mobile 
and Jay plants were awarded unemployment benefits because of the 
lockout in Alabama and the provision of a Maine law: the replacement 
workers had returned the Jay plant to more than 70 percent of normal 
production.
The conflict continued unabated at Jay. By November of 1987, IP 
had implemented a "best and final offer" contract containing job reduc 
tions, Sunday premium pay reductions, and "project productivity" that 
eliminated jurisdictional lines between crafts. IP also announced that 
988 permanent replacements had been hired, that there would be only 
12 more jobs open to any returning strikers (with the additional news 
that 200 individuals had applied for those positions). All told, almost 
3,500 UPIU workers remained on strike or lockout at the IP mills in 
Jay, DePere, Lock Haven, and Mobile.
The parties met for four hours in December in the Washington 
offices of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. The IP vice- 
president of human resources and the UPIU president emerged to issue 
a joint statement:
Despite our best efforts to explore all possible avenues to lessen 
the differences that exist between the two sides, nothing came 
from the discussions that could lead us to believe any resolution 
can be expected in the near future. We will obviously continue to 
see if other avenues exist to be explored.
Meanwhile, the corporate campaign was in full swing. Jay strikers 
organized themselves into caravans that traveled through Maine, and 
then to other New England areas, to garner support. They appeared in 
Boston in February of 1988, where the Democratic mayor declared 
"UPIU Local 14 Solidarity Day" - and also pledged to avoid buying IP 
products for the city. Democratic presidential candidates Michael 
Dukakis and Jesse Jackson vied for supportive opportunities. Rogers 
identified several major companies-including Coca-Cola, Avon, 
Anheuser-Busch, and a Boston bank-that bought paper or shared 
directors with IP and orchestrated picket lines, boycott lists, and letter 
campaigns that publicized their connections.
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Rogers' goal was to demonstrate to board members that they would 
be treated as integral parts of IP management in every aspect of their 
lives. Board members encountered pickets everywhere. Political debate 
spread from the Maine legislature to the Democratic presidential cam 
paign. The Maine governor drafted a bill that would keep non-Maine 
companies from providing strikebreakers. Each side went to great 
lengths to demonstrate the destructiveness, greed, and ultimate hope 
lessness of the other side's strategy.
Intraorganizational Activity
Every effort was made by each party to strengthen its unity and to 
undermine the other party's internal consensus. IP successfully sued 
the UPIU for injunction violations and distributed the proceeds to 
strikebreakers and outside contractors. The usual heckling of strike 
breakers continued answered on paydays with brandished pay checks. 
UPIU members attempted to enlist support from shareholders and 
board members on various fronts. For its side, IP tried assiduously to 
break the power of the corporate campaign by reaching settlements at 
other locations.
Ultimately, out of 1,250 UPIU members at Jay, less than 70 strikers 
crossed the picket line and returned to work. Although the availability 
of unemployment insurance for an extended period blunted the appeal 
of returning to work, observers suggested that, in large part, this mod 
est hireback reflected the power of the corporate campaign in giving 
strikers an active focus and reinforcement for their anger at IP and their 
resolve not to give up the strike. In a small town in which the same 
family could include hourly workers and managers, the corporate cam 
paign allowed strikers to fix upon unfamiliar faces and to engage in 
antagonistic encounters in other locations.
Finally, in March of 1988, at the urging of mediators and, it can be 
surmised, as a result of the erosion of intraorganizational consensus in 
the face of months of bruising and expensive combat three weeks of 
contract talks were scheduled in Knoxville, Tennessee. IP was reported 
to hold a "genuine desire" to reach a settlement; former Labor Under 
secretary Malcolm Lovell was prepared to expand the role he had 
already played in scheduling negotiating sessions; and UPIU President
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Glenn issued a statement at least ostensibly reflecting a new sense of 
optimism about the potential for bridging the company's and employ 
ees' interests:
[The UPIU is ready] to begin developing a positive, long-term 
relationship dedicated to the competitiveness of the company and 
the welfare of the employees.
Rogers' corporate campaign also was suspended for the duration of 
the talks; of course IP announced that it had been "terminated," while 
the UPIU declared that it had merely been put "on hold."
Negotiations lasted for two and a half weeks, resulting in a proposed 
agreement which the UPIU insisted must be ratified by pooling votes 
from all strike locations. For the union, the major features of the IP 
proposal were provisions for early retirement and a guarantee of work 
within one year somewhere in the IP system for all striking workers. 
The contract was rejected overwhelmingly-with the UPIU refusing to 
reveal the locals' specific votes.
The Strike Ends
The union then went into its convention in August 1988 with strong 
support for continuing both the strike and the corporate campaign of 
Ray Rogers. It was anticipated that, as other plants came up for negoti 
ations, they would join the "pool."
This plan came apart in November when Glenn called union presi 
dents together from all of the IP locals for a meeting in Nashville. The 
national leadership tested support for the idea that plants with upcom 
ing negotiations would "join the pool" and found that there was not 
much enthusiasm among delegations from these plants. In fact, some 
expressed concern that IP might proceed to replace all 12,000 workers. 
Other depressing factors for the union were a rumor at Jay that the 
company was planning to bring on another 200-300 workers, and 
growing fear on the part of local union leaders that some junior work 
ers would break ranks and cross the picket line quite a plausible 
response among the striking workers at Jay whose jobs appeared 
almost irretrievable after a one-year strike.
The national leadership, in conjunction with the presidents of the 
various locals at IP, agreed to call off the strike as of November 9. As a 
result, the workers were forced to accept less-favorable terms than they
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had rejected months earlier. The result was widely regarded as a defeat 
for the UPIU strikers were not to be rehired en masse, and the most 
senior strikers who rilled the handful of openings went back to posi 
tions many rungs down the job ladder.
IP's immediate fortunes suffered relatively slight setbacks: only a 
small percentage of its capacity had been affected; moreover, the coin 
cidence of the strike and rising demand for paper had helped to mini 
mize any financial strain on the company as a result of the strike.
Some costs of the dispute to IP, however, continued after the strike 
ended. First, important skills and experience were lost. Second, as 
replacement employees left the Jay mill, their positions were filled by 
strikers, numbering 100 by early 1990, and tensions between the 
strikebreakers and former employees increased. Thus, although the use 
of replacement workers largely insulated the mill from the antagonisms 
created by the bargaining tactics for a period, these antagonisms sur 
faced in the poststrike period.
The potential for friction can be illustrated by the "inversion" that 
results when a returning striker with substantial seniority finds himself 
working as a helper on a machine that he previously operated as the 
first hand. It probably had taken him fifteen to twenty years to progress 
through the various stations on the machine; by contrast, the replace 
ment, now working as first hand, learned the ropes in less than a year 
and might be twenty years his junior.
Special animosity was directed to the strikers who decided to cross 
the picket line. They were referred to as "super scabs," in contrast to 
the replacements who were labelled "scabs"; the strikers were called 
"true blues."
Another development disconcerting to national leadership was the 
strike's temporizing effect on subsequent negotiations within the sys 
tem. Some locals, especially in southern locations, conceded the Sun 
day premium as well as declining to engage in in-plant tactics such as 
work to rule and refusal of overtime. In fact, to the dismay of UPIU 
international officials, some of these plants actually proceeded to break 
production records.
But the biggest setback by far occurred in July 1992 when the work 
ers at Jay (mostly replacements) voted by a substantial margin to 
decertify the UPIU and conduct their employment relations on a non 
union basis. However, the saga continued as the company proceeded to
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meet its legal obligation to rehire former strikers as positions opened. 
Thus, as openings developed, the workforce contained a growing per 
centage of workers who supported the union. UPIU representatives 
expressed hope that they would eventually be able to win a new orga 
nizing campaign.
Analysis
When IP's forcing strategy around ambitious demands at Jay was 
matched by the UPIU's own strong forcing efforts, institutional stakes 
and intergroup hostility were escalated in a way that precluded any sig 
nificant integrative bargaining and trust building during or after the 
strike. Thus, the juxtaposition of the parties' strategic choices pushed 
the labor-management relationship to the breaking point.
On the substantive side of the ledger, management prevailed in 
negotiating the terms of employment it wanted and apparently 
strengthened its own confidence and power for securing concessions at 
its other mills. At the same time, management incurred costs: the loss 
of profits during the strike, the loss of the skills of experienced paper- 
workers, and the results of increased tension as a growing number of 
strikers returned to their jobs.
Management probably miscalculated the degree of union resistance. 
One could also argue that the union decision makers underestimated 
management's power and resolve. It is unclear whether either side saw 
itself as having alternative strategies available to it going into the nego 
tiations. Eventually, positive employee relations may emerge, but it 
will take many years.
Elements of the Power Equation
The following chart summarizes the main factors that determined 
the outcomes in the Jay case.
46 Forcing
Determining Factors—International Papef
Company
Prepared for unrestrained forcing by lining 
up replacements and galvanizing 
management
Used threats of replacement workers and 
other power tactics in other locations to 
undercut union solidarity across locations
Union
Mounted corporate campaign
Attempted (but failed) to create a large 
pool of locals willing to engage in strike 
action
Forcing Tactics and Related Negotiating Dynamics
The Jay negotiations illustrate the central role of hard bargaining in 
a forcing strategy. Each side employed tactics designed to increase its 
own power, regardless of their souring effects on the attitudes of the 
participants in the negotiations. IP's resolve to follow through with its 
pattern of demanding concessions in all of its mills despite the upswing 
in the business cycle aroused the strong opposition of union leaders 
and workers, not to mention their families. Its use of permanent 
replacements severely threatened the members as employees and the 
union as an institution. For its part, the union's corporate campaign, its 
pooled bargaining tactics, and its public relations activities reinforced 
IP management's antagonism toward the union as an institution.
The heightened mutual hostility in the Jay case illustrates how 
unbridled confrontational tactics decrease the likelihood of integrative 
solutions to work-rule issues and other operating problems. Similarly, 
the Jay case illustrates how parties try to bolster their own distributive 
bargaining positions by strengthening their own internal consensus and 
weakening that of the other side. The union's corporate campaign, for 
example, sought to publicly embarrass IP's directors, possibly to pre 
cipitate their resignation from the board, or at least to provide them 
with an incentive to urge management to resolve the dispute. At the 
same time, it provided a rallying activity for Jay strikers.
According to our analysis, while the interpretive frames of the two 
sides changed several times during this episode, they remained remark 
ably symmetrical. Initially, management viewed the negotiations as an 
economic contest over wages and other terms of employment, a contest 
in which it had the upper hand and which would continue the momen 
tum of significant gains in operating practices. The union also focused
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on the economic contest and saw its task as drawing the line after a 
series of concessions elsewhere in the industry and in other IP mills.
Later, the parties interpreted their conflict as a mutual struggle for 
institutional power, prestige, and survival, overlaid on both sides with 
agendas of revenge. Two pivotal events shaped this reframing of the 
negotiation, serving to escalate the immediate animosity and add to its 
longevity. One event was the union's decision to strike the Jay mill 
despite the union's earlier acceptance of similar management terms at 
the Maine mills of two other competitors. The second event was man 
agement's decision to operate the plant with permanent replacements 
rather than either supervisors or temporary replacements. The choice to 
use permanent replacements, followed eventually by the procedure of 
bringing back striking employees only as job openings occurred, meant 
that deeply antagonistic workers would be hired into the midst of 
employees whom these returning strikers regarded as "scabs."
Still later, the negotiators' frames shifted again from their mutual 
acceptance of the no-holds-barred conflict to a mutual desire to limit 
the ongoing and future damage of the conflict. Mediator Malcolm Lov- 
ell played a key role in coordinating the reframing of the leaders' 
views, ensuring that both sides wanted to end the strike before UPIU 
President Glenn's upcoming campaign for reelection. The negotiations 
that followed confirmed that the parties' representatives could reach a 
compromise, but the membership's subsequent rejection of the pro 
posed agreement suggests that at the local level the interpretive frame 
had not changed and was at variance with that of their representatives 
from union headquarters specifically, the national leaders who now 
felt the necessity of nationwide damage control, while the Jay local 
focused on IP's refusal to reinstate all striking workers.
Several critical events were required before the striking members 
would grudgingly accept their leaders' sense of resignation and agree 
to abandon the fight. Other IP plants with upcoming negotiations 
rejected the idea of joining the pool, and there was the ominous rumor 
that young workers might break ranks and return to work.
In retrospect, the question should be asked whether the relationship 
could not have been salvaged before the local union lost everything. 
There are a couple of options that, if pursued, might have made a dif 
ference.
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Given the siege mentality within the local union, the international 
union leadership could have insisted that the settlement worked out by 
Lovell be endorsed by the local leadership. Stronger moves would have 
involved placing the local under trusteeship (similar to the action taken 
by a different international union in another celebrated confrontation  
Hormel versus the Food and Commercial Workers at Austin, Minne 
sota). Further, Lovell could have been asked to serve as an arbitrator, 
thereby creating a forced solution and getting as many strikers back to 
work as possible. The alternative of arbitration probably would have 
been rejected by the company, since management believed it could dic 
tate the terms of the settlement once it had demonstrated that it could 
operate the plant in the face of a strike.
Also, a different response by the company at the deadline might 
have helped the local union and workforce "come around" and be will 
ing to accept some changes in cherished pay arrangements, especially 
premium pay for Sunday. By bringing in strike replacements immedi 
ately, the company shifted the negotiations from a discussion of appro 
priate pay and work arrangements to a struggle for institutional 
survival. With permanent replacements in the picture, an impossible- 
to-close negative range developed between the union's insistence that 
replacements be terminated and the company's insistence that it was 
honor bound to keep them because that was the pledge they had made 
to induce these replacements to endure the pressure of crossing a 
picket line and working inside a plant under a blockade.
Paper plants tend to be located in isolated communities, where a 
type of resolute solidarity can develop rapidly. When (in addition) mil 
itant and charismatic leaders like Ray Rogers are brought into the 
arena, the chances of finding common ground diminish greatly. It is 
possible that a delay in the use of replacement workers would have 
allowed time for the power realities to more fully become apparent. For 
example, Caterpillar, in a dispute with the UAW in 1992, followed a 
strategy of delayed resort to replacements. This strategy succeeded at 
least to the point of getting the workers back to their jobs. Of course, 
the critics will point out that relationship and substantive issues "back 
at the plant" in Peoria have been far from resolved.
This brings us to the fundamental question of whether a company 
like IP sees any value in a collective bargaining relationship, and 
whether it attempts to roll out its forcing strategy in a way that does not
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severely undermine this relationship. When companies like IP and 
Guilford (the next case to be discussed) move quickly to hire perma 
nent replacements, it is understandable why labor concludes that an 
important objective guiding employer tactics must be escape from 
union representation. Thus, the forcing strategy is revealed as a highly 
volatile option in the present economic and legal context. Power tactics 
prompt power responses that escalate an economic contest into a strug 
gle for institutional and organizational survival.
The Guilford Story
The Guilford case represents the most celebrated example of unre 
strained forcing to occur in the railroads during the 1980s. While it is 
not clear whether the parties intended at the outset to engage in unre 
strained forcing, the escalation quickly occurred after impasse was 
reached in negotiations between the company and the Brotherhood of 
Maintenance of Way Employees (BMWE). This dispute was settled by 
intervention of the federal government; however, the company unveiled 
other tactics, specifically, a series of reorganizations that allowed it to 
drastically revise its contracts and union representation arrangements. 
The company gained some important changes in work rules, although 
working relations with labor were soured dramatically. Whether a heal 
ing process will eventually take place and the parties will be able to 
fashion constructive working relations is difficult to gauge as of the 
mid-1990s.
Significant Features
The Guilford case provides important insights into the nature of 
forcing in the highly regulated railroad context:
 The parties placed dramatically different interpretations on the 
same events, especially the strike by the BMWE to force the com 
pany to improve its final offer.
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 The government played a key role in ending an escalating labor 
dispute.
  Even with a partial return to the status quo ante, the parties found 
themselves in a new relationship with the unions deeply resentful 
over the employment of replacement workers and with the com 
pany looking for every opportunity to seize the initiative.
  Rivalries among competing craft unions were effectively exploited 
by management in the context of a forcing strategy.
In many respects the Guilford case falls somewhere between the AP 
Parts and Jay cases. The parties in this instance engaged in consider 
able escalation of hostilities, but the intervention of the government 
prevented the all-out battle of Jay. While Guilford has remained union 
ized, the structure of representation has changed dramatically, with one 
union covering all workers during an important phase of restructuring. 
While the outcomes are not as dramatic as the decertification of the 
union at Jay, they involved much more fundamental changes than 
occurred at AP Parts.
The Story Line
The Guilford story is complex. We will summarize only highlights 
and identify the key elements of the strategy as it unfolded. The Guil 
ford saga can be divided into four phases:
1. Acquisition and anticipated expansion (1981-1985);
2. Strike by the BMWE (1986);
3. Springfield Terminal concept (1987); and
4. Work stoppage and its aftereffects (1987 and after).
Phase I—Quest for Viability Through Controlled Forcing
The first phase, covering the early 1980s, involved a program to 
consolidate three railroads: one marginally profitable railroad (Maine 
Central), one railroad that had been in bankruptcy since 1970 (Boston 
and Maine), and a third railroad that was in de facto bankruptcy (Dela-
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ware and Hudson). The reorganization included restructuring of shops, 
offices, and other facilities, as well as investment in labor-saving tech 
nology, e.g., new track repair equipment.
In 1983, an agreement was reached with the BMWE reducing the 
number of maintenance sections from 52 to 26. In exchange, the rail 
road provided enhanced travel allowances. In October 1984, Guilford 
reached a series of agreements with the clerk's union wherein the com 
pany gained flexibility in transferring and consolidating clerical work. 
In exchange, the carrier agreed to various severance payments for indi 
viduals affected by these consolidations. Likewise, throughout 1985 
and early 1986, Guilford attempted to negotiate a supplemental unem 
ployment benefits (SUB) plan with the International Association of 
Machinists in exchange for flexibility in executing transfer and consol 
idation moves. In addition, numerous shop, office, and operational con 
solidations were implemented under the labor protection conditions 
imposed by the Interstate Commerce Commission in the Guilford con 
solidation.
While these events were transpiring, the BMWE initiated negotia 
tions under the procedures of the Railway Labor Act seeking, among 
other things, lifetime protection of benefits for its members. For its 
part, Guilford sought to place a cap on severance pay for workers who 
would no longer be needed. In addition, the company sought to create 
one seniority district for production work at its Maine Central division 
rather than the then existing arrangement of four separate districts. For 
example, under the existing contract, if additional crews were needed 
outside of Portland, members of the statewide seniority district had to 
be utilized, subject to overtime limits, before any of the Portland per 
sonnel could be called out. Recognizing that such a composite senior 
ity unit would reduce personnel, the company proposed a severance 
program of $26,000 for individuals who would be made redundant.
Mediation was initiated in September 1984, and the parties were 
released to "self help" by the National Mediation Board (NMB) in 
September 1985. The company proposed, and the BMWE accepted, a 
ninety-day moratorium on any unilateral action. During this ninety-day 
moratorium period the parties continued negotiations. In addition to 
the $26,000 per person protective arrangement, the company agreed to 
match wage increases that would emerge from national negotiations. 
The BMWE continued to press its demand for retroactive severance
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payments for employees already furloughed. When the company 
refused to accede to this demand, the BMWE went on strike on March 
3, 1986.
Phase II—The Shift to Unrestrained Forcing
As soon as the strike began, Guilford initiated actions to continue 
operations, although at reduced levels. Specifically, the company hired 
replacement workers to supplement managerial employees. Two weeks 
into the strike, the BMWE approached Guilford about reaching an 
agreement based on the carrier's prestrike offer. From the company's 
point of view the onset of the strike had changed its decision-making 
calculus, and it responded that it was not interested in returning to its 
prestrike offer.
Soon thereafter (in May) the union set up picket lines at various 
interline points throughout the northeast (and even at selected locations 
as far away as the Midwest and the West Coast). Within two weeks the 
dispute had escalated to the point that it threatened to affect most of the 
operations of the nation's large freight carriers with the result that the 
White House stepped in and appointed an emergency board under the 
provisions of the Railway Labor Act. Subsequently, the emergency 
board recommended a settlement along the lines of Guilford's last 
offer. This recommendation was rejected by Guilford. Eventually the 
strike was settled in September 1986 as a result of a cooling-off period 
imposed by Congress and creation of an advisory board that followed 
the terms of the emergency board report.
Phase III—Continuing the Strategy of Unrestrained Forcing
With the dispute finally settled, the labor-management relationship 
continued in a direction very different from the one existing prior to the 
strike. By fall 1986, Guilford was ready to unveil yet another piece of 
its forcing strategy: transferring in stages its various operations to its 
Springfield Terminal (ST) subsidiary.
Over the years, Guilford had maintained a small subsidiary line in 
Springfield, Vermont, where it had a contract with one union, the 
United Transportation Union (UTU), for the few workers associated 
with the line. In a series of reorganizations, Guilford proceeded to
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transfer (on paper) the Maine Central, the Boston and Maine, and the 
Delaware and Hudson to the jurisdiction of the Springfield Terminal. 6 
Guilford maintained that as a result of these changes in organization, 
the ST was free to apply to the transferred operations its existing UTU 
agreement (that gave management substantial flexibility).
The parties to the ST agreement (management and UTU) did not 
reach a new agreement for the transferred operations until February 
1989. Included in the new agreement were wage increases, new admin 
istrative procedures covering bidding, displacements and reductions- 
in-force, and most important, a mutually agreed-upon basis for dove 
tailing the seniority of employees across the various railroads that had 
been placed under the umbrella of ST. The agreement also contained a 
moratorium on any changes through December 31, 1994.
Phase IV—Consolidation and Union Representation Struggles
The final phase began when the UTU went on strike in November 
1987, with 1,200 workers claiming that safety was not being main 
tained under the Springfield Terminal agreements. Again, Guilford 
management responded by operating the system with supervisors and 
replacements. The strike lasted until June 1988, when the NMB 
ordered the parties into arbitration.
Without detailing all of the twists and turns of the legal journey that 
was traveled in the aftermath of the ST reorganization, suffice it to say 
that the ICC, the NMB, and various arbitrators grappled with a range 
of issues that included seniority of transferred workers, appropriate pay 
levels, and protection for furloughed workers.
As of 1994, these decisions could be summarized as follows:
  Economic arrangements and work rules were restored to the terms 
and conditions in effect before the ST reorganization (1986) for 
workers then on the payroll, although wage increases that had been 
negotiated by the UTU in 1989 were not applicable.
 For workers employed after the ST reorganization, the revised 
terms and conditions of the UTU contract applied.
  Most of the craft unions ultimately regained representation rights.
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Analysis
An overall assessment of the Guilford strategy is still premature. 
However, a number of observations can be made on both sides of the 
ledger.
There were positive gains from management's point of view. The 
break-even point for volume was reduced by approximately 30 percent. 
In addition, compensation costs were reduced 20 percent as a result of 
the implementation of contracts with lower wage scales and reduced 
crew sizes. For example, the run from Albany, New York to southern 
New Hampshire a trip that formerly required five four-person 
crews was done with two two-person crews. Overall, 90 percent of 
all trains operated with two-person crews as of 1994.
Management maintained that this dramatic reduction in labor costs 
made it possible to schedule more frequent and shorter trains, thereby 
providing better service to its customers. Previously, it had been forced 
to collect traffic into longer trains to gain economies of scale a prac 
tice that did not provide the best service to its customers.
On the other side of the ledger is the impact of the various arbitra 
tion decisions, which eliminated a significant portion of the savings. 
Moreover, some of the expected benefits from the new arrangements 
were slow to materialize. While a major theme of the new labor agree 
ment was flexibility and cross utilization of personnel (in fact, the 
signed agreement with the UTU provided for salary enhancement as 
workers learned other skills), little change took place, primarily 
because middle management did not capitalize on the new opportuni 
ties.
The bottom line for revenue and employment was also negative. 
Tonnage did not recover to levels existing prior to the spring of 1986, 
and while the railroad returned to profitability (1994), overall revenue 
was 25 percent lower. Employment fell from approximately 5,500 to 
slightly over 1,000 by 1994.
The relationship between management and the workers/unions also 
continued to be very acrimonious and complex, especially in light of 
the previously mentioned point that employees hired before the ST 
reorganization were returned to their former pay arrangements while 
new employees were held to the terms negotiated by the UTU. In addi-
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tion, individual workers filed complaints with different government 
agencies alleging safety problems and harassment. Add to this the ten 
sion created in work groups where replacement workers found them 
selves alongside long-service union activists and the picture of a 
contentious workplace was complete.
The Power Equation
Each side possessed certain advantages that included: 
Determining Factors—Guilford
Company
Closely held company with a willingness 
of key managers to take risks
Unions
The ability of the unions at Guilford to 
mobilize other unions into a secondary 
boycott
In the power equation above (evenly balanced), the decisive factor in 
determining the eventual outcome was the government's stepping in 
and mandating a settlement. During the second round the government 
again stepped in, but by this time the company had introduced simpli 
fied work rules and bargaining structures that remained in place. In 
effect, the function of government intervention was to get the railroad 
functioning again and this role could have helped either side (depend 
ing on the terms of the return-to-work agreement).
The Dynamics
The Guilford story represents a saga of "let's get even," with the 
company encountering the BMWE strike, then "going for broke" with 
the Springfield Terminal restructuring, followed by the unions striking, 
and finally with the company seeking to sustain its advantage through 
court and arbitration proceedings aimed at confirming the new operat 
ing arrangements.
These moves and counter-moves can be summarized:
  Company presents a proposal that it considers fair.
  Union follows standard script: It assumes that by striking it will 
sweeten the package.
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 Rejection of "fair" proposal by union creates "agonizing reap 
praisal" on management's part.
  Company "declares war" and hires replacements.
  Union is incensed by the action of the company in hiring perma 
nent replacements and succeeds in escalating the dispute by enlist 
ing support from other unions around the country.
  Government intervenes and mandates a settlement.
  Company uses a reorganization (Springfield Terminal) as a means 
for revising labor-management contracts and recognizing the UTU 
as sole bargaining unit for its operating employees.
  Unions strike over issue of safety.
  Craft unions other than UTU extremely resentful and form a craft 
council.
  Relations remain extremely tense.
Unrestrained forcing unleashes these dynamics wherein each side 
adopts tactics that seek to redress a power disadvantage and/or to gain 
a new advantage. This tit-for-tat is very characteristic of unrestrained 
forcing.
Why did management at Guilford undertake such drastic restructur 
ing via the ST concept? When the emergency board made its recom 
mendations that the dispute with the BMWE be settled on the basis of 
the company's last offer, "railroad buffs" would have expected that the 
relationship would have returned to arm's-length, i.e., to businesslike 
dealings that had existed for several decades. After all, the company 
had gained the changes that it wanted, and the workers had received a 
settlement matching industry levels of compensation. Why, then, was 
the company proceeding with additional forcing tactics by using the 
shell of the ST to rewrite existing labor agreements?
The campaign by Guilford to force, on a continuing basis, changes 
in work practices and pay levels is explained by the low value that the 
company placed on preserving the labor-management relationship. In 
most instances of change, the formal labor-management relationship 
remains intact, and a desire to prevent it from souring serves as some 
degree of restraint on the behavior of the parties. In the case of Guil 
ford, the labor-management relationship was, for the most part, frac-
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tured when management decided to proceed with its hard forcing 
strategy of replacing striking BMWE workers. With nothing to lose, 
since it had already been labeled the "bad guy" of the industry, Guil- 
ford pressed on with other tactics in this case, using the ST subsid 
iary to revise all of its labor contracts. Of course, the company was 
aided in its isolate behavior by the willingness of UTU, also an isolate 
among railroad unions, to step forward as the bargaining agent for all 
of the unionized workers on the railroad.
The Springfield Terminal move raises the interesting question about 
the circumstances that delineate the line between restrained forcing 
tactics and an all-out battle. In interviews, Guilford management 
asserted that it did not enter the negotiations with BMWE with any 
plan of confrontation in mind. The unions maintain otherwise. But 
regardless of the company's original intent, when the union rejected 
what the company negotiators thought was a fair package, top manage 
ment shifted in their mindset.
Basically then, the strike by BMWE was evaluated from very differ 
ent perspectives by the parties. For the unions it was the normal course 
of action to go on strike whenever the Railway Labor Act procedures 
were finally exhausted. For the company, the strike represented a piv 
otal event or, in their language, "the last straw." The rejection by the 
union of management's offer moved the relationship beyond the point 
of no return.
How could something as "routine" as the BMWE going on strike 
create such a shift on the part of Guilford management? The expecta 
tion of the union was that management would make some small 
changes in its offer, the strike would be called off, and the contract 
signed; or, if management insisted on holding to its position, then an 
emergency board would be appointed and a recommendation would 
come forward that would "sweeten" management's last offer. By con 
tinuing to operate, and especially by hiring replacements, management 
charted a very new course. What explains this pivotal development?
When management decided to "go all out," it was giving release to 
decades of pent-up frustration over not being able (from its point of 
view) to deal adequately with the "labor problem." The additional dol 
lars that would have been required to compensate workers already on 
furlough were not large, but as is the case with the onset of most holy 
wars, a limit had been reached. This choice to move from traditional
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distributive bargaining to a strategy of unrestrained forcing was heavily 
influenced by the thinking of the CEO, Tim Mellon. The combination 
of a privately held company, a small regional carrier operating prima 
rily in New England, and a strong-willed leader all coalesced to 
make the strategy both feasible and desirable for management.
The Guilford strategy, to a very large extent, was dictated by eco 
nomics. The 1986 BMWE strike lasted from March 3 until late May. 
The strike resulted in a serious loss of revenue and a permanent loss of 
some traffic. These facts, combined with the long-term secular decline 
in railroad traffic in New England, convinced Guilford management 
that an immediate restructuring of labor costs was necessary via the ST 
concept. Of primary importance was the changing of work rules (e.g., 
changing from five-man crews on the Maine Central and three-man 
crews on the Boston and Maine to two-man crews under the ST agree 
ment). There was a real sense in 1986 that Guilford could not wait for 
the gradual restructuring of labor costs that may or may not have taken 
place on the national level. In other words, there was a sense of 
urgency that something had to be done in the short term.
Given this explanation it is hard to imagine ways that the parties 
could have reached their objectives without experiencing this debacle. 
One possibility would have been for the leaders on both sides to have 
found ways to create some type of alignment across their divergent 
perspectives. Such an idea sounds fine as a general proposition but 
becomes very difficult to operationalize in the face of a long history of 
arms-length dealings and the reality of bringing about changes in key 
assumptions within organizations characterized by many levels and 
factions. Nevertheless, like our speculation on the Jay case, if manage 
ment at Guilford had delayed hiring replacements once the BMWE 
went on strike, the chances of reaching and changing the outlook of the 
rank and file might have increased.
Indeed, Guilford management engaged in very little direct commu 
nication with their workers. Rather, the approach appeared to be to 
catch the union leadership off balance by quickly hiring replacements 
when the BMWE struck and subsequently pushing through reorganiza 
tion moves. At no point did the company put the union and members 
on notice that it would be forced to take action by a specific date if no 
agreement could be reached on the proposed program for change. Such 
as approach might not have worked, i.e., the company would still have
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been "forced to force" but a modicum of trust across the boundary 
might have been preserved. As it turned out, when confronted by the 
various moves of the company, the unions could only conclude that 
they were in a fight for their survival.
The Future
In many ways 1994 stands as a key year in the history of the Guil- 
ford saga. With the recertification of the craft unions and with contracts 
due to expire at the end of the year, the parties embarked upon contract 
negotiations for the first time since the confrontations of the 1980s. All 
parties were committed to remaining outside of national negotiations 
(also scheduled to commence in late 1994).
While the company succeeded in changing key work rules as a 
result of its forcing strategy, and while it looked for a while like its 
local initiative might gain for it some advantage vis-a-vis the rest of the 
industry, the irony is that similar flexibility had been achieved by oth 
ers. Large freight carriers like Union Pacific and Norfolk Southern, 
who had remained committed to national negotiations (termed 
"national handling"), were operating with the same reduced crews and 
flexibility as Guilford as a result of the 1991-92 industry settlement.
So with respect to outcomes, Guilford ended up even compared to 
the rest of the industry on work rules. On the relationship side of the 
equation, however, it had generated considerable resentment. Negotia 
tions unfolding as this book was going to press presumably provided 
an opportunity for the parties to strengthen working relationships and 
to take advantage of a number of business opportunities in the New 
England region, including alliances with Canadian regional railroads, 
intermodal arrangements in Albany, and new warehousing at the 
restructured Ft. Devens in Massachusetts.
In retrospect, it is easy to be critical of the strategy chosen by Guil 
ford. When they embarked upon their program of change in the mid- 
1980s, it did not appear that any substantial breakthroughs would be 
forthcoming from national negotiations. Significantly, virtually all of 
the small and medium-size railroads had found it necessary to deal 
locally with their respective unions. And no doubt they will continue in 
this vein, despite the gains realized by the National Railway Labor
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Conference (the employers association) in the 1991-92 industry settle 
ment.
The next chapter of the Guilford story will be especially important 
to monitor, since it will shed light on the question of whether medium- 
size regional carriers (as well as small, short lines) can fashion strate 
gies that improve their viability in ways more expeditious or compara 
ble to the change avenues available to the large national freight carriers 
as a result of industry-level negotiations.
OVERVIEW OF FORCING
Outcomes
In drawing up a balance sheet for our three cases of forcing, a num 
ber of patterns are evident:
  The unions involved never ended up winning. In two cases, some 
or all unions lost representation rights (Jay and Guilford) and in 
one case, they struggled to a stalemate (AP Parts).
  The workers did not fare much better, either. Some of them lost 
their jobs at Jay and Guilford, and in all of these cases workers suf 
fered losses in pay during the strikes and were forced to return to 
work under drastically altered contracts.
  Management generally fared better. In every case they gained more 
favorable labor contracts. However, in varying degrees and for 
varying periods, the three companies experienced deteriorated 
labor-management relationships. Even where the company suc 
ceeded in escaping union representation, a legacy of bitterness 
remained within the workforce.
Lessons Learned
In reviewing the three cases, we can identify a number of best prac 
tices. They can be organized around the three time periods that often
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characterize a forcing effort, namely, formulation of the plan, actions at 
the deadline, and relations in the aftermath of the forcing episode.
Formulating and Presenting the Demands
As discussed at several points, the forcing strategies might have 
been executed more successfully if the companies had found ways to 
make their objectives more credible. In the AP Parts case, where man 
agement felt it needed to reduce compensation costs (rather than just 
achieve productivity gains), the task of making its position plausible 
became much more difficult.
Acceptance of the need for change by the union and its members at 
AP Parts was made especially difficult by developments that had 
occurred during the early 1980s. Management, in a prior negotiation, 
had achieved a series of concessions, leading to the conclusion on the 
part of many workers and union leaders that the competitive problem 
had been fixed. Thus, as AP management approached the 1984 negoti 
ations it faced an even higher hurdle in making a credible case for new 
(and much larger) concessions.
In varying degrees, the unions felt that these companies were being 
unreasonable in seeking changes that could be viewed as rolling back 
the clock or breaking away from the patterns of the industry. Ulti 
mately, there may not have been an elegant solution to a dilemma fac 
ing these companies, namely, how to focus attention on changes that 
they believed were required as a competitive necessity without being 
seen as abrogating the historical understandings with their unions and 
employees.
Thus, the best available solution in most circumstances may be for 
management to make its case as best it can and to deal with the inevita 
ble escalation as effectively as possible.
From the union side of the picture, the best stance could be a course 
not followed by any of the unions in our forcing cases, namely, to ask 
for involvement in management decisions previously reserved exclu 
sively to management. In return for concessions, the union leadership 
would be seeking involvement in matters essential to the competitive 
survival of the firm. The type of quid pro quo we contemplate is best 
illustrated by Packard Electric and Budd in the next chapter.
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Actions at the Deadline
As noted in the discussion of AP Parts, if management can continue 
operations without resort to hiring replacements at the deadline, then 
more options are preserved for sustaining the labor-management rela 
tionship. Similarly, if the union avoids strike action and keeps discus 
sions going, the chances are enhanced that some common ground can 
be found.
But again there may not be any alternative short of a test of resolves 
via a strike or lockout. Given the incompatible expectations that usu 
ally accompany any discussion aimed at securing major concessions, 
an outcome that all sides can live with may not emerge until the parties 
experience the rising costs of conflict.
Reconstruction of Labor-Management Relations
Ultimately, the best opportunity for the exercise of leadership occurs 
after the raw power aspects of the forcing episode have subsided. From 
this perspective, the escalation that characterizes a forcing regime may 
be inevitable, given the history of the relationship and the new direc 
tion that one of the parties (usually management) wants to pursue.
The challenge for the parties, then, is to conduct the early phase of 
the conflict so that the possibility for reconstruction is not precluded 
and to handle the poststrike period with skill and imagination.
The Key Role of Leadership
The reconstruction of relationships after a forcing episode does not 
happen all at once, but occurs over time as a result of a series of trust- 
building events. Associated with these pivotal events are critical 
choices centering on management and union leadership styles. In the 
case of AP Parts, an adherence to traditional adversarial management 
styles (matched in parallel by the preference of union leaders to use 
traditional tactics) meant that the relationship, when reestablished, 
would be arm's length.
Once the hostilities associated with the strike subsided in these three 
cases, the parties at AP Parts were able to restore relations, but at Guil-
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ford there was dramatic restructuring and at Jay the local union was 
mortally wounded and eventually decertified. The exact course that 
relationships take after the trauma of unrestrained forcing is somewhat 
indeterminate, as illustrated by the different journeys of these cases. 
Clearly, the skills and orientation of key leaders on both sides explain 
in large part the tone and nature of the ongoing labor-management rela 
tionships.
The Essential Nature of Forcing
These three cases vividly illustrate the dimensions that are inherent 
in all instances of forcing especially the dynamics of confrontation 
and escalation. Although it is not inevitable that every case of forcing 
proceeds to the extreme stage, these three cases are representative of a 
much larger set of celebrated cases of intense conflict that we summa 
rized in the opening chapter.
Rapid Deterioration of Relations
When management in these cases departed from the norms of inter 
action by making demands for significant concessions and hiring 
replacements, a sequence of events unfolded that resulted in a major 
deterioration of social relations. Underlying the collapse was the real 
ity that each side perceived their own organizational or institutional 
survival to be at stake.
A type of siege mentality often developed during the confrontations. 
Management at AP Parts and Guilford, for example, believed so fer 
vently in the lightness of their actions that they ended up isolated from 
large segments of the business community.
Departing from familiar rules was a tactic seen by management as a 
means of sending a signal of just how dire the situation had become. 
For the most part the response, however, was for the unions to feel 
institutionally threatened. What followed was a set of tit-for-tat interac 
tions involving distributive bargaining, negative attitudinal structuring, 
and intraorganizational initiatives that produced progressively lower 
trust relations. 7
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Third Parties and the Law
A related point is that third parties often found themselves being 
pulled into the vortex of an escalating conflict. When the community 
sought to intervene in the AP Parts strike, labor and management 
entered into a contest for partners. Community suggestions were inter 
preted as supporting or threatening one side or the other, and the poten 
tial for mediation was eroded. In the case of Jay, the parties vied for 
support from state officials, and at Guilford the federal government 
found itself compelled to intervene.
The law is often intended to provide a check on destructive behavior 
that is not adequately regulated by market forces. In the two cases that 
fall under the jurisdiction of the NLRA, however, we found that the 
limited scope of influence and action available to the NLRB meant that 
the law had little impact on the escalating disputes. By contrast, the 
escalating tensions in the one case involving the National Railway 
Labor Act were moderated by the various procedures under the Act.
Prognosis
A large literature on labor-management cooperation identifies the 
new beginnings that often emerge after strikes. The amendment that we 
bring to this conventional wisdom is that the parties certainly learn 
some lessons as a result of unrestrained forcing, and these can have a 
tempering or therapeutic effect on relationships when those relation 
ships survive the conflict. But poststrike relations can remain turbulent 
for a long time, especially given the stark possibility that, for the 
unions involved, their very existence may be undermined. In all, unre 
strained forcing in the present era has the potential to generate dra 
matic change, but much of the change is not necessarily what is antici 
pated or desired by the forcing party.
NOTES
1. Valuable research assistance was provided by Pat McHugh in the preparation of this case.
2. As of the early 1990s, long after the tensions associated with the 1984 negotiations had sub 
sided, it was difficult to determine what private plans (e.g., getting rid of the union) were guiding 
management. All of the principals of management's side of the table were no longer associated 
with AP Parts, and the new management officials indicated that they did not really know.
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3 Specifically, the union's filing with the NLRB stated that the employer had failed "to pro 
vide the data necessary for intelligent collective bargaining"; refused "to alter, except in insignifi 
cant ways, the terms of their initial proposal"; threatened to "discharge those workers who refused 
to accept their proposal"; made a final offer "before bargaining could narrow the issues between 
the parties"; "threatened and coerced its employees through the hiring of professional goons and 
guard dogs"; unilaterally changed the wages, hours, and working conditions of its employees 
without bargaining in good faith"; and engaged in "calculated mass discipline of over 300 workers 
because they have chosen to refrain from striking."
4 Specifically, the regional director stated that the employer's tactics did not constitute unlaw 
ful surface bargaining, that there was sufficient notice of changes in working conditions, that 
information regarding the employer's entry into the original equipment manufacturing market was 
irrelevant to the negotiations, that the employer's direct contacts with employees were lawful, and 
that there was insufficient evidence of concerted discipline For their part, the union representa 
tives cited the opinion of hearing examiners that the AP Parts negotiations featured some of the 
worst violations of the National Labor Relations Act that they had even seen, and that the regional 
director's decision reflected pressure from conservative members of the NLRB in Washington.
5 Valuable research assistance was provided by Kathleen Rudd Scharf in the preparation of 
this case.
6 When analysts first hear the term "Springfield Terminal," they assume that the subsidiary 
must be based in Springfield, Massachusetts. This is not correct. In fact, the subsidiary, which in 
1987 employed virtually no workers, was located in Springfield, Vermont and had served as a 
small switching railroad for the products of Jones and Lamson, a major machine tool company 
that had fallen on hard times. When one of the authors visited the property, all that could be seen 
was a roundhouse with rusty rails and uncut grass.
7. One illustrative feature of the resulting dynamic is important to note in a number of our 
cases the managers rebuffed poststrike union offers to settle on some variation of management's 
final offer. Essentially the union was told that once the strike began, the cost of settlement went 
up. While this is not a new tactic, in the present era this tactic heightens the irreversibility of "holy 
wars," when the decision to strike or lock out is made.

3 
Fostering
Negotiating Commitment and Cooperation
Whereas a forcing strategy is intended to enable one party to prevail 
over the other and relies upon coercive power, a fostering strategy 
attempts to advance common or complementary interests through atti 
tude change, persuasion, and problem solving.
This chapter examines how companies have attempted to foster new 
relationships and new contracts with labor. Given its commitment to 
foster change, how does management formulate its objectives and 
choose its negotiating tactics? How does management deal with the 
anxiety in its own organization created by its efforts to negotiate 
employee commitment? How does the union discern the intentions of 
management and deal with its own ambivalence about the changes 
management seeks? How do employees shift from a mindset of com 
pliance to one of commitment? We explore these and other issues via 
cases from the paper, auto supply, and railroad industries.
The first case, Bidwell, illustrates our broad definition of labor nego 
tiations (not just limited to collective bargaining), and it highlights the 
negotiated aspects of the Quality of Worklife (QWL) genre of change 
efforts.
The second case, CSX, chronicles an ambitious effort by a major 
freight railroad to fashion a breakthrough agreement with its operating 
unions in advance of industrywide negotiations. The case also illus 
trates the complexity of pursuing a fostering strategy where there are 
multiple internal constituencies (represented by different unions) on 
the labor side.
The third case involves a small, skilled trades setting Anderson 
Pattern and a craft union, the Pattern Makers Association. Distinctive 
issues emerged around new technology, with the parties proceeding in 
steps toward a productive and positive relationship.
These three cases highlight several ways of traveling down the fos 
tering path. At the level of union-management relations, we examine 
the establishment of permanent labor-management steering commit-
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tees, temporary (issue-specific) labor-management task forces, union 
involvement in business planning activities, and the utilization of prob 
lem-solving approaches in collective bargaining. At the individual level 
of employee relations, we trace employee involvement initiatives, qual 
ity control innovations, semi-autonomous work groups; and increased 
direct ties between individual employees and customers. Also, we 
examine issues that cut across these levels, such as information-shar 
ing, training, and the introduction of new technologies.
Some of the fostering efforts are focused on changing attitudes  
building a sense of teamwork and cooperation; others are focused more 
on behaviors improving work operations and enhancing productivity 
through contractual changes (McKersie and Hunter 1973). For exam 
ple, we will see in the Bidwell QWL effort a strong emphasis on atti 
tude change, whereas in the case of CSX the parties focused on 
revising the contract (specifying changes in behavior). In the case of 
Anderson, both attitudinal and behavioral change processes were 
employed in a closely coordinated fashion.
Key Aspects of Cases Featuring Fostering
Focus of efforts
Mechanism
Level of the activity
Number of unions 
involved
Scope of potential 
change
Substantive 
changes
Relationship with 
union
Relationship with 
workers
Bidwell
Change of attitudes
QWL
Local union officials 
and rank and file
4
Department by 
department
Minimal
Deteriorated 
somewhat
Little change
CSX
New contract 
language
Early negotiations
Company-union 
representatives
10
Systemwide
None as a result of 
these negotiations
Improved somewhat
Little change
Anderson
Both attitudes and 
behavior
A series of joint 
activities and 
innovative 
negotiations
All levels
1
Plantwide
Large
Improved
Improved
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Against the historical backdrop, these examples of fostering are 
similar to the many examples of labor-management cooperation that 
have been fashioned throughout this century.' The agenda or the partic 
ular format may be different but the attitudinal and problem-solving 
elements are similar.
Although all three cases involve fostering, they differ from one 
another in many ways.
AN ABORTIVE BID TO FOSTER COOPERATION 
Bidwell Mill, 1981-1984
The Bidwell case is about the initiation, development, and decline of 
a QWL program in a paper mill between September 1981 and early 
1984.2 It is a case of essentially pure fostering. 3
At management's initiative, mill managers and officials of three of 
the four local unions negotiated an agreement to jointly sponsor a 
QWL program. The fourth local opposed the program but allowed 
QWL activities to go forward elsewhere in the mill. Participative activ 
ities took root firmly among employees and their supervisors in some 
parts of the mill, allowing them to renegotiate their daily work roles 
and responsibilities. Thus, labor and management took steps that on 
their face could have led to cooperative labor relationships at both the 
union-management and employee/shop-floor levels. However, the 
apparent agreement between management and the unions unraveled; 
and, in the absence of institutional support, employee participation 
activities on the mill floor declined.
The Bidwell case represents a form of fostering highly typical of the 
late 1970s and 1980s one centered on employee participation. It also 
illustrates many typical barriers encountered by such initiatives 
(including changes in leadership and ownership, as well as incomplete 
attention to the interests of key stakeholders) and several other barriers 
(such as division among multiple unions) that are more characteristic 
of some industries than others. We will highlight many process ele 
ments in such a story. These include negotiations over the nature of the 
fostering, internal negotiations within labor and management, and 
negotiations (as well as a lack of negotiations) over various implemen-
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tation decisions. Stated more succinctly, we will analyze negotiations 
over the timing, structure, and priority of the QWL program, as well as 
its eventual demise.
Significant Features
The case that follows contains a number of significant elements. 
Those include the following:
  Initial off-site meetings provided headway (after initial skepticism) 
for union and management decisions to co-sponsor QWL.
  Three of the four unions agreed to goals and a joint structure for 
QWL.
 The high-status hold-out union was not easily influenced, but 
agreed to stand aside so long as no QWL activity occurred with its 
members.
  Management's own underlying limited interest and/or ambivalence 
about more cooperative relations and more commitment was a 
major factor in explaining why it did not follow through.
 Eventually the hold-out union attacked management and other 
union officials for QWL activities.
  The use of a third-party facilitator both assisted and complicated 
the decision-making process.
  The process ultimately collapsed as a result of various unsuccess 
ful negotiations within labor and management, as well as between 
labor and management.
Getting Underway With QWL
The Bidwell mill, started in the 1960s, employed 500 people in 
1981. In a pattern typical of this industry, mill management received 
relatively detailed direction from corporate headquarters. Corporate
Fostering 71
staff, for example, scheduled production for the mill and negotiated 
local contracts.
Corporate management also provided the impetus for the QWL pro 
gram at Bidwell. Executives had visited Japan and several QWL sites 
in the United States, including General Motors, and concluded that the 
company should develop a new approach to management that included 
QWL activities.
Several Bidwell managers attended a three day workshop sponsored 
by corporate staff to "encourage" mills to embark on QWL change 
efforts. Although Bidwell managers had little enthusiasm for the idea, 
they felt they had no real choice but to agree to start a QWL effort.
In September 1981, the Bidwell mill manager hired an external con 
sultant recommended by corporate staff and began a series of meetings 
with local management. These early meetings surfaced the historic dis 
trust toward "corporate folks," their doubts about the merits of the 
QWL effort, and their expectations that it would fail. Increasingly, 
these meetings and other meetings they spawned were devoted to the 
development of internal cohesion and consensus within management. 
The consultant, who facilitated team development and planning ses 
sions of the mill manager's staff, noted that they agreed to proceed on 
QWL "with a cool, dispassionate resolution," without enthusiasm and 
without any real commitment.
Management scheduled three major activities involving salaried 
employees: first, all salaried employees attended a one-day QWL ori 
entation session; second, managers participated in a series of two-day 
supervisory skills training sessions; and third, management staff were 
surveyed and feedback sessions were held on a unit-by-unit basis. 
Commenting on this internal management phase, the consultant 
observed, "this staff was approaching the process as  'taking their 
foul-tasting medicine' a lot of complaining, and yet overt compliance 
to the plans they, as a team, developed" (Mohrman 1987).
Negotiating Union Support and Employee Involvement
The second phase was marked by the onset of joint union-manage 
ment activities. The mill manager had kept the four local union presi 
dents informed of the company's interest in QWL, the preparatory 
work within the management organization, and his plan to approach
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them formally about establishing a QWL steering committee. The 
union presidents reacted with a mixture of interest and skepticism.
In the spring of 1982 the mill manager decided to have preliminary 
discussions with the unions before summer, with the prospect of estab 
lishing a steering committee in September. On the one hand, he was 
feeling pressure to proceed from the consultant and from the fact that 
sister mills already had their unions "on board." On the other hand, he 
was also aware that vacation schedules in the summer made it a diffi 
cult time to hold meetings. His own staff was divided on the timing 
issue. Some were prepared to form the steering committee soon, others 
felt September was the earliest practical date.
In the preliminary meeting, the union officials asked for the same 
orientation workshops that managers had already attended. Manage 
ment agreed and a workshop was conducted by the consultant and 
attended only by union officers, who again raised questions about the 
seriousness of management's interest in QWL and about its intentions. 
At the conclusion of the workshop, officers from three of the four 
unions were interested and decided to proceed. Officers of the fourth 
union were negative, but after failing to convince their union col 
leagues not to proceed, they decided to participate in another meeting 
with management.
In this next meeting, managers and union officials agreed to estab 
lish a mill steering committee to manage a joint QWL process and to 
begin three-day joint training sessions. They also set up substeering 
committees in the three parts of the plant represented by the three inter 
ested unions. While the officers of the fourth union agreed to be on the 
mill committee, they did not plan any activities in their area of the mill. 
Significantly, the uninvolved union represented the paper machine 
operators, the most skilled and prestigious workers in the mill.
The decision to proceed during the summer came about at the 
unions' urging. Managers expressed their preference for a September 
start, but then agreed to go along earlier. They later expressed resent 
ment because they felt the consultant had tilted the discussion toward 
the unions' preference. For her part, the consultant felt managers' inhi 
bitions about expressing their limited support reflected the need for 
more management team development.
The QWL activities got off to a good start that summer (1982). The 
mill steering committee discussed issues in the mill and agreed to a
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statement of philosophy to guide the QWL process. Participants 
responded well to the training, and by fall problem-solving teams were 
active in two of the four areas of the mill. Teams tackled, among other 
issues, scrap rates, maintenance backlogs, and clean-up procedures. 
These activities produced cooperative relationships in specific depart 
ments and in some cases were self-sustaining, i.e., requiring no ongo 
ing oversight by top mill management or local union leaders.
Internal Divisions Undermine Cooperative Work
Two factors broke the momentum of the summer's change process. 
First, the Bidwell mill and its sister paper mills in the company were 
put up for sale twice within a short period of time, deflecting manage 
ment's attention and creating uncertainty about the commitment of 
future managements. In this context, individual managers and supervi 
sors who had felt all along that QWL was either unwise or getting too 
much priority began to express their doubts more publicly. Second, 
officers of the paper machine operators' union withdrew from the mill 
steering committee and charged that the other unions' officers were 
being brainwashed and that QWL would undermine the unions. 
Although some officers of the other unions defended their involvement 
in QWL, the leaders of the papermakers union succeeded in raising 
doubts within the ranks of the other unions. These leaders also attacked 
management for not keeping the unions fully informed about the pro 
spective sale and for discrepancies between its QWL rhetoric and its 
actions or inaction in the case of a labor proposal to eliminate time 
clocks.
The QWL change effort underwent another setback in the fall when 
Bidwell was sold and the new corporate owners installed a new mill 
manager. The new executives expressed support for QWL, and the new 
mill manager claimed to have a natural inclination to manage participa- 
tively. However, when he realized that his own staff was internally 
divided on many issues, he decided that the most pressing concern was 
management development.
The new mill manager soon discovered that the divisions among his 
staff extended to their views of QWL. In February 1983, mill manage 
ment staff met to review the status of QWL. The substantive reports of 
activities indicated that some areas were doing well but others had
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bogged down. In the latter areas, union members had asked for visible 
signs of management commitment to cooperation, such as the removal 
of time clocks cited earlier. The reports soon gave way to an expression 
of concerns: top management appeared to be preoccupied with QWL, 
and it was creating stress for supervisors and managers by asking for 
dramatic changes in behavior; too much time was spent in meetings; 
the unions were pressing for faster progress; and union employees 
were becoming increasingly emboldened to the point of criticizing 
supervisors.
The new mill manager's response was to redouble his attention to 
team development within his own staff. In the meantime, the paper- 
makers union also stepped up its efforts to halt the QWL effort. In the 
spring of 1983, two of the other three unions withdrew from the QWL 
effort, citing management's failure to change its ways and to support 
whole heartedly QWL. One union went further and said that corporate 
pressure was leading managers to attempt covert "work-rule changes." 
In these two unions only a few of the officers who were originally 
involved in establishing QWL were still in office; most had either lost 
elections or opted not to run, feeling burned out by the QWL effort and 
discouraged by the results. Only one local union continued the cooper 
ative efforts in its area of the mill.
The participative processes on the mill floor had not completely 
ceased, but the effort by management and labor to renew their institu 
tional relationship and to restructure the work environment of the mill 
was effectively dead.
Analysis
The ultimate impact of the QWL program at Bidwell is difficult to 
gauge. Given the limited objectives for the program, its demise proba 
bly did not have serious consequences for the parties. However, any set 
back, even small, can act as a deterrent to the initiation of other change 
efforts.
It is instructive to explore why, after getting off to a good start, the 
program came apart. Several explanations are possible. First, Bidwell 
mill management was not driven by a conviction about the need for
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either substantive changes or a change in the labor-management rela 
tionship. Rather, it was presented with a corporate mandate to engage 
in a particular change effort, i.e., QWL.
Underlying the QWL approach, which had become fashionable 
among progressive managers in many American industries by the 
1980s, was an implicit assumption of the desirability of creating coop 
erative relations with labor. However, the original motivation of Bid- 
well management to foster change was not based on a clear desire to 
produce commitment and cooperation as much as a perceived need to 
conform to a corporate mandate. Because its labor relations were not 
marked by strong adversarialism, management assumed it would be 
feasible to engage the unions in the fostering process.
Another key requirement for effective problem solving and attitude 
change was not sustained during this QWL initiative internal consen 
sus within both management and labor in the mill. In fact the absence 
of consensus and coherence within both the management and the labor 
communities contributed to the failure of the parties to negotiate robust 
change in their relationship.
Although less significant, the parties also failed to recognize the 
need for distributive bargaining structures and processes. For example, 
when labor and management appeared to have different preferences for 
the timing of the start of QWL activities, they failed to caucus (or con 
firm in some other way their interparty differences) and decide how to 
resolve them. The unaddressed differences exerted a deleterious effect 
on the relationship and the process.
Labor responded to management's stated bid for new relationships 
with workers and with their representatives by making a number of 
requests. Management acceded to some of labor's requests, such as the 
accelerated start of QWL activities, but not others, such as removing 
time clocks and acting to correct behavior of supervisors out of tune 
with the QWL philosophy. These failures by management to negotiate 
acceptable terms for labor's commitment and cooperation probably 
also reflected management's own ambivalence and disunity. The omis 
sions also underscored the need for both parties to have understood 
more explicitly that fostering efforts such as this QWL program were 
indeed a negotiation process, one in which they had to be capable of 
resolving contentious issues as well as engaging in problem solving.
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Further, it had to be a process responsive to substantive interorganiza- 
tional issues, as well as interparty attitude change.
A related limitation, often inherent in a QWL initiative, is the stan 
dard ground rule that these programs be kept separate from collective 
bargaining. The often-used guideline that subjects relating to contract 
negotiations will not be discussed within the participation process may 
be necessary to gain support from union leaders, but unless the foster 
ing efforts deal with fundamental work issues (governed by the con 
tract), then the change program is likely to diminish in importance 
(Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Kochan, and Verma 1991).
This necessary juxtaposition of collaboration and other negotiation 
activities creates many dilemmas. When the joint activities only deal 
with attitudes and the tenor of the relationship, they are dismissed 
(especially by bottom-line-oriented management) as "touchy-feely" 
activities that are long on rhetoric and short on results. A further issue 
has to do with the deep ambivalence of unions about all attitude change 
efforts. Most union leaders feel very uneasy about a process of attitude 
change that may align interests of employees much more directly with 
the company, thereby making it more difficult for the leaders to main 
tain their independent political standing.
In the case of Bidwell, one union attempted to hedge by maintaining 
an adversarial stance. Such ambivalence can pose obvious difficulties 
for the effective functioning of the new process. Subsequently, when 
the leaders of two unions withdrew cooperation from the process after 
concluding that they could not simultaneously be involved in a cooper 
ative process and an adversarial process, the QWL effort quickly 
unraveled.
Pivotal Events
Understanding "what went wrong" also involves an analysis of sev 
eral critical events that influenced the course of the ongoing negotia 
tions. The first pivotal event in the Bidwell case was the already- 
mentioned perfunctory decision by mill management to undertake the 
QWL effort. The follow-on steps of internal management education 
and initial discussions with the union leaders were taken on the basis of 
only cursory consideration of the magnitude of the changes they 
implied. They were made in the absence of informed leadership com-
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mitment to the change. As a consequence, management was commit 
ting the members of its organization to processes and outcomes for 
which it was unprepared emotionally.
A second pivotal event in the Bid well case was the decision to move 
ahead on the QWL program during the summer. Managers, who 
resented both the outcome and the way the decision was made, were 
less committed to the joint effort than if they had directly and con 
sciously negotiated their differences with the union leaders. The mean 
ing for union leaders was different they had successfully influenced 
the program and gained more sense of ownership of it than before 
when its terms had been shaped and initiated by management. The 
event also tarnished the consultant's image of neutrality in the eyes of 
managers.
Another pivotal event in the Bidwell case was the decision of the 
leaders of the union representing the paper machine operators not only 
to stand aside from any involvement in the QWL effort but also to 
actively discourage other unions from participating in the effort. This 
not only deepened the divisions within the local union structure, but 
aroused greater controversy in the mill, thereby helping to arrest the 
diffusion of new practices throughout the mill.
It is also important to remember that much of the fostering period 
was influenced by the uncertainties and changes of leadership that 
attended the sale of the entire mill. At the least, management and union 
opponents of change were handed a rational justification for their posi 
tion, and key managers had to shift time and attention to sale transac 
tions and integration of new management organization.
Revisiting the Critical Choices
If the parties had the opportunity to relive this story, what alterations 
in their choices might have made a significant difference in overall out 
comes?
First, the arrival of new ownership and management could have 
been used to galvanize attention to ways of improving the performance 
of the mill and the role of QWL in the process. Rather than signalling 
uncertainty, the new leadership could have used the occasion for a 
renewal of commitment to the existing change program.
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Second, any change program requires a certain tenacity and willing 
ness to stick it out through the middle period of limited results. Typi 
cally, these types of programs pass through a phase of initial euphoria, 
waning enthusiasm, and finally (but not always) acknowledged suc 
cess. Management at Bidwell may have given up too quickly.
Often in cases like Bidwell, a plateau effect develops when exagger 
ated expectations are not met. Specifically, management tends to view 
these programs as "magic bullets" that will instantly increase produc 
tivity and lower operating costs. For their part, union leaders see the 
projects as insuring that business and jobs will expand. When these 
high expectations are not met, disillusionment naturally occurs.
Third, insufficient attention was paid to creating the internal align 
ment within management that was required for QWL to expand and to 
succeed. We will see in the case of DeRidder (chapter 4) how critical it 
is to develop consensus and enthusiasm within management for a 
change program. Top management at Bidwell could not bring this 
about. Nor was the consultant able to help management develop the 
critical level of internal consensus. What was probably called for, given 
the fact that many managers had different interests, was a mild form of 
distributive bargaining. From this perspective it would have been 
appropriate for either management or the consultant to have allowed 
managers to caucus and sort out what they were prepared to endorse 
and then to have insisted that all managers support the concept and 
timetable for implementation of QWL.
In many ways, the Bidwell case may not seem very remarkable. The 
North American landscape is full of abandoned QWL and quality cir 
cle initiatives. However, it is important for this very reason. A close 
look at the case reveals a number of junctures where key issues of con 
cern to labor or management were not engaged. The initiative was 
treated as a program, rather than as an ongoing process of negotiation 
over issues of cooperation, commitment, decision making, and leader 
ship.
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CSX: AN AMBITIOUS ATTEMPT TO REACH A 
BREAKTHROUGH WITH ITS UNIONS
The CSX case is a dramatic example of fostering via integrative bar 
gaining.4 This joint planning project undertaken by CSX and its unions 
during the late 1980s stands out over the past two decades as one of the 
most ambitious change efforts in railroads. In this case a major carrier 
sought to engage in a change process with all of its operating and non- 
operating crafts to design a comprehensive package of new work rules, 
employment protection, and gainsharing.
CSX decided at the end of the 1984 negotiations to explore with its 
major operating unions the feasibility of joint exploration of a compre 
hensive change program. While management gave some attention to 
attitudinal change, the company moved rather expeditiously to place a 
proposal for substantive change in front of the unions. While this inte 
grative bargaining effort did not produce an agreement acceptable to all 
of the unions, it did create a substantially improved climate and a much 
greater understanding of the financial realities facing the parties.
Significant Features
Among the distinctive features of the CSX case are the following:
  Management took the initiative to develop a "win-win" proposal.
  The company was willing to share considerable financial informa 
tion, and the parties expended considerable effort to develop trust 
and to create openness.
  Within the context of an individual carrier attempting to realize a 
breakthrough agreement, it was important for the parties to involve 
all levels in the design of the new arrangements.
  A complex structure of many craft unions and many levels within 
the unions presented immense challenges in gaining acceptance for 
a negotiated plan (in fact, in an industrial relations system as inte 
grated as railroads, opposition in just a few regions of one union 
stopped this change effort).
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  Despite the positive attitudes engendered by the company's bold 
initiative, when the exercise had to be abandoned, the company 
was not able to capitalize effectively on the reservoir of goodwill, 
i.e., CSX faced the same resistance and difficulties in implement 
ing change at the local level as other carriers.
The CSX Story
As the 1984 round of national negotiations ended in 1987, key offi 
cials from CSX asked top union leaders whether they would be inter 
ested in embarking upon a different approach to the resolution of many 
long-standing issues. The premise advanced by the company was that 
if the parties could start a planning/negotiation process before the com 
mencement of the next round of national negotiations, then it might be 
possible for the parties to achieve substantial breakthroughs for the 
benefit of all concerned.
The concept originated with top leadership of CSX, specifically 
John Snow, the president who had joined the company after service 
with the Federal Railroad Administration and John Sweeney, vice- 
president of industrial relations, who had worked for Conrail during its 
critical period of revitalization. These two executives were convinced 
that a better way could be found than the arm's-length atmosphere of 
national negotiations and the drawn out procedures of the National 
Mediation Board.
The key unions responded affirmatively, and thus began a very 
intense and complex undertaking that spanned eighteen months and 
involved many, many meetings at various levels of the system. The ini 
tial meeting took place at Greenbriar, West Virginia, with the unions 
represented by their presidents except for the United Transportation 
Union (UTU), which sent a vice-president.
At this meeting, the company reviewed its financial situation and its 
intention to concentrate on railroading. The extent of overstaffing 
(from the company's perspective) was highlighted. With respect to 
potential solutions, the company indicated that it had several thoughts, 
ranging from gainsharing to some forms of employee ownership. Sub 
stantial time was allowed for the unions to ask questions of the various
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management representatives who were present, including those repre 
senting finance and operations, as well as labor relations.
Shortly thereafter, the executive board of the Railway Labor Execu 
tives Association (RLEA) held a meeting and invited CSX representa 
tives to make a follow-up presentation. The president of the UTU 
attended this session. As an outcome of this meeting, RLEA estab 
lished a task force to examine the CSX ideas that were starting to crys 
tallize into specific proposals. RLEA hired a consultant, Brian 
Freeman, to represent the interests of the different railroads; and for the 
next several months, various meetings took place between CSX offi 
cials and Freeman, accompanied by various union representatives. It 
was during this period that the idea of worker ownership was dropped 
in favor of crystallizing a gainsharing proposal.
Finalization of the Plan
In February 1988, at a meeting of all interested parties in Florida, 
the company presented an expanded proposal, and the unions were 
asked whether they wanted to consider the proposition in a formal 
manner. This decision was left to each union to make on a separate 
basis, but the company indicated it needed participation from unions 
representing at least 80 percent of the workers before it could proceed 
with a final proposal.
The plan represented a sweeping approach to work and institutional 
arrangements between CSX and its unions. The deal contemplated the 
reduction of the CSX workforce by approximately 10,000 workers out 
of a base employment of 42,000, with separation pay ranging from 
$30,000 to $50,000 per individual. Savings from the reduction of per 
sonnel would be shared with the workers remaining in employment on 
a 50-50 basis after separation costs had been amortized. In most 
instances crew sizes would be reduced to two persons per train, and 
there would be substantial intercraft flexibility in the repair shops. The 
application of these principles would be fleshed out on a union-by- 
union basis.
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Union Responses
The first union to step forward was the Brotherhood of Maintenance 
of Way Employees (BMWE). And in the discussions that took place, 
considerable progress was made in refining the proposal. A potential 
win-win arrangement involved a proposal to reduce the seasonality of 
work gangs specifically, the development of additional employment 
opportunities within the maintenance shops during winter months.
However, the draft was rejected by the UTU general chairmen (each 
from a different region) toward the end of March. The meeting 
included a presentation by Brian Freeman, as well as by representa 
tives from CSX. The general chairmen said, in effect: "This is the first 
time we have heard about this plan, and we are not convinced that it is 
a good deal." This response proved fatal for the plan.
Shortly after the negative vote of the UTU general chairmen, the 
company decided to explain the features of the proposal in a letter sent 
to all employees to their homes. Some local UTU leaders criticized the 
company for not sharing more information sooner, and others labeled 
the communication as an "end-run."
Basically, the opposition to the plan from the leaders of the UTU 
centered around the fact that almost 4,000 of the 10,000 workers who 
would be severed would come from the ranks of the UTU. However, 
the savings would be shared equally across all remaining union mem 
bers. Given its proportion of the total workforce, the share going to 
UTU members would approximate 25 percent (compared to the 40 per 
cent that they would comprise of the separated workers).
Another explanation for the rejection was more institutional. CSX 
management remarked in interviews: "If we could only have made 
resources available to the unions to compensate for a reduction in dues 
paying members, we would have been able to get over the rough 
spots." In essence, the parties found the task of designing a scheme to 
provide financial assistance to a union in decline insurmountable. By 
contrast, in a number of manufacturing industries, the creation of joint 
training and career development funds had made it possible for 
resources to be provided for union staff who were needed for coopera 
tive activities. Such an approach had not emerged in railroads.
Still, it is noteworthy that the process undertaken by CSX and its 
unions produced tentative agreement on the part of several crafts and
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the development of a very innovative plan for dealing with many of the 
central problems of the railroad industry. A high degree of trust 
emerged among many key officials. Several union leaders praised man 
agement at CSX for openness and constructive efforts to deal with 
worker and union interests. Richard Kilroy, then chairman of the 
RLEA, commented that CSX made available complete financial infor 
mation so that the unions could judge the "facts of the current and 
long-term picture." He noted that one of the striking aspects of CSX's 
proposal was that the company claimed no current financial crisis. 
Rather, the company emphasized that while it was in the black, profit 
levels ($400 million in 1985) were not good enough for the long term. 
Kilroy concluded by saying: "The first ingredient of a project of this 
magnitude is trust. I know there will be employment declines, whether 
I sit at the table or not".
The Aftermath
Subsequent to the shelving of the gainsharing proposal (as it came 
to be called), the company sought to reach agreements with local gen 
eral chairmen on voluntary plans for reductions in staffing (in distinc 
tion to the tabled proposal that would have required junior workers to 
accept separation if not enough volunteers could be found). However, 
little if any progress was made at the local level in reaching agreement 
on new staffing levels despite the fact that the workers would have 
retained their special pay rules (usually these "arbitraries" add at least 
40 percent to base compensation) and the company would not have had 
to share ongoing savings realized from reduced crew sizes.
Since CSX was not covered for its UTU workers by the 1991-92 
national agreement, it sought in local negotiations to reach agreement 
on revised crew sizes. Ironically, these agreements were less favorable 
to the company than the arrangements that the other railroads realized 
as a result of national bargaining.
Yet some indication of cooperation can be cited. In 1990 the parties 
inaugurated an employee involvement program in the Florida region. 
Also, in opening a new computer subsidiary, CSX agreed to recognize 
the clerical union (TCU) and to train surplus workers from the other 
crafts for this new information center.
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In general, considerable disappointment was voiced, and in some 
quarters there was a feeling of failure that a significant program 
designed by the management and union architects had not gone for 
ward. Some of the animosity was directed at the UTU, which did not 
ratify the agreement and thereby forced the overall package to be put 
aside. The possibility that other unions interested in the proposal would 
put pressure on the UTU to reconsider did not materialize. In fact, the 
UTU distanced itself from other craft unions by stating its intention of 
becoming the "industry union" of railroads.
Analysis
The rejection of the package proposal illustrates a basic dynamic in 
large-scale fostering initiatives. From the viewpoint of CSX, it seemed 
logical to fashion a program to reduce the workforce rapidly, to gain 
more flexibility in the deployment of personnel and to share the 
savings with the workers who remained. But a number of key union 
leaders felt that it was "crass" for a union to "sell jobs" and allow those 
who remained (as a result of possessing sufficient seniority) to benefit 
handsomely from the deal. When this perceived inequity was com 
bined with the reality that the size of the unions (especially the UTU) 
would be shrunk rapidly (with a corresponding diminution in dues 
income), then a profound difference in perspectives existed. Interest 
ingly, if the financial crisis had been severe enough (as in the case of 
Conrail) and the challenge before the parties had been one of survival, 
then these misgivings about exchanging money for employment reduc 
tions might have been less dominant.
CSX was able to convince most of the top leadership of the unions 
regarding the need for change, but this conviction was not extended in 
the ratification process to the lower levels of the organization, espe 
cially within the UTU. This top-down approach almost worked, but in 
the end key leaders were not able to produce attitudinal change deep 
and broad enough to convince members and their respective 
representatives about the wisdom of accepting a dramatically different 
approach to industrial relations.
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The CSX story also clearly underscores the difficulties in achieving 
internal consensus, especially on the union side. At CSX, employees 
were represented by thirteen different unions, with approximately 140 
different general chairmen. The task of achieving majority support 
within each separate union, and in the case of the large unions, major 
ity support within each region, posed a formidable challenge. Add to 
this the historic rivalries among the craft unions (for example, com 
pany officials were not successful in bringing representatives from sev 
eral of the key unions together in the same room) and it is clear why 
leading negotiators were not able to use "group pressure" to ameliorate 
differences in outlook. In fact, after several preliminary meetings, most 
of the negotiations took place with subsets of the unions; and in the 
case of meetings with UTU representatives, other unions were not 
present for these critical discussions. Several strategic alternatives 
were available to the parties in this complex situation.
Testing the Possibilities of a More Deliberate Approach
Some union leaders criticized CSX management for moving ahead too 
fast and not utilizing a multiunion task force that might have achieved 
more buy-in both across and within the unions. In choosing its 
approach, the company opted for dispatch and concreteness, i.e., crys 
tallizing a plan rather early as a way of focusing the negotiations. Sig 
nificantly, it chose to meet separately with the major unions.
While the approach of a multiunion working party might have 
increased the chances of success, company officials point out that it 
was important to learn "sooner rather than later" whether its program 
was feasible. Basically, management wanted to determine whether an 
innovative package could be formulated away from the procedures of 
national negotiations. Key executives reasoned that they would not be 
worse off if discussions failed, and they might create a better set of 
shared understandings for proceeding with change on a more decen 
tralized basis.
The Use of an Agent by the Craft Unions
Once the negotiations got into high gear, a professional consultant 
was used by the unions to represent them in discussions with the com-
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pany. This choice was based on the fact that the negotiations involved 
fairly technical decisions about the possibility of employee ownership 
plans and gainsharing formulas. This arrangement did have some 
drawbacks, however. Specifically, it meant that there was less interac 
tion between key company officials and key union leaders. Also, it 
meant that most of the interactions were happening at the top, leaving 
lower levels of union leadership outside the process.
The package eventually was turned down by the general chairmen 
from UTU, who were not involved in the process. The chances of suc 
cessful ratification of the package might have been enhanced by direct 
involvement of such key local leaders.
Company Versus Industry Negotiations
The most important strategic choice to revisit is whether in retro 
spect it was better for CSX to have attempted to work out a carrier- 
level agreement with its unions (and failed) or whether CSX would 
have been better served to have remained in national handling and 
worked for the culmination of the 1988 round of industry bargaining. 
Given the fact that several other major carriers (such as Union Pacific 
and Norfolk Southern) chose to seek changes in work rules via national 
negotiations and as a result of the 1991-92 negotiations and related 
emergency board recommendations have fared very well (in fact better 
than CSX) in terms of their progress toward two-person crew sizes, the 
quick judgment might be that CSX gambled and lost.
However, the appraisal must be more reasoned and needs to con 
sider other factors. First, the effort undertaken by CSX in 1988 pre 
empted the attention of the entire industry. National negotiations that 
were due to commence that year were delayed until the outcome of the 
CSX deliberations was clear. For one reason, national-level union offi 
cials could not handle two sets of major negotiations. More important, 
many carriers wanted to see whether an individual company could 
achieve a breakthrough. If CSX had been successful, no doubt it would 
have created a pattern for other carrier-level negotiations.
Second, the effort by CSX, while it failed, did create considerable 
discussion and attention to schemes for achieving reduced crew sizes. 
In this sense, CSX must be given considerable credit for the concepts 
that finally were embedded in the 1991-92 national agreements.
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It is not surprising that the same local resistance that prevented the 
gainsharing package from being approved also slowed the implementa 
tion of the 1991-92 national pattern at CSX. Only time will tell 
whether the improved relations that developed with several unions as a 
result of the gainsharing discussions can be translated into commensu 
rate substantive gains.
Lessons Learned
The CSX case teaches a number of important lessons about large- 
scale systems change. First, and most important, we see that the com 
plex network of relationships with many craft unions at both national 
and local levels cannot be ignored. In this case the system not only 
included labor-management relationships, but also cross-union rela 
tionships and dynamics within unions. Second, we see the value of an 
initial negotiations text (generated in this case by management) in 
focusing the dialogue among representatives in such a complex system. 
Inevitably, there is a tension between the first two lessons building 
full consensus across a complex system of relationships can be an end 
less task, yet in this case moving ahead quickly with a concrete pro 
posal can preempt the development of supportive relationships.
Hindsight is always 20/20. During the early and mid-1980s when it 
looked like the rate of change in work rules and staffing would remain 
slow, the effort by various carriers to work out company-level plans 
with their unions seemed like a winning strategy. The fact that during 
the early 1990s the big gains came as a result of industry level-negotia 
tions could mean that the potential of change at this level has now been 
fully exploited and the future will see greater emphasis on accommo 
dation and change at the carrier and local levels.
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CUMULATIVE EFFECTS OF SUCCESSFUL 
FOSTERING INITIATIVES
Anderson Pattern and the Pattern Makers Association 
of Muskegon
The essence of the Anderson story is that the parties proceeded in a 
step-by-step fashion to implement a fostering strategy, starting with 
limited initiatives and eventually evolving into a broad agenda that 
mixed both integrative bargaining and relationship changes that bene 
fited the company, the workers, and the union. 5
Key factors associated with the successful sequence were the style 
of the CEO, who had been a pattern maker, the business decision to 
move away from serving original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) as 
a primary market and an effective linkage of technological change, 
revised work rules, and employment security.
Significant Features
The Anderson case represents the clearest success story in our sam 
ple of fostering strategies. In this regard it will be important to identify 
some of the factors that contributed to positive outcomes. Key factors 
include:
  In a small company situation, the style and initiative of top man 
agement had a profound impact on the process of change.
  Certain joint activities, which by themselves might seem inconse 
quential (e.g., a joint delegation visiting a trade show), turned out 
to be significant turning points for the relationship.
  Imaginative problem solving resulted in a series of packages that 
met the key interests of the parties.
  Innovative agreements between this employer and the union weak 
ened areawide bargaining (involving multiple employers dealing 
with the same union).
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  Engaging workers and the union at every step of the process of 
introducing new technology generated strong commitment, 
thereby ensuring a successful introduction of the new equipment.
  While initial pilot experiments (with new technology in this case) 
depended on goodwill and trust, subsequent large scale diffusion 
depended on substantive changes (such as language minimizing 
the risk of job loss).
 Despite a multiyear history of successful fostering, distributive 
confrontations continued to occur sometimes even as a direct 
result of earlier fostering successes (such as disagreements over 
the use of newly acquired training skills).
While there are unique aspects to the Anderson Pattern case, such as 
its predominantly skilled trades workforce, there are many features of 
the case that are characteristic of small firms. These include the key 
role of the entrepreneur/owner, the informal nature of interactions, and 
the capacity for dramatic substantive change once a moderate degree of 
attitudinal change has occurred. In this regard, the case teaches lessons 
relevant to a large number of North American firms.
Background
Originally founded in 1931, Anderson Pattern is a leading North 
American firm in what it calls the "shape" industry, which includes the 
manufacture of permanent molds, dies, patterns and related design and 
machining operations. The firm's specialties include wheel molds, 
engine castings, and other design-and-build work for the automobile 
industry. This is a small firm with 110 employees and annual sales of 
$12 million, though it is the flagship plant for a company that includes 
two pattern-making operations in Michigan and one each in Ohio, Ari 
zona, and Ontario. The larger company has a total of 200 employees 
and sales of $20 million. It also has international production arrange 
ments with shops in Mexico.
The president and chief executive officer of Anderson Pattern, John 
Mclntyre, was at one time a journeyman pattern maker. He came to 
Anderson Pattern as general manager in 1980 and purchased the firm
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in 1982 along with a partner, Thomas Lerowx, the current vice-presi 
dent. In this small-firm context, Mclntyre's values and personality have 
played a critical role in negotiations over fundamental changes. His 
commitment to implementing the best practices has built on his vora 
cious appetite for popular business literature. Hence, Mclntyre sought 
to make this an "excellent" firm, orientated towards total quality, and 
he has coined the following motto or overall goal for the firm: "We will 
be leaders, innovators and masters of the shape industry . . . competi 
tive worldwide."
At the time of this study, about 85 employees were highly skilled 
and members of the Pattern Makers Association of Muskegon, an affil 
iate of the Pattern Makers League of North America. The balance of 
the employees were supervisors, managers, and sales and office staff. 
Pattern makers, once they achieve journeyman status, were paid the 
same wage (in the early 1990s, just over $20 per hour).
Historically, the pattern-making industry was entirely unionized, 
with uniform wages across all shops. Workers were highly mobile, 
often leaving one shop for another to get more overtime or more inter 
esting work. However, by the early 1990s, workers tended to stay with 
the same employer for longer periods of time due to the rise of non 
union operations. For example, in Muskegon, only half of the pattern 
making industry shops (four out of eight) remained unionized. As one 
pattern maker who was working as a supervisor expressed it:
Pattern makers are kind of independent. It was always: "If I don't 
like it here, I can go down the street." There is less moving now 
because there is less down the street.
Jim Howard, the business manager of the Pattern Makers Associa 
tion of Muskegon, also worked at Anderson Pattern. The workforce at 
the other three unionized operations in Muskegon also belonged to the 
Association, with collective bargaining traditionally negotiated on an 
areawide basis. Given that certain aspects of employment relations 
were governed on an areawide basis (such as wage levels and benefits 
administration), a key challenge to the union was the desire by Ander 
son Pattern for increasingly distinctive contract provisions.
Our focus will be on fundamental changes that occurred with 
respect to several substantive outcomes, specifically the addition of 
profit sharing to the compensation package, increased flexibility in the
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utilization of new technology, increased job security, expanded worker 
training, and greater worker autonomy on the shop floor.
A Managerial Initiative to Offer Profit Sharing
In 1984, approximately two years after Mclntyre became co-owner 
of Anderson Pattern, the collective bargaining agreement expired 
between Anderson Pattern, the three other unionized pattern-making 
firms, and the Pattern Makers Association of Muskegon. Although 
most of the negotiations were conducted on an areawide basis, a pro 
posal to establish a profit-sharing plan, raised by John Mclntyre, was 
of no interest to the other employers. As a result, discussions pro 
ceeded bilaterally between the union and Anderson Pattern.
The union's initial response to the proposal was negative for two 
reasons. First, the union had higher priorities and did not see this sub 
ject as highly valued by its members. Second, the union was concerned 
about breaking from the single areawide compensation package. How 
ever, Mclntyre felt that a profit-sharing plan would more tightly align 
the interests of the employees with those of the firm. As a result, he 
indicated that he was prepared to "give" the union profit sharing with 
out seeking anything in return. In this case, the union saw little reason 
to say no. As the union's then business manager and lead negotiator put 
it:
At the time, we told John Mclntyre that the people didn't give a 
damn about profit sharing. He insisted. There was nothing to lose, 
so we took it.
By including the profit-sharing provision in the contract, the parties 
departed from traditional practices in a number of aspects. First, it was 
unusual for management to raise such an issue. Second, this was not a 
case of traditional hard bargaining. Instead, as a most simple form of 
fostering, management gave the employees the chance to earn addi 
tional income via profit sharing without asking for anything in return. 
Third, this was a decentralization of bargaining over compensation, 
which was previously handled on a centralized multiemployer basis.
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Finally, the provision represented an explicit attempt by management 
to move toward a social contract based on employee commitment.
Over the first five years, the profit-sharing plan paid out $260,000 in 
benefits. The annual distribution of a profit-sharing check took place at 
a special dinner in August, for which printed invitations were sent to all 
employees and their spouses. Featured speakers were invited. For 
example, the speaker in 1989 was Martin Devries of Grand Valley State 
University, who discussed: "Can the U.S. Sustain its World Economic 
Position?" In addition, door prizes were awarded and the two owners 
distributed the year's profit-sharing checks. Over 120 employees and 
spouses attended the 1989 dinner.
Profit sharing posed dilemmas and opportunities for both parties. 
One minor issue was that some employees would have preferred larger 
checks to having a ceremonial dinner, while others enjoyed the event. 
A larger issue was illustrated by the following union member's com 
ment: "I have become a believer. The concept has merit, though there 
are still some problems with the way it is designed and administered." 
As the statement suggested, the profit-sharing plan posed continual 
administrative challenges for management if it was to serve as a moti 
vator. For the union, it posed a deeper challenge should the union 
take on a more active role in this aspect of compensation (e.g., sharing 
credit for its successes and blame for any shortfalls)?
Bargaining Over the Introduction of New Technology
Approximately one year after the profit-sharing language was nego 
tiated, a second major managerial initiative unfolded this time in the 
area of new technology. Historically, Anderson Pattern had regularly 
upgraded equipment, for example, replacing lathes and drill presses 
and adding computer numerical controls (CNC). Machine tolerances 
and consistency improved, but the organization of work did not funda 
mentally change. In 1985, however, the president of Anderson Pattern 
approached the union with a unique proposal.
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A Proposed Quid Pro Quo
Mclntyre indicated that he would be willing to spend a few million 
dollars to purchase a state-of-the-art center containing a coordinate 
measuring machine. He noted as a quid pro quo, however, that 
increased flexibility would be required in order to run the equipment 
with fewer workers (and with each worker running multiple opera 
tions).
At issue was a restrictive contract provision (Article XIX) that only 
allowed operators to run more than one "automatic" machine if no 
workers were laid off and, even then, only for certain combinations of 
machines.6 Under this arrangement, the firm was constrained in bid 
ding on certain contracts since the only safe assumption in making a 
bid was to plan on one operator for each machine. The importance of 
the contract language to the union was evidenced by a two-year strike 
against another firm in the Muskegon area over "one man running 
more than one machine." This strike ultimately ended in the decertifi 
cation of the union at that location creating an object lesson of forc 
ing and escape for the parties at Anderson Pattern.
Management's approach to the subject of new technology was a 
departure from the traditional modes of interaction in a number of 
respects. First, the proposal was made outside of the areawide bargain 
ing structure. Second, it was made on an informal basis, while the 
existing collective bargaining agreement was still in force. Third, the 
proposal asked for a sharp departure from the highly specific provi 
sions in the existing collective bargaining agreement. Finally, manage 
ment wanted dialogue with the union regarding capital resource 
allocations usually a carefully protected strategic right of manage 
ment. The proposal was pivotal both with respect to the process (repre 
senting a potential shift toward decentralized and more informal 
interactions) and the substance (as a potential change in the contract 
regarding machine operations and management rights).
A series of meetings followed. The subject was hotly debated 
among all employees. The second pivotal event involved a form of atti- 
tudinal structuring directly aimed at resolving the internal differences 
within the workforce. The president of Anderson Pattern offered to 
make arrangements for any interested employees to travel to Chicago 
to see the proposed equipment at a trade show that was then under way.
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Although only twenty-five machine shop employees would be directly 
affected by this new technology, almost the entire workforce chose to 
go to the trade show. According the union's business manager, the 
workers returned with a vivid understanding of how computer-con 
trolled equipment could operate feasibly with fewer workers. More 
over, he reported that most workers were persuaded that the equipment 
could "make us competitive enough to increase volume so that we 
wouldn't have to eliminate people."
Management's initial overture embodied a fostering approach it 
was a proposal, not a demand. The decision to subsidize the education 
of the entire workforce on the issue (via the trip to Chicago) served to 
reinforce the initial fostering strategy. Still, the union was concerned 
just how far to depart from existing practice.
In retrospect, the negotiations were distinguished as a special case in 
two ways. First, management did not push for the complete elimination 
of the contract language on machine operation it only asked for an 
exception for the two proposed pieces of equipment. Second, the pro 
posed exception was only to be in effect until the expiration of the 
existing collective bargaining agreement. An additional issue of impor 
tance to the union concerned the new work associated with program 
ming and maintaining the equipment, which it wanted to keep in the 
bargaining unit. Management agreed to this proposal.
This fostering approach proved successful. On May 10, 1985, the 
parties signed two letters of understanding: one for a programmable 
coordinate measuring machine and one for a vertical CNC milling 
machine. The wording of the letters was similar, with each waiving the 
"one employee, one machine" rule and guaranteeing that programming 
and other such work would remain in the bargaining unit. For example, 
the text of the CNC milling machine letter was as follows:
Agreement
It is herein agreed that until May 31, 1987, the following letter is 
in addition to the current contract between Anderson Pattern and 
the Pattern MakersAssociation of Muskegon and vicinity.
Anderson Pattern, Inc. will purchase a Mazak V-20 Vertical CNC 
milling machine with toolcharger and a pallet system. This 
machine will have functions allowing it to run unattended.
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This machine will have an assigned operator at all times who, 
under the guidelines of safety and common sense, may be 
assigned to operate another machine at any time it is feasible to 
allow the Mazak V-20 to run unattended.
All work done on this machine will be considered bargaining unit 
work.
The one man/one machine provision of the Article XIX does not 
apply to this machine.
All programming for this machine will be done by bargaining unit 
employees, except a program provided by the customer may be 
used or it may be translated into the V-20's language from an out- 
source.
The agreement itself marked a third pivotal event, taking the parties 
a step further down a fostering path. They had agreed to conduct a two- 
year experiment that represented a fundamental departure from estab 
lished machine operation procedures.
In reflecting on the agreement, the union's then business manager 
(who negotiated the agreement) commented:
Until recently, pattern making was 99 percent unionized. Restric 
tive work rules didn't matter because we all worked under the 
same rules. That changed in the 1980s. Now an employer will 
only spend a half-million dollars on a new machine if that 
machine can be fully used. What do we gain if, instead, that 
investment goes to a nonunion shop? The best thing to do was to 
negotiate training arrangements so that our people learn the latest 
technology.
It is important to note that the parties did not depart fully from a tra 
ditional frame of reference emphasizing contractual specificity. Even 
in allowing for increased flexibility, they were very precise about the 
scope (two machines), the time frame (two years), and the additional 
conditions (programming being done by bargaining unit employees). 
Thus, while the substance of the contract had been dramatically altered 
and the parties had departed from the areawide bargaining structure, 
some key norms governing the labor-management relationship had not 
changed.
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Making Flexibility the Rule, Rather than the Exception
In 1987, the collective bargaining agreement expired, along with the 
letters of understanding regarding the new equipment. This set the 
stage for a fourth pivotal event. The parties were faced with the ques 
tion of whether to abandon or continue to expand their experiment.
Management again took the lead. It proposed the elimination of the 
entire contract provision on machine operations (Article XIX). Further, 
management proposed establishing a new form of work organization 
around work cells where the work of each operator would be defined 
relative to multiple machines.
Management's proposals were highly controversial within the 
union. Although the union membership had been correct in their 
assessment that the two new pieces of equipment as a special case  
would generate a sufficient increase in volume to maintain the existing 
workforce, it was much harder to assess the potential impact of com 
pletely eliminating the contact language. It was very possible that the 
increased flexibility would contribute to increased business, but it was 
also possible that severe consequences would be triggered by a sharp 
downturn. Further heightening this concern was the fact that within the 
pattern-making profession layoffs had not been made on the basis of 
seniority, but rather on the basis of work requirements and worker 
skills. As a result, management's proposal provoked deep job security 
concerns among the entire workforce.
As a small auto supply firm, job security was a difficult issue to 
address. The industry had been cyclical and small firms generally did 
not have the slack resources nor alternative work that was available in 
large firms. Nevertheless, the union took a strong bargaining stance 
and indicated that unless management addressed job security, it would 
not agree to the work cells or to the elimination of Article XIX.
While Anderson Pattern could not provide a blanket no-layoff 
pledge, the parties found a way to ensure that no individuals would dis 
proportionately suffer the consequences of the increased flexibility. 
Specifically, in the event of a downturn, the parties agreed that a 
worker could not be laid off for longer than two months, unless 75 per 
cent of the workers in that work area had been laid off for more than 
two months. Management also requested the elimination of the union's 
midterm right to strike under the contract.
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The midterm right to strike, historically an emotional issue, was less 
important to the members given the outcomes of strikes they observed 
in other area firms. At the same time, the promised new investment in 
the business and the language on job security were viewed as important 
gains. The workers thus agreed to eliminate Article XIX. Summing up 
the union's justification in eliminating the contract language on 
machine use, the current union business manager stated:
Do we want to protect jobs and skills that are becoming noncom- 
petitive or do we want to provide the opportunity for our members 
to learn new and more competitive skills?
He also noted that highly skilled pattern makers "would go nuts if their 
only job was to program a machine and watch it operate."
In eliminating Article XIX and the midterm right to strike, while 
introducing job security language and a promise of new investment, the 
parties were not only making significant substantive changes, but they 
were also moving away from the traditional regulatory approach to 
issues. Stated differently, they were moving away from positional bar 
gaining (how many machines could one person operate) and toward 
more of a problem-solving approach centered on underlying interests 
(flexibility and job security). It is important to note, however, that man 
agement's fostering overtures on flexibility occurred in a context where 
the union had lost the ability to keep work rules out of contention, and 
where forcing and escape were realistic alternatives. Equally, the union 
had to take a distributive stance on job security to establish this interest 
as a legitimate part of the discussion.
Further Pivotal Events in Training and Health Care
The training programs at Anderson Pattern illustrate the evolving 
nature of the relationship following the introduction of new technology 
and the expansion of job security. The first pivotal event occurred when 
training was expanded to the entire existing workforce, once the agree 
ments were reached on new technology. The initial actions on training 
occurred on a unilateral basis by the employer. Management created 
educational opportunities for all employees by forging partnerships
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with external institutions (a local community college and a four-year 
college). First, a series of training courses were established with the 
community college that were just focused on the new technology. 
Then, additional courses were added so that employees could earn a 
two-year degree. Ultimately, an arrangement was established with a 
local four-year college that would accept the two-year coursework 
towards a four-year degree all paid for by the company.
Initially, the expanding educational options played a pivotal role by 
reinforcing the fostering between the employer and the employees. The 
course offerings propelled employee-employer relations in a direction 
that emphasized increased commitment, as evidenced by the high num 
ber of employees that chose to pursue the additional training. The edu 
cational choices, however, did not involve the union and hence did not 
reinforce the growing focus on labor-management cooperation.
A subsequent pivotal event did involve the union. This was associ 
ated with the emerging equity issues around utilizing the new skills. As 
the union business manager described the situation:
The training program is popular. Many members have taken 
advantage of it. But, it has caused some hard feelings for people 
who have taken classes and who are not able to now use the skills. 
Realistically, it isn't practical to have everyone run every machine. 
It would be great to allow people to run the center for a length of 
time, but there are still only 4-6 CNC positions and 25 guys who 
have now been trained to operate the equipment.
Issues such as these could inevitably undermine management rela 
tions with individual workers and union leadership simply because 
employee commitment might be reduced for those who cannot use the 
new skills, and union-management cooperation might be weakened 
since the union would be saddled with the task of managing complex 
internal differences. It remains to be seen how these issues will be 
resolved, but it is clear that there is more at stake than merely the inter 
ests of a few workers being able to use their skills more fully.
A separate set of pivotal events also took place with respect to health 
care, involving the union, Anderson Pattern, and other area pattern- 
making shops. In 1984, the union had pressed the employers to move 
from a set contribution for health care to a situation where the 
employer bore the full cost a pivotal shift in the structure of the sys-
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tern. When the employers responded by focusing on cutting costs, the 
union came back in the 1987 negotiations to request a return to the old 
situation, which the employers rejected a second pivotal event. Then, 
by 1990 the continued escalation in health care costs led the employers 
to indicate that they would indeed be willing to return to making a set, 
defined contribution rather then covering the full cost of health care. 
This time, the union rejected the idea a third pivotal event.
This sequence of events teaches important lessons about strategic 
negotiations. Under the original arrangement, there were both common 
and competing interests between the union and the employers, but the 
structure emphasized the common interests. When the structure shifted 
to total costs, the parties interests diverged. Subsequently, events that 
led one or the other party to want to return to the original arrangement 
did not produce the desired change. While maintaining the original 
structure would not have eliminated the inevitable tensions associated 
with rising health care costs, the parties would have at least faced this 
challenge from the vantage point of a cooperative structure for joint 
governance rather than in the context of an already contested set of 
relations on this issue. Changing the "rules of the game" is a powerful 
tool, but it can produce unwanted as well as beneficial outcomes.
Analysis
The Anderson Pattern case represents a long-term unfolding story 
with numerous fostering initiatives.
On the substantive side, the main accomplishments were the imple 
mentation of profit sharing and the introduction of advanced technol 
ogy, with more flexible staffing patterns. In summarizing their 
experience with new technology at the 1989 Michigan Governor's
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Conference on Labor-Management Relations, the union business man 
ager identified the following positive results from a union perspective:
  The workers who are involved in operating these machines feel a 
sense of accomplishment in both their ability to master the 
machine and also the type of work they can produce from this 
equipment. They are glad they can go on to something else while 
the machine is operating in the automatic mode.
  The machines allowed us to be competitive in types of work that 
are nontraditional for pattern shops.
  No one lost his or her job because of the changes. 
Among the significant outcomes were the following:
Significant Outcomes—Anderson Pattern
Substantive 
outcomes
Investment in new
technology
Flexible work rules
Profit sharing
Limitations on 
layoffs
Health care formula
restructured
Elimination of
midterm right to
strike
Management- 
employee relations
Increased worker
autonomy
Increased
information sharing
with employees
Frustrations over 
use of new CAM
skills
Gradual movement
toward high
commitment,
building on the base
of a highly skilled
workforce
Management- 
union relations
Increased informal
dialogue and
midterm 
negotiations
Management
investment a subject 
of negotiations
Gradual movement
toward cooperation, 
but with few formal
institutions
Other outcomes
Increasing
departure from area
pattern bargaining 
structure
Dramatic business
growth 
New institutional
arrangements with a
community college 
and a four-year
college
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The union business manager also noted the following negative con 
sequences from a union perspective, which focus on equity issues:
Because of the high utilization of the machines, men in the tradi 
tional machining area are at the bottom of the overtime list and at 
the top of the list for layoffs. They also feel left out because they 
have not had the opportunity to be trained on the new equipment.
At the same panel session, the president of Anderson Pattern pointed 
to five years of new technology investment totaling over $3 million, 
which had been possible as a result of the agreements with the union. 
During the same period, sales tripled to over $11 million (including 
$1.5 million in exports).
On balance, the relationship between Anderson Pattern and the 
union shifted from arm's length toward cooperation. As well, the rela 
tions between management and employees shifted from one of moder 
ate control toward one increasingly characterized by employee 
commitment.
However, unresolved issues still remained. For example, the initial 
profit-sharing plan strengthened ties between the employer and the 
employees, but created a new area of ambiguity for the union. The 
accord linking new technology with job security served to reinforce 
relations between the company and the union as well as between the 
company and its employees. Yet, unresolved issues remained regarding 
training for the new technology.
To explain the successes at Anderson Pattern it is important to look 
at both internal and external factors. Internally, the values and back 
ground of the primary owner/entrepreneur (including his ability to 
speak the workers' language and his commitment to sharing informa 
tion) were critical. Equally critical was the union's willingness to break 
from traditional areawide collective bargaining and to engage in mid- 
contract negotiations. The tradition of autonomy among skilled trades 
workers was also important, including a desire to return to "the way 
things used to be" regarding self-directed work. In the larger context, 
the small size of the firm was a key factor. For example, it was feasible 
to educate the entire workforce about proposed changes in technology. 
A backdrop of escape and forcing in the broader community and area 
industry was also a key factor management did not have to articulate
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forcing threats since the forcing alternative was readily apparent to all 
parties involved.
Taken together, the experiences of Anderson Pattern and the Pattern 
Makers Association of Muskegon illustrate the iterative process by 
which a cooperative labor-management arrangement was constructed. 
At the time of our study, the parties were fashioning, on a piecemeal 
basis, elements of what appeared to be a very different labor-manage 
ment relationship. It remains to be seen whether they will choose to 
explicitly discuss the nature of the social contracts that the major stake 
holders (management, the union, and the employees) would prefer. 
One thing is certain, however as a small firm the process is 
informal and highly pragmatic. As the union business manager com 
mented: "There is no formal setting to work out problems, we just tell 
each other our problems and we work them out." The president of 
Anderson Pattern expressed the same point even more bluntly: "With 
about 100 people you can eliminate the B.S. factor and deal with real- 
ity."
OVERVIEW OF THE FOSTERING CASES
Our three fostering cases fall across a wide spectrum in terms of 
results. One case, Bidwell, barely got started with a QWL program 
only to have it abandoned. A second case, CSX, embarked upon an 
ambitious integrative bargaining exercise that did not come to fruition. 
The third, Anderson, succeeded admirably in a multiyear iterative pro 
cess of negotiating dramatic substantive and relationship changes.
Like all strategies, fostering contains risks not just that the goals 
might fail to be realized. There is a deeper risk that relationships might 
be worsened as a result of the venture down a path of change. Bidwell, 
for example, ended up without a QWL program, with increased dis 
cord within management, and with slightly increased distrust between 
labor and management. Even though CSX did not end up worse off 
when the gainsharing approach had to be shelved, the setback affected 
the overall momentum for change.
At Anderson Pattern, we saw that the small size of the firm, leader 
ship, risk-taking on both sides, a skilled trades workforce, and a back 
drop involving forcing and escape were all keys to success. By
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contrast, at Bidwell and CSX, where multiple unions were present, the 
complexity of the change process increased considerably, and the par 
ties were not able to solve issues of internal consensus. Bidwell illus 
trates that this task is often as difficult on the management side as on 
the union side of the equation.
In terms of the important choice of starting with attitude change ver 
sus substantive integrative bargaining, clearly an emphasis on both 
dimensions was ultimately necessary. Anderson Pattern illustrated the 
need to deal with both the relationship and substance.
It is helpful to abstract several themes in terms of best practice for 
executing a fostering strategy. First is the development of initial levels 
of trust. Some of this occurs as a result of the time spent together in 
joint activities by key players who previously may have interacted only 
in an adversarial atmosphere. Credibility and good faith are particu 
larly important ingredients. Often the process starts out slowly because 
one party, usually the worker/union side, is skeptical of whether the 
other (management) really wants to conduct its affairs with input from 
other stakeholders. Thus, some token or symbolic action is required 
early on in the process to convince all concerned that management is 
serious and open minded. This requirement can be realized when man 
agement moves quickly to handle worker/union concerns, e.g., dealing 
with long-standing safety problems.
A second feature of the process is what theorists have referred to as 
an unfreezing event and the creation of a superordinate goal that pro 
vides a rallying point to bring parties together on a common basis. In 
some cases, threatened bankruptcy of the firm has produced the crisis. 
As well, improving quality of service or products has become a similar 
catalyst in a number of attitude change programs. Increased business 
opportunities (and hence jobs) can be another catalyst.
A third ingredient of a successful process is the ultimate "bottom 
line" that there be concrete benefits for all parties. For management, 
concrete benefits may include demonstrated gains on cost, quality, and 
delivery outcomes, as well as increased flexibility in operations and 
fewer daily hassles in managing operations. For union leaders and 
members the benefits may come in terms of job security, increased 
skills, the sharing of financial gains, greater institutional stability for 
the union, and also fewer daily hassles on the job. In other words, out 
comes must be present that meet the respective interests of workers,
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union representatives, and management in order to reinforce and 
extend fostering strategies.
If these guidelines had been employed at Bidwell and CSX, would 
they have helped move these two cases into the success column? We 
have already made some comments along these lines respectively in 
the analysis at the end of these two cases. Clearly there was unrealized 
potential for increased joint gains in both cases. But fostering, by itself, 
usually is not a sufficient strategy. It must be well executed in a context 
where there is sufficient time for the unfolding sequence of relation 
ship building and substantive change. In the absence of these circum 
stances, some forcing may also be required as the next two chapters 
demonstrate.
NOTES
1. This history dates back at least to the turn of the century, when joint labor-management 
committees were established to address safety issues in the mining industry. It includes a variety 
of labor-management committees established during the 1920s and 1930s in the railroad and tex 
tile industries, as well as over 5,000 such committees established to improve production during 
the second world war. During the 1950s, the Armour Automation Committee, the Modernization 
and Mechanization Agreement in the West Coast longshoring industry, cooperative efforts in the 
steel industry, and numerous early experiments with gainsharing were well known. The joint initi 
atives described in this chapter are part of this larger historical story.
2. Valuable research assistance was provided by Kathleen Rudd Scharf in the preparation of 
this case.
3. This account is based on Mohrman (1987).
4. In addition to field interviews with key participants, we have benefitted from the availability 
of a report by Goldberg (1990).
5. Valuable research assistance was provided by Pat McHugh in the preparation of this case.
6. Specifically, the language in the 1984 contract reads as follows:
Article XIX Machine Operations
Section 19.1 Machines must be attended at all times, but this is coupled with the understand 
ing that there be a limit of (2) machines assigned to a man, the first be an automatic stylus 
machine designed for duplicating. That machine shall not have more than (2) operating heads in 
use while being used as a second machine. The operator, when he attends an automatic machine, 
does not leave the other machine cutting stock. When the machine department is regularly sched 
uled for a reduced number of hours, then the automatic machines will run for the same reduced 
number of hours. Any employee laid off in the machine department will trigger one employee, 
one machine.
4 
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Sequences Of Forcing And Fostering
Even though there are many complexities that arise in the imple 
mentation of either forcing or fostering strategies, the challenges are 
even greater when forcing and fostering strategies are employed in 
sequence. Of the two possible sequences, the most common is forcing 
followed by fostering. All three of the cases in this chapter feature this 
sequence.
The cases begin with periods of sustained forcing around substan 
tive concessions and, in two instances, with strikes during the forcing 
periods. Subsequently, all three cases feature repaired relations and 
substantial fostering initiatives centering, in two cases, on joint labor- 
management committees. A third case features fostering primarily 
aimed at individual employee involvement. The parties in all three 
cases were faced with the challenge of being effective during the forc 
ing initiative, while mindful of the subsequent need to foster. During 
the subsequent fostering it was necessary to move past the anger and 
mistrust built up during the forcing period.
Of course, a reverse sequence is also possible. In the AP Parts case 
presented in chapter 2, for example, there were some limited coopera 
tive efforts around employee involvement that preceded the forcing ini 
tiative. Similarly, in a case covered in the next chapter the Pensacola 
case we will examine forcing that follows a period of sustained fos 
tering. When the sequence is reversed, with forcing following foster 
ing, the challenges center on the degree to which trust built up during 
the fostering period will be undercut by the subsequent forcing.
There are few historical parallels to these sequences of sustained 
forcing and sustained fostering observed during the 1980s and 1990s. 
One notable case occurred in 1960 in the West Coast longshoring 
industry, where Harry Bridges departed from a highly adversarial 
approach and agreed to the Mechanization and Modernization Agree 
ment. 1 For the most part, however, the historical cases of hard forcing 
have been followed by the complete collapse of relations or by the
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resumption of arm's length relations. Similarly, most historical cases of 
far-reaching fostering are built on histories of relatively positive rela 
tions. Thus, this look at several instances of forcing and fostering 
sequences involves the exploration of new territory.
It is the purpose of this chapter to better understand how the parties 
have been able to combine the best elements of the distinct forcing and 
fostering strategies into a coherent program for change. We present 
three cases that cover a wide range of experience on this path of 
sequential change.
The first case involves sequences of negotiations occurring during 
the period from 1983 to 1990 in the Boise Cascade Mill at DeRidder, 
Louisiana. This story begins with a bitter strike over work rules and 
management's imposition of greater flexibility in assignments. Follow 
ing the strike, management rebuilt relations with the workforce in 
order to effectively implement the new work system.
Adrian Fabricators, our second case, is a small auto parts company 
that moved through several phases, characterized by the introduction of 
an ESOP as a response to bankruptcy, then a bitter strike arising out of 
unmet expectations on the part of the workforce. This conflict was fol 
lowed by mutual efforts to repair relations and finally a period of 
intense fostering on issues that ranged from daily safety matters to the 
overall business strategy.
The Conrail story is our third case. It also involves a struggle back 
from bankruptcy. In this case, the hard forcing occurred while the com 
pany was under the protection of the federal government. After its 
return to stock ownership, the parties continued a relationship marked 
by some contention but also by a range of joint activities.
Before presenting the separate stories, it is useful to profile some of 
the key attributes of these three examples of sequential forcing and fos 
tering.
As the table indicates, the forcing in all three cases occurred in the 
context of contractual negotiations, while the fostering primarily 
occurred during the subsequent period of contract administration. The 
cases focus on the immediate periods following the forcing, through 
the fostering initiatives persisted in all three cases through subsequent 
rounds of collective bargaining.
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Key Aspects of Cases Featuring Sequences of Forcing and Fostering
Background 
factors
Locus of 
negotiations
Time frame for
forcing
Time frame for
fostering
Pivotal events
Substantive 
outcomes
Relationship 
outcomes
DeRidder
Cumbersome work 
rules and low 
productivity
Plant
Contract
negotiations
Contract
administration
Strike; new 
management team
Reduced job 
classifications
Elimination of most
work rules 
Elimination of
Sunday premium
pay
Substantial wage 
increases
Increased job
security
Improved plant 
safety, 
maintenance, and
training practices
Increased worker 
commitment
After a long delay 
initial steps toward 
improved union-
management 
relations
Adrian
Bankruptcy and 
creation of ESOP
Plant
Contract
negotiations
Contract
administration
Strike, union 
abandoned and 
reestablished; new
CEO
ESOP with 
employee majority 
ownership
Wage and benefit 
concessions
Flexible work
practices
New direction in 
business strategy
Increased worker 
commitment
High levels of 
union-management 
communications and
trust
Conrail
Bankruptcy and 
federal government 
intervention
Company
Government-
imposed reopening 
of contracts
Contract
administration
Stock privatization
Major changes in 
work rules and 
staffing levels
Reinvestment in the 
business
Some increase in 
worker commitment
Increased levels of 
union-management 
communications
During the rounds of forcing in all three cases there were important 
substantive changes made in collective bargaining agreements. During 
the subsequent periods of fostering, important improvements in rela 
tionships occurred. Thus, the cases featured in this chapter are notable
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in that they all feature major changes along both substantive and rela 
tionship dimensions.
MANAGEMENT SUCCESS IN FORCING 
FOLLOWED BY FOSTERING
Boise Cascade (Deridder), 1983 to 1990
Boise Cascade Corporation succeeded in forcing major change in 
the way its workforce functioned in its DeRidder, Louisiana, mill dur 
ing 1983 and 1984, and then succeeded in fostering related changes 
over the rest of the decade. 2
Management won a two and one-half-month strike that targeted 
work-rule changes, but not economic concessions. Management's sub 
sequent fostering achieved an impressive move toward mutual commit 
ment with workers, but did not involve any revision in union- 
management relations over the next six years. Then, in late 1990, Boise 
Cascade management initiated an effort to build a new cooperative 
relationship with the international union and the locals at the mill level. 
The union responded positively to the overture.
By 1990, the DeRidder mill had risen from one of Boise Cascade's 
poorest to one of its top performers. The workers had become the high 
est-paid papermill workers in America, according to the company.
Significant Features
The DeRidder case represents a management success story, first on 
the forcing side of the ledger and then on the fostering side as well. The 
following are significant dimensions of this case:
 Management conducted a forcing campaign in contract negotia 
tions with the union leadership and then made the transition to a 
fostering strategy aimed at rank-and-file employees.
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 The company shaped the agenda by focusing on productivity 
improvements (new work rules and management rights) and in 
return offered higher pay and enhanced job security.
 The company prepared for a strike but refrained from using 
replacements (that had been trained and were standing by).
  After the strike, management took direct responsibility for getting 
workers on the same wave length by an elaborate program of com 
munications and related actions.
  After the strike, the new mill management made a concerted effort 
to listen to employee concerns (especially those regarding safety, 
maintenance, and training) and then took action on these issues.
  Pay increased to the best in the industry (by combining and mov 
ing people "upward" into a reduced number of job classifications), 
and people-oriented policies and practices were emphasized.
  Mill managers used selective rewards and punishments to get man 
agers on board with the new program.
  Management avoided antagonizing union officials, but at the same 
time did not offer them additional power, status, or information.
  Eventually the parties entered into early negotiations, and this mill 
became the first in the company to take Sunday premium pay out 
of the contract.
 International union representatives and local leaders eventually 
were favorably impressed with the people policies espoused and 
practiced by management.
Within the labor movement this type of case is, of course, contro 
versial. In the pure forcing cases such as the International Paper 
negotiations at Jay, Maine the battle lines are clearly drawn. Here, 
the sequential strategies made this case much more challenging to 
union leaders. Management was in the driver's seat and able to achieve 
many of its long-sought goals (such as simplified work rules, reduced 
job classifications, and elimination of Sunday premium pay), while 
concurrently paying workers well and responding promptly to many of 
the issues they raised. In fact, high levels of worker commitment to the 
firm were evident at the time of our study. As a result, the union faced 
the complex task of redefining its role in a new work system.
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If the union succeeds in redefining its role and a union-management 
partnership unfolds, then this case will represent a complete transfor 
mation of an industrial relations system. As of the mid-1990s, it 
already stands as a clear example of a hard forcing strategy executed in 
such a way as to facilitate subsequent fostering meeting manage 
ment's dual objectives of rapid, far reaching substantive change along 
with high levels of employee commitment.
The Forcing Campaign
The forcing phase of this change effort began during preparations 
for (and the subsequent collapse of) the 1983 negotiations, intensified 
during a bitter two and one-half-month strike, and continued into the 
first year of the new contract.
Management had become progressively dissatisfied with the perfor 
mance of the DeRidder mill. Built in 1969, it was the company's new 
est and largest mill, but it had generally failed to meet management's 
performance expectations. As an index of the mill's poor performance, 
hourly employment increased steadily between 1976 and 1980, rising 
from 385 in January 1976 to 490 in January 1980, without commensu 
rate increases in productivity; in fact, during this period DeRidder's 
return on total capital employed declined both absolutely and relative 
to other comparable Boise Cascade mills. The addition of a new paper 
machine at DeRidder in 1980 helped improve the mill's overall returns, 
but the size of the increase itself was disappointing.
The performance of the DeRidder mill also fared poorly when 
judged against three other indicators: its accident rate was among 
Boise Cascade's highest, its grievance rate was high compared to other 
company mills, and its management turnover rate was also high there 
had been seven mill managers in the previous fourteen years.
Management attributed the mill's poor efficiency and disappointing 
returns to adverse labor relations and the increasingly restrictive rules 
governing work assignments negotiated during the 1970s. The work 
rules constrained operational flexibility, DeRidder managers felt, and 
generated an endless stream of disputes that absorbed time and energy 
and helped to sustain an adversarial climate.
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The mill had been organized by the UPIU shortly after it opened. 
Employees were represented by two locals, one for maintenance work 
ers and the other for production workers. Contract negotiations in 1971 
and 1974 produced bitter strikes of over two months' duration. In 1977 
and 1980, management avoided strikes, but in the process accepted 
what it came to regard as an increasingly unmanageable labor contract. 
The restrictive aspects were contained not only in contract provisions, 
but also in a proliferation of work practices recorded in memoranda of 
understanding between supervisors and workers.
Ichniowski (1986a) analyzed the relationship between grievance 
activity and productivity in Boise Cascade's eleven mills and found 
that grievance rates had a significant inverse relationship with mill pro 
ductivity. For example, the mills experiencing grievance rates at the 
average were more than 10 percent more productive than the two mills 
with the highest grievance rates and DeRidder was one of these two 
mills.
In 1982, Boise Cascade management reflected on how labor matters 
had come to their current state at DeRidder. It identified factors that 
went beyond the union's relative power advantage in the 1977 and 
1980 contract negotiations just cited. The union's daily pursuit of these 
protective work rules was both systematic and effective, and upper- 
level mill management provided little oversight. As a result, depart 
ment foremen and supervisors had wide latitude in making agreements 
with employees and union representatives on the mill floor agreeing 
to local practices that were inconsistent with each other. The union also 
kept better records of agreements than did management, and their 
officers generally had longer tenure than management.
Introduction of the Team Concept
Management decided to force change during 1983 contract negotia 
tions to eliminate the system of rules it found restrictive and to install 
what it called the "team concept." In particular, it sought to eliminate 
all side-bar agreements, to establish greater management discretion 
over work assignments, and to win contractual authority to make deci 
sions based on business needs. Boise Cascade also sought a contain 
ment of health care costs, but chose not to seek wage concessions.
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Management's interest in the new team concept was based on the 
reportedly favorable experiences at IP and Crown-Zellerbach mills. 
Because management anticipated strong union and employee resis 
tance to these changes, it planned carefully for negotiations, a possible 
strike, and unilateral implementation of the new contract.
To enhance the company's bargaining power, a management group 
arranged for continuation of the inflow of raw materials and outflow of 
finished products with the following contingencies: staffing the mill 
during a strike with managers from other Boise mills, training of man 
agers in skills not readily available, provision of temporary housing, 
and the development of an extensive security plan. The group also con 
structed a new access road to the plant and, in doing so, bypassed the 
union hall which was located on the regular access road. Another man 
agement group planned for communications within management, to 
the workforce, and to the community.
DeRidder managers apparently had relatively little contact with 
UPIU Local and International officers ahead of the formal contract 
talks. Once negotiating agendas were exchanged, the union's reaction 
to management proposals was so negative that the union committee 
never really engaged management negotiators over the proposed 
changes. Neither side was prepared to make significant concessions to 
the other. A strike began in September of 1983 and only ended two and 
one-half-months later in November, when the union agreed to call off 
the strike and accept the already implemented conditions. During the 
strike, the mill operated at about two-thirds capacity, using manage 
ment personnel and temporary contracted workers. While management 
had threatened to hire permanent replacements for the striking work 
ers, it never did so. The lost production resulted in significant reduc 
tions in profits for 1983 and 1984.
New Contract Language
Returning workers found themselves facing a company-imple 
mented contract containing the changes management originally had 
proposed. Annual wage increases (that had not been at issue) consist 
ing of 6 percent, 6 percent, and 5 percent were implemented in line 
with other industry settlements that year. The important changes were 
the introduction of team concept and the insertion of a "zipper clause"
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explicitly overturning all previous side agreements. The 1983 contract 
also included a ground-breaking employment security provision.
The zipper clause represented a thorough elimination of the agree 
ments and practices DeRidder managers believed had hampered their 
ability to manage successfully:
The elements of team concept supersede all conflicting limitations 
on management rights provided in the labor agreement, and all 
preexisting rules, commitments, understandings, work practices, 
past practices, grievance settlements, arbitrations, or side agree 
ments written or unwritten.
The intent of the Team Concept language was straightforwardly intro 
duced in the new contract as well:
Team concept simply means the company has flexibility in how it 
assigns employees.
The ninety-four separate job classifications and the progressions that 
applied contained in the 1980 contract were telescoped into a small 
number of "clusters," i.e., groups of related jobs to be performed inter 
changeably. For example, in the paper machine area, workers formerly 
known as fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh hands, paper tester, refiner 
hand, and utility hand were now all included in the "C Operator" clus 
ter. Significantly, workers received the rate of pay for the highest- 
ranked jobs in the clusters. As a result, DeRidder's hourly employees 
received increases in base rates in addition to the 6 percent across- 
the-board adjustment.
The contract expanded management's right to contract work out and 
to decide whether and how temporary vacancies would be filled. 
Within-shift seniority replaced across-shift seniority in determining 
bumping rights in layoffs of less than thirty days. The contract also 
provided for a new performance evaluation system, the results of 
which would be taken into account in filling permanent vacancies. This 
tilted the balance between merit and seniority clearly toward merit.
The contract also offered an employment security provision that for 
1983 was unusual in the paper industry:
No current employee will lose his employment or suffer a reduc 
tion in wage rate due to the implementation of team concept or as 
a result of the company's contracting out work.
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Distributive bargaining, which had dominated the 1983 contract 
negotiations, continued to be a major factor during the first year of 
implementing the team concept. For example, top management made 
sure that the organization complied with the overall plan, specifically 
that the new job structures and appraisal systems were developed and 
introduced, that supervisors were trained to play their roles in negotiat 
ing the day-to-day operation of the system with workers, and that a 
monitoring system was developed to help ensure that units were fol 
lowing the provisions of the new work system and to measure the 
advantages of flexibility.
A Phased Transition to Fostering
For represented employees, the first day back on the job in Novem 
ber of 1983 consisted of an eight-hour orientation session that included 
three hours of safety instruction and five hours on team concept con 
tract language and "new rules of order and discipline" to be imple 
mented.
Managers had already attended extensive contract implementation 
training during the strike, and management training continued. This 
training and the fact that the union had not been in a position to make 
its usual request for hundreds of pocket-size copies of the new contract 
for its members put managers in clear command of the contract and 
its interpretation. As a manager later described the average DeRidder 
supervisor's new position, "He could just eat a shop steward alive." Top 
management's determination to exercise the supervisory discretion 
spelled out in the new contract was made clear in many ways.
New Mill Management
Soon after workers returned, a new mill manager was appointed. 
Although this individual had filled several managerial positions in the 
mill in earlier years, he had been away from DeRidder for a time and 
so was not associated with the events of the strike. He arrived prepared 
to be firm in implementing the 1983 contract, but also to change man-
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agement practices that hurt employee morale. Shortly before his 
arrival, a new human resources manager was hired, as well.
The new mill manager acted quickly to demonstrate attention to 
quality and productivity, safety, and hourly workers' concerns. He 
recalled later:
I started right away emphasizing safety, quality, productivity, and 
management on the people side. Then we just tried to sell it. [The 
mill human resources manager] and I had meetings with all the 
natural work groups and their supervision, and they really 
unloaded on us. ... Our whole thrust has been that the people are 
going to make the difference. . . . We put our whole emphasis on 
people. They had the feeling we would sacrifice one of them for a 
ton of paper [in the past], and sometimes they were right.
The meetings with work groups, known locally as "listening sessions," 
were a key part of direct negotiations with the rank and file. Meetings 
were scheduled so that all shifts in all departments eventually met with 
the mill manager and human resource manager. Without any formal 
union involvement, DeRidder employees had an opportunity to express 
their feelings, perceptions, and complaints. Mill managers either 
addressed the problems brought up in the listening session or explained 
any delays to the departmental groups.
The new mill manager also used other tools to foster and force   
change in the management organization. He established a Manage 
ment-By-Objectives system in which safety performance was a genu 
ine criterion, along with the more usual productivity and quality goals. 
Supervisors who used poor judgement in safety matters were disci 
plined, to the point of "severance arrangements" in some extreme 
cases. Management merit increases, essentially automatic in previous 
years, were now reduced by poor safety performance. The human 
resources manager said later:
The safety issue was a thing they could grasp. People knew safety 
was bad there, and a lot of supervisors would just say, "It's dan 
gerous making paper." Supervisors would say that all accidents 
arose from "unsafe acts."
The plant and human resource managers understood that the actions 
they took toward supervisory staff would at once affect two negotiation 
subprocesses. First, they would promote managerial consensus around
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changed priorities. Second, the emphasis on safety would help 
unfreeze the negative and skeptical outlook of the workforce. 
Several other actions were taken:
  An Employee Assistance Program was set up, with the assistance 
of a specialist from the UPIU's national headquarters, but without 
formal local union participation.
  The Bridge Committee, a peer contact point for referral for sub 
stance abuse and other problems, was launched.
  Hourly employees were asked to join in customer visits, which 
provided independent evidence of quality issues and market fac 
tors.
 Significant and visible expenditures on maintenance to address 
productivity, safety, and quality of worklife issues were instituted.
By the time top managers made a second circuit of the mill for depart 
ment listening sessions, the tenor of these meetings had changed. The 
initial wave of anger and frustration had begun to recede, and some 
promised changes could be seen.
DeRidder managers realized also that training would be critical to 
their efforts to implement the team concept. Although there was some 
objection from upper levels of management during a period of 
depressed profits, the new manager built a training center once again 
seeing it both as a practical site for necessary activity and as a symbol 
of management commitment to training and to change. Training was 
also visibly supported when fifteen additional operators were hired in 
1985 so fifteen others could rotate off the floor to analyze training 
needs and to develop training materials. This was part of a large and 
ongoing effort to involve hourly employees in codifying operating 
practice and writing standard procedures, training materials, and skills 
tests.
By the end of the new manager's first year, many supervisors had 
left the mill, reportedly in reaction to reduced merit raises and new per 
formance demands. They were largely replaced from within DeRidder. 
Again, these appointments moved the composition of the managerial 
corps in directions supportive of change, rewarded supervisory flexibil 
ity, and demonstrated the depth of top management's commitment to 
change. During this period hourly turnover was negligible.
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Union-Management Relationship
The change effort at DeRidder was targeted on managers' relation 
ships with hourly employees. For the first two years of the new con 
tract, the officers of the two UPIU locals refused to sit on joint 
committees, and mill managers did not extend any public gestures of 
support or rapport for union leadership. By the end of 1984, there had 
been a complete change of union leadership. One manager said later:
It was a reaction against the strike. They were saying, "We were as 
misled by the union as we were ever mistreated by the company."
As of the early 1990s, the maintenance local president first elected in 
1984 had remained in office, but the production local was on its third 
president. Mill managers explained this in terms of the union's chang 
ing posture and significance at DeRidder, since the old mechanisms of 
grievances, arbitrations, contract demands, and strikes looked far less 
central to employee well-being, but at the same time the union had not 
taken on any new modes of interaction with management. The human 
resources manager left his door open to the union officers, and he grad 
ually built personal relationships with them, but he continued to 
emphasize direct contacts with employees:
Throughout this entire period my group and I have dealt with the 
union officers on anything they want to deal about. We've negoti 
ated a third extension [of the 1983 contract, with, few changes] 
until 1995. By the time they come to me I've usually heard every 
thing at the listening sessions.
Even contract negotiations became very different events from the 
earlier patterns. The company firmly declined to renegotiate issues 
other than wages and benefits, and negotiations were conducted in an 
integrative rather than distributive mode.
The first contract extension, negotiated in 1985, embodied an impor 
tant change in team concept language and practices. It had been diffi 
cult under the 1983 language to persuade workers to move into 
positions in higher paid clusters because increased pay came only with 
permanent promotion, and managers were not required to fill vacan 
cies. The 1985 contract changed this, providing pay at the higher clus 
ter's rate for fully qualified workers if a vacancy had been declared, 
even if they had not been permanently promoted into the new cluster.
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This agreement reportedly was worked out during informal discussions 
between union officers and the human resources manager in response 
to complaints raised during the listening sessions.
Team Concept Effects
Ichniowski (1986b) analyzed various indexes of performance under 
the new contract to determine whether the team concept was actually 
making a difference. He compared average monthly performance for 
three periods:
 January-June 1983, which he called "1983" or "prestrike";
 April 1984-March 1985, called "1984" or "year 1" of team con 
cept; and
 April 1985-March 1986, called "1985" or "year 2" of team con 
cept.
His analysis confirmed that by early 1986 management was achiev 
ing the advantages it desired from the changes. Management had con 
tracted out much of a large backlog of maintenance projects during 
1984. Controllable overtime hours for production workers were cut 
from 7.2 percent of all hours worked in 1983 to 3.5 percent during
1984 and 1985, reflecting the fact that management had exercised its 
new contractual right to leave vacancies unfilled and to transfer work 
ers temporarily across departments. Maintenance overtime hours also 
had declined. However, total straight-time pay for both production and 
maintenance employees had increased substantially in both 1984 and
1985 as a result of the general increases of 6 percent and 5 percent plus 
pay-for-knowledge increases.
Total employment remained stable. The agreement's employment 
security assurance to "current employees" and the low rate of turnover 
in the mill precluded significant workforce reductions. Moreover, the 
major amount of cross-training required to make the team concept 
work required a buffer of extra employees.
Given a stable level of employment, productivity increases, if any, 
would be reflected in increased production volumes, due mainly to an 
avoidance of disruptions to the continuous flow process of paper manu 
facturing. Productivity did not increase in year 1 of team concept but 
did increase in year 2. The average tons per day in 1983, 1984, and
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1985 were 1744, 1703, and 1830, respectfully. The increase of 86 tons 
per day from 1983 to 1985 generated an increase in monthly revenue of 
about $800,000, which more than offset the increase in total monthly 
labor costs of about $500,000.
By early 1990, DeRidder's managers were able to report further 
changes in performance and labor relations indicators:
  Tons per person-hour had risen steadily, from .44 in 1983 to .54 in 
1990; this reflected some technical improvements but no additions 
of capacity. Most of the 24 percent productivity increase was 
attributed to improved working practices.
  Significant improvements in yield resulted from closer attention to 
the usage of materials.
  Grievance filings had declined still further and were now almost 
completely limited to disciplinary matters,
  The mill which had been one of the most dangerous in the com 
pany received an industry association safety award in 1989.
  The labor agreement had been extended again, this time until 1995, 
without Sunday premium pay. DeRidder thus became the first 
Boise Cascade mill to eliminate entirely the Sunday premium, 
since the contract did not entail a gradual phase-out.
In 1990, DeRidder managers reported that their workers averaged the 
highest straight-time pay in the paper industry, due to annual increases 
and the effects of clustered pay. While labor costs had continued to 
rise, productivity had continued to more than match this rise. DeRidder 
made a $98 million profit for 1989, on 800,000 tons of production.
DeRidder and Boise Cascade
As of the early 1990s, developments at DeRidder had exerted lim 
ited influence on the overall Boise Cascade/UPIU relationship. Boise 
Cascade continued to be thought of as "the scoundrels of the South" by 
UPIU activists as a result of strikes in the DeRidder and Rumford, 
Maine mills and because of the company's reputation for aggressive 
ness. Nevertheless, the UPIU International officers had begun to soften 
their stance, based on reports of the "people-oriented" management at 
the DeRidder mill. While the UPIU representative for the southern
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Boise mills had not become deeply involved, neither had he been 
openly critical of the DeRidder change process.
Analysis
Several factors help explain the ability of DeRidder management to 
first force substantive change and then foster new relations. It is partic 
ularly instructive to contrast DeRidder with Jay, our pure forcing 
example from the paper industry.
  The ambitiousness of demands: DeRidder focused just on work- 
rule changes, whereas Jay included both economic and work-rule 
concessions.
  Power tactics: the use of temporary but not permanent replace 
ments at DeRidder avoided the ultimate threat to institutional and 
job survival. Permanent replacements were used at Jay, which led 
to both job loss and the decertification of the union.
 Power perceptions: DeRidder management clearly appeared to 
have the advantage and therefore the ability to prevail; labor did 
not have any tactical advantages at their disposal. By contrast, the 
coordinated bargaining at IP and the use of the corporate campaign 
seemed to offer labor a chance to defeat IP.
  Regional attitudes: DeRidder is located in the South and Jay in the 
North consequently, cultural differences in these regions proba 
bly explained much of the contrast regarding resolve and power 
perceptions.
  Time frame: DeRidder's proposals were made at a different point 
in time from Jay 1983 versus 1987. UPIU had been forced to 
accept several contracts it saw as concessionary in the intervening 
period, and by 1987 it had decided to draw the line. Several IP/ 
UPIU contracts came up during a short period, presenting the 
union with an opportunity to "pool" several mills in order to 
increase its bargaining power an opportunity it did not posses in 
1983 at DeRidder.
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In addition, DeRidder's managers invested in communication mech 
anisms (including a daily newspaper and team meetings) designed to 
support the messages conveyed symbolically by maintenance expendi 
tures, management behavior, training, and customer visits. Manage 
ment essentially bypassed a problematic relationship with the UPIU by 
dealing directly with employees in permissible ways. In so doing, they 
avoided the intraorganizational consensus problems they perceived 
within the union, and they kept local officers from having to confront 
the possibility of a disjunction between the desires of some local offi 
cials for open cooperation with management and the more anticoopera- 
tion and generally anti-Boise Cascade stance of the national as well as 
many local officials of the UPIU.
Could the union have played a more central role in the change pro 
gram at DeRidder? Clearly, the union decided it was wise to neither 
support nor oppose DeRidder management's initiatives aimed at its 
members. While the union officials were concerned about what man 
agement was doing, they perceived the mill manager to be gaining so 
much support from workers that they feared a test of wills over the new 
program. One practical reason for the stance: it was not invited to be a 
party. A crucial question is whether the local union leadership could 
have insisted on some type of partner role in fostering the new regime, 
thereby deriving some credit for the improvements that emerged. The 
answer to this question is at the heart of the dilemma faced by all union 
leaders in today's economic environment: If they remain aloof to avoid 
being co-opted (and in so doing ensure their independence), they run 
the risk of being marginalized. On the other hand, if they seek to play a 
leadership role in the new initiatives, they may encounter opposition 
from management, as well as from a vocal minority within their mem 
bership.
As of the early 1990s, it looks like local union leadership at DeRid 
der had made the right choice. The company's program was viewed 
favorably by most members and as such was generating positive eco 
nomic returns. And DeRidder management had started the process of 
involving local union leadership in decisions regarding the team con 
cept. However, the success of their strategy depended on two factors 
that are not always present. First, it depended on management choos 
ing not to press its power advantage and undercut the union. Second, it 
depended on management being effective on its own in implementing
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the team-based work system and then being willing to bring the union 
back in as a partner. Since these circumstances are not always present, 
the DeRidder story may not be a model for union leaders confronted 
with a fostering initiative on the heels of a period of sustained forcing.
RECONCILING FRAMES OF REFERENCE 
The Case of Adrian Fabricators and UAW Local 963
The starting point for the Adrian story began with an ownership 
transition the conversion of a private stock company to a majority 
employee stock ownership plan (ESOP). 3 This transition modified 
employee assumptions about the existing employment relationship. 
Labor saw itself as new owners and held high participatory and mone 
tary expectations. In contrast, management adhered to a traditional 
view of employee-employer relations and pursued an autocratic style 
of management.
In the midst of this set of incongruent frames, management 
responded to competitive pressures by adopting a forcing change strat 
egy that ultimately provoked a strike an unusual event since the 
employees were literally striking against themselves. The resolution of 
tensions occurred with a change in top-level management, an expanded 
role for the union, and the emergence of a fostering strategy more con 
sistent with the employee ownership structure.
Significant Features
Adrian Fabricators is an independent manufacturer of wire mesh 
industrial containers used in warehouse operations of manufacturing 
facilities. Located in Adrian, Michigan, the company serves many 
automotive production facilities. With total employment of 141 in 
1989, it has been a relatively small supplier.
The Adrian Fabricators case is unique in many respects, including 
the following:
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  The ESOP emerged out of a common commitment to avoid a plant 
closing, but with relatively little attention to the structure and 
meaning of the plan, thereby creating the potential for future con 
flict.
 The employees abandoned their union as unnecessary following 
the establishment of the ESOP, only to reestablish it as a vehicle 
for collective voice.
  Initial wage and benefit concessions were made in the spirit of the 
ESOP, but subsequent demands for further concessions by man 
agement were seen by workers as negating their standing as own 
ers.
  Despite violence on the picket line, the parties settled the strike (in 
part because some worker-owners continued to operate the plant, 
and management did not hire replacements for striking worker- 
owners).
 After the strike, the relationship shifted rather quickly to robust 
cooperation with help from state government; with a new CEO 
opening the books, sending letters to homes, and initiating an open 
door policy; with symbolic union gestures (such as replacing bro 
ken windows in the factory); with the parties renegotiating the 
profit-sharing formula; and with the establishment of a labor-man 
agement committee.
The Adrian Fabricators case teaches many lessons about the specific 
challenges of an ESOP structure, but the case also has broader applica 
bility. In particular, it illustrates the important roles of leaders in man 
aging the shift from a forcing period to the implementation of a 
fostering strategy.
The case is notable in that the sequencing of forcing and fostering 
was not part of a larger intentional strategy (which was the case in 
DeRidder). The forcing occurred in the context of an unexpected esca 
lating dispute. The subsequent fostering reflected a desire on the part of 
all parties to build a constructive relationship. Thus, the case illustrates 
the way sequences of strategies (as well as particular strategies) can 
emerge in a relationship.
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Employee Ownership Within a Traditional Frame of Reference
The history of Adrian Fabricators began in 1966 when the Adrian 
facility started fabricating operations under the ownership and opera 
tion of the Tri-State Engineering Corporation. The facility was orga 
nized that same year by the UAW. For the next twenty-five years, the 
success of the company was tied to the cyclical movements of the auto 
mobile industry, since well over 80 percent of its business came from 
the automotive industry. Collective bargaining arrangements mirrored 
those throughout the automotive sector. During this period, the estab 
lished pattern of bad times followed by prosperous periods contributed 
to complacency on the part of management when faced with a down 
turn in business. Thus, management was not well prepared for the deep 
financial exigencies that emerged in the early 1980s  especially with 
a backdrop of near-record sales of $26 million in 1979.
Management's inadequate financial foresight in terms of cash flow 
planning and capital planning, coupled with the recession of the early 
1980s (which was especially severe in the automotive sector) led to 
sales levels falling to $6 million by 1982. During this downturn, inter 
mittent layoffs left only the most senior employees in the workforce. 
At one point, the collective bargaining agreement was virtually dis 
carded as several employees voluntarily worked without pay in the 
hopes of keeping the operation afloat. By February 1983, the company 
had filed for bankruptcy.
The ESOP Plan
At the request of several senior employees, a team of state govern 
ment agencies and private consultants helped formulate an employee 
stock ownership plan. By the fall of 1983, Adrian Fabricators was 
reconstituted as a majority employee-owned company. With the cre 
ation of the ESOP, the workforce chose to discontinue its relationship 
with the UAW. This decision was difficult for the international repre 
sentative to accept since he had led the initial organizing effort of Tri- 
State in 1966 and had been a strong proponent of the ESOP revival 
effort. The employees' desire to disassociate from the union exempli 
fied a shift in the frame of reference of the workforce. In essence, the 
workers believed that employee-owners did not require representation.
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As one worker put it: "Management will be by committee ... there will 
be no foremen here."
Ultimately, the "employee ownership" expectations of the work 
force conflicted with the principles and assumptions about the employ 
ment relationship held by management. For example, the first president 
of the company after reorganization was described by some members 
of the firm as a "benevolent dictator" with a nonparticipative manage 
ment style.
Tensions arising from contradictory assumptions about the character 
of employment relations were heightened by the day-to-day reality of 
trying to salvage an underfinanced operation. Specifically, manage 
ment announced that financial constraints would make wage increases 
difficult. Many workers found this hard to accept, not just because they 
needed wage adjustments, but because they had envisioned that stock 
ownership would mean a less arduous work pace and eventual wealth.
By 1985, the tensions had precipitated a reorganizing drive by the 
UAW within the facility. Management's subsequent approach toward 
the resurrected union was characterized by a member of the union's 
bargaining committee as "a resistance to recognize, never mind bargain 
with, the union." Managers felt that the union would only intensify the 
financial problems faced by the company because the leadership of the 
union would make "irrational demands." This attitudinal orientation 
(with overtones of escape) further polarized management and labor.
Workers Striking Against Themselves
On February 5, 1986, after management fired the chair of the bar 
gaining committee for leaving work early to attend a union meeting, 
over half the workforce walked off the job with the statement that, "If 
you fire him, then you have fired all of us." Consistent with their 
escape/forcing strategy, management attempted to continue operations 
during the strike using employees a minority of the workforce who 
were willing to cross the picket line. The worker-owners who did not 
cross the picket lines were, in effect, striking against their own firm. 
Sometimes brothers or relatives were split, with one working and the 
other on the picket line. As one worker who chose to cross the picket 
lines commented:
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I crossed because of the ESOP. I felt like it was our plant and that 
we would lose our jobs and everything we had worked so hard for.
In terms of the negotiations themselves, one member of the bargain 
ing committee stated:
It was pure hell. They brought in some lawyer and he presented us 
with a dinosaur contract. It was an old-style contract that those at 
the international level hadn't seen in twenty-five years.
After three months of extremely tense negotiations, punctuated by 
occasionally violent confrontations between striking and nonstriking 
employees, management and the union finally reached agreement in 
May 1986 on a three-year package that included a one and one-half 
year freeze on wages, recognition of union stewards, creation of a 
union shop, implementation of a grievance procedure, and a seniority 
system. Labor and management agreed that economic pressure felt by 
both parties provided impetus for the accord.
Construction of a New Frame of Reference
Following the strike, labor-management relations remained tense. 
The union helped soften some of the tension by assuming the cost of 
repairing windows and other property broken during the strike. Still, it 
was a traditional, arm's-length set of relations between labor and man 
agement. The precarious financial situation served as a continuing 
source of tension.
A Change in Management
In the fall of 1987, the president of the company left for another job 
and, on his recommendation, the chief financial officer of the company 
became president. With this change in top leadership, labor-manage 
ment relations slowly began to change. Although the new president 
was at first skeptical of the value the union would have for the plant, 
his management style was more participatory than his predecessor. 
Over time, he concluded:
The union gives more benefits than costs, by providing a more 
acceptable voice to employees ... the union has been the method
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that they have chosen to voice their concerns. Having union repre 
sentation is a very stabilizing factor.
Thus, a major shift began to take place as management came to recog 
nize the legitimacy of the union and the full range of employee con 
cerns. This change in management was a pivotal event though its 
pivotal nature only became clear over time.
Establishing a Labor-Management Committee
Coinciding with the managerial transition at Adrian Fabricators, 
state officials from the Michigan Governor's Office for Job Training 
provided consultation assistance to both labor and management and 
recommended the initiation of a joint labor-management problem-solv 
ing committee a second key pivotal event following the strike. Both 
parties signed a letter of understanding acknowledging commitment to 
the creation of the committee where:
The purpose of the committee is to enhance communication and 
understanding between and among labor and management. 
Through formal participation in this decision-making process, it is 
the intent that labor will gain a greater appreciation for the neces 
sity of the profit motive, and management will gain insights that 
may promote this motive.
This committee addressed substantive issues, such as the absenteeism 
policy, production problems, and safety concerns. Subsequently, the 
parties also agreed to use the committee as an additional step in the 
grievance procedure, indicating that the labor-management committee 
was seen by the parties as a valuable forum and marking a movement 
away from the formal arm's-length model of labor-management rela 
tions.
Revision of the Profit-Sharing Formula
The next major development involved a revision of the profit-shar 
ing component of the ESOP plan. Under the original plan, the first year 
payment of profit-sharing checks was perceived by the workforce as 
substantially more favorable to the managers in the firm. In fact, work 
ers received payments earlier as part of their wage package, but the dif 
ferential in the checks surfaced deep equity issues arising from the
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workers-as-owners frame of reference. The resolution of this situation 
involved agreement on uniform profit-sharing payments. In this situa 
tion, the ESOP arrangement served as a vehicle by which the workers 
were able to force equity (or the perception of equity) an example of 
union forcing within a fostering context.
Additional Developments
Several developments emerged, not from internal forces, but from 
external prompts. In 1989, state MIOSHA inspectors cited the plant for 
a number of safety violations. In response, the president of the firm met 
with the union leadership, and the parties each appointed representa 
tives to a joint safety committee, established outside of the formal 
structure of collective bargaining.
A subsequent development, also outside of the formal collective 
bargaining process, involved the establishment of what the parties 
termed the "equipment committee." This was established at the initia 
tion of the firm's president, after consultation with the union. The 
equipment committee oversees the installation and training needs for 
major capital investments projected to eventually increase productivity 
by at least 300 percent.
Although this case began with harsh forcing, the increasing use of 
joint committees created a form of governance consistent with a foster 
ing approach to change. A further step in the fostering direction likely 
to have implications for the daily work experiences of all workers was 
the exploration of the team concept.
The shift in frames of reference can be seen in the startling contrast 
between the two negotiations. In the 1986 negotiations, management 
would not recognize the legitimacy of the union, whereas in the 1989 
negotiations the company's books were open. As the president of 
Adrian Fabricators put it, "We wanted to have as much mutual trust as 
possible, so we invited the UAW economists to look at our books." In 
essence, a dramatic change took place in the assumptions underlying 
the employment relationship.
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Economic Stability and a New Social Contract
Clearly, the financial success that the company began to experience 
in the fall of 1988 had been a necessary condition for the widespread 
changes in trust that occurred. After the strike, the value of shares 
increased 247 percent, employment rose 145 percent, and in 1989 
profit sharing became a reality. For the hourly workforce, financial suc 
cess was best seen in the fact that wages increased by over 25 percent. 
While causality is always hard to attribute, most managers and union 
officials gave the improved labor-management relationship significant 
credit for the improved economic performance.
The parties viewed the emerging social contract as vital to corporate 
strategy. First, financial success was not just seen as an end in itself, 
but as a foundation for building trust between labor and management. 
Second, small auto supply firms such as Adrian Fabricators needed to 
"guarantee" creditors and customers that "there would be no prob 
lems" in terms of labor-management relations.
In addition to moving toward a fostering strategy in labor-manage 
ment relations, management at Adrian Fabricators worked jointly with 
the union in developing a business strategy that would insulate the 
company from the cyclical automotive supply industry. One aspect of 
this strategy included efforts by the company to garner long-term con 
tracts with large customers. Adrian Fabricators was somewhat success 
ful with this approach. While the company was locked in on prices, one 
management representative noted: "if there is a downturn, we will have 
some security with our foot in the door with a huge company." A sec 
ond and more important component of Adrian's strategy was to remove 
the company from the auto supply industry by actively seeking to 
diversify its mix of customers. For example, in 1986 over 75 percent of 
the company's business was with customers in the automotive industry, 
whereas by 1990 that figure had fallen to below 15 percent.
In short, there was a conscious strategy to remove the labor-manage 
ment relationship from the volatile context associated with the automo 
tive supply industry. It is significant that this case began as an example 
of forcing within the auto supply industry and it continued as a case of 
fostering that took the parties increasingly outside of the industry.
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Analysis
The Adrian Fabricators story features a series of shifts in the labor- 
management relationship that occurred over a period of hard forcing, 
followed by a period of sustained fostering. The multifaceted nature of 
the outcomes that characterized the Adrian story can be summarized in 
chart form:
Significant Outcomes—Adrian Fabricators
Substantive 
outcomes
Early economic
concessions
Contingent 
compensation
Work-rule
flexibility
Employee stock 
ownership
Management- 
employee 
relationship
Movement from
control
to 
expectations of 
mutuality
to
disillusion and strike
to 
sustained movement
toward commitment
Management-union 
relationship
Movement from
adversarial
to 
a form of escape 
(since employees no
longer saw the union
as necessary)
to 
arm's-length
involving a strike
to
sustained movement
toward cooperation
Other outcomes
Major performance
improvements
Mutually costly 
strike
Strategic business
plan to seek business
outside the auto 
supply industry
The Adrian Fabricators story contains many elements of the classic 
sequence wherein a severe crisis occurred, the parties reached for a 
quick solution (ESOP), matters become more complicated, and only 
after a second crisis was the situation ripe for a breakthrough. In this 
case a new CEO and a skilled international union representative pro 
vided the leadership necessary for the parties to move into a construc 
tive relationship.
At the time of the first crisis, several divergent interests were at 
work. Most members of management and some employees saw the 
ESOP as a means for emphasizing the employee qua owner status and 
de-emphasizing the role of the union and collective bargaining in mat 
ters of governance.
When management came on strong and took a very traditional 
approach to the next negotiations, any semblance of cooperation that
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had been engendered by the ESOP was shattered. With matters wors 
ening, new leadership (both the CEO and government officials), cou 
pled with a series of constructive, fostering steps, moved the 
relationship decisively in the cooperative direction.
Several questions can be asked about critical junctures in this story. 
Was a second crisis necessary i.e., would it have been possible for the 
parties in the throes of bankruptcy to have moved directly to a positive 
relationship in a manner similar to Conrail (a case soon to be consid 
ered)? The answer has to be yes. But such a changeover would have 
required a thorough reorientation of all stakeholders regarding the 
opportunities and limitations of an ESOP. It also would have been nec 
essary for the parties to have initiated earlier the cluster of fostering 
activities that eventually were implemented after the strike.
If, on the other hand, management had wanted to escape from the 
union, what steps could have been taken to this end? (This is a question 
not normally asked by industrial relations researchers, and it surfaces 
some uncomfortable issues, but it is important for both union and man 
agement leaders to consider.) A skillful management, intent on escape, 
would have shared power, used the ESOP as a communication channel, 
and strengthened the axis of management to employee communica 
tion all at the expense of the union. Moreover, at the next negotiation, 
management would not have come on strong but would have laid out 
the problems to the employee-owners, with the possibility that atten 
tive supervision could have successfully marginalized the union leader 
ship. Eventually, the union might have been decertified not as a result 
of confrontation but as a result of the workers asking: "What is the 
need for a union?"
The lesson in all of this is that a crisis prompts management to take 
the initiative. If done properly and in a way that creates credibility, then 
what starts out as forcing can be transformed into a fostering regime. 
However, if the crisis induces management to act precipitously or 
induces the workers to lock on a solution on the basis of unrealistic 
expectations, then matters become more complicated. Eventually, 
management, the union, and the workforce at Adrian arrived at a con 
structive stage, but only after several painful episodes.
The case illustrates the degree to which a structural change such as 
the establishment of an ESOP did not guarantee success for a firm and 
its workforce. The new ESOP structure merely provided a platform for
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negotiations, which brought both new opportunities and new dilem 
mas. Initially, the interactions were dominated by the dilemmas, such 
as inflated employee expectations, an ambiguous role for the union, 
and the persistence of autocratic management styles. In time, and after 
the painful episodes, the opportunities became more apparent, includ 
ing high levels of employee motivation, complete information sharing, 
and extensive union-management dialogue.
Three factors are most important in accounting for the successful 
realization of the opportunities. These same factors, in their absence, 
account for the initial difficulties. First, leadership on both sides was 
key initially it was absent or contradictory with the ESOP concept 
and a key factor later on. Second, employee knowledge and expecta 
tions were critical when they were out of line, relations suffered and 
when there was alignment, motivation was high. Third, government 
officials played a key role as a source of training and third-party facili 
tation, which was not present initially, but was subsequently very help 
ful. Thus we see that the same forces that, in their absence, drive an 
escalating forcing contest, can also serve, by virtue of their presence, to 
support a robust fostering initiative.
FOSTERING AT THE SYSTEM LEVEL
The Conrail Story
The experience of Conrail illustrates a unique combination of forc 
ing and fostering. Dire economic circumstances created a need for 
forcing, while the skill and values of management established the ratio 
nale and feasibility for fostering.
Conrail faced bankruptcy. As a result, the federal government 
stepped in with a revival program. The carrier dropped out of national 
bargaining and renegotiated its labor agreements. Extensive communi 
cation occurred with employees and with the various unions. With the 
return to profitability, Conrail rejoined national handling, and the par 
ties implemented a series of joint activities.
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Significant Features
The Conrail story features the most active role of government across 
our cases and has the following distinctive features:
  Management prepared the rescue plan in conjunction with federal 
agencies and in consultation with the unions.
 The CEO and top management dealt with all parties in an open 
fashion.
  Considerable information was made available to all unions and 
rank-and-file employees.
  The government provided a powerful and face-saving framework 
for initial forcing on substantive issues.
 Reinvestment in the business concurrent with the concessionary 
requests reduced opposition to changes in work rules.
  Subsequent fostering produced positive economic gains and less 
ened the extent of catastrophic job loss.
There are many features of the Conrail story that are unique to regu 
lated industries in general and to the railroad industry in particular. It is 
instructive to see how intervention by government can exert such a 
positive influence on labor-management relations and economic per 
formance.
Highlights
Conrail was formed as a result of the Regional Rail Reorganization 
Act of 1973 (3R), combining railroads formerly known as the Penn 
Central, Erie Lackawanna, Central Railroad of New Jersey, and several 
other smaller lines. The new organization did not begin operating until 
early 1976.
The next several years saw big losses, and by 1981, with Conrail 
still losing money, management moved to develop a plan to place the 
railroad back on a profitable basis. After substantial analysis, a plan 
that management felt was realistic was brought forward and, at com-
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pensation levels then existing, a gap of $200 million remained. To deal 
with this gap the concept of a wage freeze emerged that would defer 
national wage increases up to 12.5 percent.
At about the same time, management also developed a plan for 
reducing crew size on trains from the customary complement of five 
(engineer, fireman, conductor, and two brakemen) to three (dropping 
the fireman and one brakeman). This plan called for a separation pay 
ment of $25,000 per individual and required federal funding.
A number of structural changes also were implemented. As part of 
the continuing consolidation, many duplicate facilities were elimi 
nated. For example, the number of maintenance shops for diesel loco 
motives was reduced from fifty to nine. The remaining shops went to 
three-shift operations in order to better use the plant and equipment.
As a result of the Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981 that transferred 
ownership to the federal sector, Conrail was able to expedite proce 
dures for abandoning unprofitable lines. In addition, the number of 
local labor agreements was reduced, and virtually all of the arbitraries 
(special payment provisions) were eliminated. For example, when 
Conrail commenced operations in 1976, there were 285 separate agree 
ments; by the early 1980s, the number had been reduced to 23.
Results
Due to these changes, Conrail gradually returned to profitability and 
was spun out from under government ownership and placed in the pri 
vate sector in 1987. In the process, staffing levels had dropped from 
90,000 to approximately 25,000 by the early 1990s. With the reduction 
in crew size, most trains were able to operate with three-person 
crews 93 percent for through freight, 84 percent for local, and 96 per 
cent for yard operations. By 1994, labor costs stood at 36 percent of 
total costs compared to 62 percent prior to restructuring. While com 
pensation increases had been deferred for several years, eventually 
these wage deferrals were restored in lump-sum payments, averaging 
approximately $6,000 per employee. Most workers who remained with 
Conrail more than recouped their losses, taking into account that they 
received stock when Conrail went public.
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Analysis
Conrail succeeded in reducing crew size and realizing other changes 
in work rules almost a decade ahead of other carriers, and it achieved 
these major improvements while maintaining positive relations with 
most of its unions. In fact, labor leaders place Conrail at the top of the 
"good guy" list for the railroad industry. What explains these favorable 
outcomes?
In terms of our framework, the Conrail story possesses certain ele 
ments of forcing, but with special characteristics. The key driver, of 
course, was the economic crisis: Conrail was losing large amounts of 
money and it was clear that the federal government would be forced to 
do something drastic (like selling pieces of the system to other carriers) 
if the corporation were not returned to profitability in the early 1980s.
A second significant factor was the role of legislation and adminis 
trative directives establishing procedures that enabled management to 
reduce the size of the workforce rather directly something that other 
railroads have not been able to do as easily. Specifically, when workers 
who had been hired after 1969 were offered a $25,000 buyout (and 
large numbers of them accepted), the company was able to shrink 
employment by eliminating these positions unlike other railroads 
who (until the mid-1990s) had been required to bring back furloughed 
workers, i.e., allowing them to exercise seniority rights to fill vacated 
positions.
A third factor (and in some ways pivotal) was the federal bailout; 
Uncle Sam "footed the bill." Summing up the various pieces of the 
overall program, namely, the massive physical rehabilitation of the sys 
tem and the labor protection costs and financial settlements with the 
various predecessors of Conrail, the total price tag for the federal gov 
ernment came to over $8 billion (unadjusted for inflation). Labor pro 
tection (primarily the buyouts) alone amounted to $630 million in 
direct federal grants.
Unlike other carriers that attempted (unsuccessfully) to convince 
their union leaders and workers that change was necessary to improve 
profitability, management at Conrail did not have to engage in such 
rhetoric. The situation spoke for itself: Agree to changes or face the
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uncertainty associated with splitting up and reorganizing the Conrail 
system.
When the compulsion for change comes from objective circum 
stances rather than a one-sided initiative (often coupled with a contract 
expiration), it is easier for the parties to maintain and even improve 
their social relations. Thus, in the case of Conrail, management empha 
sized the importance of developing strong rapport with key union lead 
ers and handling the change process in an open and participative 
manner. These elements of fostering were facilitated by the values and 
style of the CEO and other key executives.
Extensive communication programs also were instituted to inform 
all employees about the challenges being faced and the progress being 
made during the early 1980s. Wherever possible, management looked 
for ways to continue the employment of workers who were no longer 
needed. For example, when a shortage developed of skilled signal per 
sonnel to staff a range of new electronic technologies, Conrail 
recruited approximately 300 individuals from other crafts and insti 
tuted both classroom and on-the-job training in keeping with the com 
pany's policy of affording employment opportunities to employees 
who had been furloughed from other lines of work.
The fostering process also benefitted from the services of facilita 
tors such as William Usery, former Secretary of Labor, who played a 
key role during the 1980s in bringing about consensus on the major 
pieces of the labor relations program involving severance payments, 
reduction in crew sizes, and consolidation of local agreements, as well 
as encouraging the parties to approach change in a constructive man 
ner.
Significantly, the industrial relations function was a part of the top 
management team within Conrail. The vice-president for labor rela 
tions played a key role in the formulation of business strategy, and top 
management placed the highest priority on achieving constructive 
labor-management relations.
The best term to describe the tenor of labor-management relations 
would be "accommodation." The CEO met regularly with top union 
leaders, and a number of them sat on what is referred to as the Conrail 
Subcommittee that was made up of top executives and presidents of 
most of the major railroad brotherhoods. However, the approach was 
not one of jointness. Management's objective was to keep the unions
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informed, but not to bring them into co-management. In the example of 
retraining craft workers to become signal operators, Conrail initiated 
the training and only notified the union as a matter of information.
The main conclusion of the Conrail story is that by taking an ailing 
railroad and placing it under the shelter of government support, the 
parties were able to restructure operations and to streamline the work 
force to the end that economic viability was restored. In effect, man 
agement took advantage of the federal clout to force through the 
necessary changes, but at the same time strove to maintain positive 
relationships with its employees and unions.
The question needs to be asked whether the working accommoda 
tion forged in the throes of bankruptcy would continue. Several pieces 
of evidence suggest an affirmative answer. During the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, the parties instituted a joint labor-management safety pro 
gram, and a labor-management cooperation program was expanded 
substantially. The chairs of the various subcommittees alternated each 
year between management and labor representatives. These programs 
were guided by an overall Joint Labor-Management Committee. Sig 
nificantly, union representatives on this latter committee were full-time 
Conrail employees.
Frequently, these joint labor-management teams worked with cus 
tomers in designing procedures for better service. For example, a 
cross-functional team from Conrail interfaced with a team from Beth 
lehem Steel to reduce billing errors from 14 percent to 3 percent, with 
an eventual target of zero defects.
Compelling circumstances and a well-managed process combined to 
produce the favorable outcomes at Conrail. We have seen in other cases 
that neither a compelling context nor an effective process alone is suffi 
cient. Adrian Fabricators, for example, experienced the focusing effect 
of bankruptcy, but the parties did not emerge from bankruptcy with a 
jointly understood and viable plan for recovery so economic crisis 
alone was not sufficient. In the CSX case, the parties handled the pro 
cess reasonably well, but the absence of a crisis allowed the local 
chairmen of the United Transportation Union (UTU) to opt for the sta 
tus quo indicating that a collaborative process alone was not suffi 
cient.
By dropping out of national handling and by focusing the attention 
of union leaders and workers on the tough realities facing the company,
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management was able to gain acceptance for fundamental changes that 
would not have been possible within the traditional structure of multi- 
employer, multiunion, collective bargaining. The fact that ownership 
was (for an important period) in the hands of the federal government 
also lent credibility to the need for fundamental restructuring.
This case teaches, therefore, that the use of compelling economic 
arguments is most effective when accompanied by a positive relation 
ship between labor and management. Conrail found itself in a situation 
where the economic situation (impending bankruptcy) created consid 
erable credibility for change. However, even with these objective cir 
cumstances, the union leaders and rank and file could have easily 
concluded that they were being coerced by circumstances or that man 
agement was using bankruptcy to extract undue concessions.
The challenge is the following: How does management present an 
accurate picture without the union reacting in a negative fashion  
thereby setting in motion an escalation towards unrestrained forcing. In 
the case of Conrail, the strong positive relationship that had developed 
between top officials (building on the commitment of top management 
to proceed in an open way) made it possible for the forcing elements 
that were present to be viewed in a constructive fashion. In essence, 
labor had no other choice than to accept major concessions, and full 
information sharing made the concessions more attractive than the 
alternative scenarios (such as the collapse and breakup of the entire 
railroad).
In certain circumstances the role of third parties, especially the gov 
ernment, can be crucially important for the change process. In the 
instance of Conrail, the federal government brought resources and its 
good offices all of which provided considerable impetus to the fash 
ioning and implementing of a recovery plan. By contrast, in the case of 
AP Parts, the role of governmental officials remained limited they 
were local (lacking the authority of .federal agencies) and, most impor 
tant, they lacked resources to bring to the table. Indeed, from this per 
spective, some analysts criticized the Conrail rescue as an overly 
generous bailout that cost the taxpayers dearly.
Holding aside the taxpayer issue, another lesson that then emerges is 
that union concessions are more palatable when they are accompanied 
by reinvestment in the business. From this point of view, sufficient
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resources make it possible to overcome a good deal of what would 
have been resistance to the large-scale change.
Significantly, Conrail did not revert to the typical arm's-length rela 
tionship (characteristic of railroads) when it was spun out from under 
governmental ownership. Basically, the explanation is that once a posi 
tive relationship had developed and the parties had realized benefits as 
a result of this relationship, it was unlikely, short of major changes in 
personnel or the environment, that the strategic approach being fol 
lowed by the parties would be modified. Thus, like the DeRidder case, 
key choices made during the initial period (with heavy elements of 
forcing) laid the foundation for a subsequent period of constructive 
fostering.
COORDINATING STRATEGIES 
Strengths and Challenges
Ultimately, all three of the cases featuring a sequence of forcing and 
fostering strategies met with success of course, in varying degrees 
and after different journeys.
In two cases (Adrian Fabricators and Conrail) bankruptcy provided 
the forcing impetus; however, in the case of Adrian, a second crisis was 
required before the parties turned the corner and embraced a robust 
fostering strategy. In any event, in both of these instances the positive 
results were realized relatively quickly. In the DeRidder case, the crisis 
was not externally imposed, and the reconstruction of relations took 
longer. In that case, however, the sustained fostering initiatives ulti 
mately transformed the mill into one of the company's most produc 
tive, safest, and best-paying paper mills.
The significant difference between these three cases, on the one 
hand, and the cases discussed in the preceding two chapters, on the 
other, is that here the parties avoided the destabilizing tendencies 
inherent in an exclusive reliance on either of the two distinct strategies. 
The parties engaged in such integrative arrangements as extensive 
information sharing, problem solving, and consensus decision making, 
yet they found ways to surface and to handle serious conflicts.
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All of the cases were characterized by the emergence of a new set of 
norms governing relations on an ongoing basis. Significantly, the exer 
cise of power became more subtle and certain distributive tactics were 
foreclosed. Basically, the new norms were integrative in nature.
On the other side of the ledger, when the parties engaged in forcing, 
they did so without letting it escalate into an out-of-control confronta 
tion. Management at DeRidder picked its issues carefully focusing 
on work rules rather than the economic package. Similarly, Conrail 
sought major contractual concessions, but demonstrated continuing 
commitment to the business (made possible by the federal bailout 
funds).
Lessons Learned
The experience of these three cases suggests a number of important 
lessons regarding the effective sequencing of forcing and fostering 
strategies.
The important role of key leaders cannot be overstated. DeRidder, 
Adrian, and Conrail all were eventually characterized by a consultative 
style of top management and illustrate the dominant influence of key 
individuals on the process. Management leaders in the DeRidder and 
Conrail cases ensured that the forcing remained restrained, and in all 
three cases management ensured that the fostering proceeded in a 
focused fashion. Union leaders in the Adrian and Conrail cases played 
key reciprocal roles in the reconstruction of relations after the forcing.
Objective standards were critical as justifications for forcing and for 
moving past the forcing. The speed with which Adrian and Conrail 
tackled their problems was in large part due to the credibility of the 
stories presented by management.
The importance of persistence and a steady approach is also under 
scored by these cases. In these three success stories the parties kept 
their eye on realizing both substantive gains and improved relations. In 
several cases these results were slow to materialize, but the parties kept 
their attention on the long run and did not veer towards escape, unre 
strained forcing, or "soft" fostering.
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The ability of the parties to learn was key as they proceeded to 
grapple with the many challenges. In all of these cases organizational 
learning occurred as crises were addressed and solutions developed  
often generating new problems. For example, it took the stakeholders 
at Adrian some time to sort out the complex interrelationships between 
management initiative, employee ownership, gainsharing, and collec 
tive bargaining. Similarly, at DeRidder management first focused on 
building employee commitment and ignored the union. Eventually cor 
porate management revised its approach arid decided to build positive 
union-management relations. The DeRidder mill management joined 
in the new corporate policy.
Taken together, the sequence of forcing followed by fostering has 
the potential to address the key limitations of strategies that are exclu 
sively oriented around one or the other pure strategy. An exclusive 
focus on forcing may yield fast change, but the benefits may prove elu 
sive due to soured relations, while an exclusive focus on fostering may 
improve relations, but may not yield substantive change quickly 
enough. Properly sequencing the strategies both tempers the forcing 
and creates sufficient change to create a strong economic foundation 
for fostering initiatives. The appeal for management of such sequenc 
ing should be clear. The sequence is much more problematic for 
unions, which face a double loss they may lose the forcing battle, and 
then they may also lose again in the fostering period if a program of 
employee commitment weakens the union. Thus, the sequenced 
approach depends on management's power and skill during both the 
forcing and fostering phases. Where labor is strong or the tactical 
moves poorly executed, a different combination of forcing and foster 
ing may be required which is the focus of the next chapter.
NOTES
1. Signed in 1960 for the West Coast longshoring industry, the Mechanization and Moderniza 
tion Agreement established a $5 million productivity fund, wage and employment guarantees and 
incentives for early retirement in return for the union giving up work rules that required multiple 
people to handle goods, extra workers to be employed and that facilitated containerization facilita 
tion (see Kochan 1980, pp. 351 ff for a discussion of this and other early instances of far-reaching 
fostering preceded by some degree of forcing).
2. We rely heavily on published and unpublished materials from Casey Ichniowski (1986a, 
1986b) for a description of DeRidder change processes and analysis of selected performance 
results through 1985. Our own discussions with mill and corporate managers provided us with
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additional details of the period before 1985, as well as with the data to construct our account of 
subsequent events. Valuable research assistance was provided by Kathleen Rudd Scharf in the 
preparation of this case.
3.Valuable research assistance was provided by Pat McHugh in the preparation of this case.
5 
Combined Strategies
The Interweaving of Forcing and Fostering
Negotiation strategies can become quite complex. We have already 
seen that travel down the forcing or fostering paths is complicated in 
itself and even more complicated when the pathways are traveled in 
sequence. Most complex of all, however, is the simultaneous travel 
down both forcing and fostering paths or multiple sequences of forcing 
and fostering strategies. When skillfully executed, elements of the two 
strategies that would normally be at cross purposes instead can lead to 
positive synergies.
Two of the cases presented in this chapter, Budd and Packard Elec 
tric, feature periods of simultaneous forcing and fostering, followed by 
extended fostering periods (each also featuring some distributive con 
frontations). The other case, Pensacola, involved a sequence of forcing, 
followed by fostering, followed by a combined period involving both 
forcing and fostering.
There are no obvious historical parallels for these complex strate 
gies. In part, this reflects management's ascendancy in power. In the 
past, labor was primarily setting the tone in negotiations, and its strate 
gies relied primarily on forcing in combination with periods of arm's- 
length accommodation. This reflected labor's dual desire for increased 
economic gains combined with the stability of equitable and well- 
defined work rules. Now, with management primarily setting the tone, 
complex combinations of forcing and fostering reflect management's 
dual desire in many cases for rapid change and for high levels of 
worker commitment.
Interestingly, only one of the cases, Pensacola, features a period in 
which forcing and fostering were intentionally combined in order to 
achieve certain benefits associated with each. This occurred in the con 
text of a collective bargaining negotiation that was designed to roll 
back certain economic benefits while still sustaining existing fostering 
initiatives. In the other two cases, the combined periods reflected 
simultaneous but independent management initiatives. Both at Budd
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and at Packard Electric, the combined periods featured forcing around 
the relocation of work into lower wage locations that occurred at the 
same time that quality of worklife efforts focused on shop-floor 
employee involvement were being implemented. Even though these 
forcing and fostering initiatives were not tightly coupled, each had 
important implications for the other.
The following chart features salient elements of all three cases. The 
complexity of these cases is evident in the time frames for forcing, fos 
tering, and combined strategies. In all of these cases, the various strate 
gies were executed both during the contractual negotiations and (in 
between) during contract administration.
Key Aspects of Cases Featuring Concurrent Forcing and Fostering
Background 
factors
Locus of 
negotiations
Time frame 
for forcing
Time frame 
for fostering
Time frame 
for combined 
strategy
Pivotal events
Substantive 
outcomes
Relationship 
outcomes
Pensacola
Declining market for 
primary product; sale 
of the mill to a new 
owner
Plant
Contract negotiations
Contract 
administration
Contract negotiations
Arrival of new owners
Work-rule flexibility
Team-based work 
system
Increased worker 
commitment
Strong working 
relationship between 
union and 
management
Budd
Fierce competition in 
industry; new 
capacity in southern 
nonunion plants
Company and plant
Contract negotiations 
and administration
Contract 
administration
Contract negotiations 
and administration
Massive layoffs in 
early 1980s
Wage and benefit 
concessions
Special issue joint 
task forces at national 
(health care) and plant 
(die transition) levels
Some increase in 
worker commitment
Strong working 
relationship between 
union and 
management
Packard Electric
Fierce competition in 
industry; new 
capacity in southern 
nonunion plants and 
Mexican operations
Company and plant
Contract negotiations 
and administration
Contract negotiations 
and administration
Contract negotiations 
and administration
Threatened loss of 
work to Mexico
Lifetime job secutiry 
Multitier wage system
Flexible work 
practices
Increased worker 
commitment
Strong working 
relationship between 
union and 
management
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As we saw with the three sequential cases, strong substantive and 
relationship outcomes occurred in all three of the combined cases. The 
relationship gains were particularly strong between management and 
the union in these cases, reflecting extensive joint problem solving on 
many issues. While the stories also featured increases in worker com 
mitment, this was tempered by strong feelings around the concurrent 
forcing.
ALTERNATING AND COMBINED EPISODES 
OF FORCING AND FOSTERING
Pensacola Mill, 1985-1990
By the end of the 1980s, many companies in the paper industry had 
concluded that to stay competitive they must be prepared to bargain 
forcefully for substantive changes and also employee commitment and 
union cooperation. 1 The efforts of management at the Pensacola mill of 
Champion Paper Company over the period 1985 to 1990 provide us 
with a rich illustration of this combination of objectives.
Specifically, management at the Pensacola mill forced major 
changes during the 1985 contract negotiations. It then developed and 
fostered high levels of employee commitment and union-management 
cooperation over the next several years. Management returned to the 
1988 negotiations, however, with a major wage provision objective it 
knew it could not sell by persuasion and would need to force.
Pensacola management forced concessions in contract negotiations 
in 1985 (as well as in 1988) without precipitating a strike. In 1985, it 
took advantage of the vulnerability labor felt about the future of the 
mill and employment at the mill and exploited this power factor to 
rewrite the contract in its favor. It was not constrained in 1985 by con 
cerns about souring employee or union relations.
In 1988, the situation at Pensacola was different. Management was 
in a bind. Corporate management insisted upon the elimination of Sun 
day premium pay, a demand strongly resisted by the workforce. But 
mill management wanted a contract and a negotiation process that 
would not disrupt worker commitment and union-management cooper 
ation generated during the preceding three years.
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Accordingly, Pensacola management moderated its demands and its 
tactics in an effort to put the best possible face on its position. The fact 
that relationships had become more constructive during the preceding 
three years helped the parties through this difficult negotiation without 
a breakdown in their relationship. While the corporate agenda to elimi 
nate premium pay for Sunday throughout all plants required company 
negotiations to force this bitter pill on labor, management sweetened 
the overall settlement with an unrequested 40IK plan and employed 
tactics that were as nonprovocative as possible.
Significant Features
This is a complex case with many dimensions, including the follow 
ing:
 In the 1985 negotiations, management assessed its business needs 
and used the opportunity presented by its new ownership to engage 
in fairly aggressive forcing.
  During the time period between contracts, management engaged in 
an intensive program of education, involving off-site conferences 
attended by both management and union officials, visits to a non 
union mill, and considerable attention to the reorientation of the 
workforce.
 During this same period management initiated a series of 
fostering tactics that: (1) used sociotechnical system (STS) tech 
niques to redesign work; (2) introduced the team concept and other 
forms of participation; (3) used pilots where units were ready; (4) 
worked on jointness, e.g., a trip to an Ecology of Work conference 
where joint union-management teams shared experiences and best 
practice; and (5) shared both power and responsibility with work 
ers and union leaders, e.g., the creation of a millwide stakeholders' 
committee.
 Management approached the 1988 contract negotiations with the 
necessity of securing some significant changes in contractual lan 
guage, especially the elimination of Sunday premium pay, while at 
the same time holding the objective of preserving the good work-
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ing relations that had developed during the preceding period of 
contract administration.
 Management achieved these seemingly incompatible bargaining 
objectives by: (1) placing the blame for the elimination of Sunday 
premium pay on the corporation; (2) not attempting to justify its 
Sunday premium pay demand as reasonable from the union's point 
of view; (3) minimizing the influence of the UPIU national bar 
gaining council; (4) urging that both sides communicate their posi 
tions as widely as possible; (5) agreeing that language about 
participation and cooperation be treated as a quid pro quo to assist 
internal alignment within the union; and (6) facilitating the elimi 
nation of a Sunday premium pay with a 40IK plan.
The initial periods of forcing and fostering in the Pensacola case 
parallel the three cases presented in the previous chapter. That is, the 
exercise of restraint during the initial forcing period set the stage for 
subsequent, far-reaching fostering. Implementing these bargaining 
strategies required all of the care and subtlety we noted in our discus 
sion of sequential strategies. This case became even more complex, 
however, when management was faced with the prospect of having to 
seek a controversial give-back after three years of joint fostering.
Background
Although the Pensacola mill was established in the 1940s, it became 
a part of Champion through a merger with St. Regis Paper in 1984. 
After a long career as St. Regis' most profitable mill, Pensacola had 
begun to decline as shifts in the supply and demand for kraft paper 
products made them less profitable in the 1970s.
In 1979, St. Regis began a $250 million capital project at Pensacola 
whose centerpiece was P5, a huge new kraft machine designed to pro 
duce a 350" wide web at the rate of 750 tons of paper per day. In the 
ensuing years, management bargained several major human resource 
developments related to P5. First, St. Regis managers hand-selected the 
new P5 crew from among the crews working on other paper 
machines a procedure agreed to by the affected unions only under
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threat of wholesale outside hiring. This episode created an isolated, 
elite crew for P5 and angered machine tenders who were not chosen.
Second, St. Regis and the four union locals three from UPIU and 
one IBEW signed a memorandum of agreement in 1979 to explore 
"team maintenance" for the huge new computerized machine. The par 
ties agreed it would require new and more efficient procedures so that 
machine operators, for example, would not have to wait for a mainte 
nance crew to repair their machine. The union saw an opportunity to 
obtain labor rates established elsewhere in the South for multicraft 
positions, and management was willing to reverse several years of 
resistance to higher rates in exchange for more efficient use of person 
nel and of its large capital investment in P5.
Third, the terms of a further subsequent agreement also created 
smaller maintenance crews and fewer classifications for the P5 
machine. While premium pay for operating extra pieces of equipment 
was eliminated, maintenance workers gained a 10 percent wage 
increase. Then in 1981 the "crew concept" was negotiated for produc 
tion workers in departmental side agreements deliberately discussed 
long enough before the 1982 negotiations to insulate it from the con 
tentiousness surrounding formal contract negotiations.
Both team maintenance and crew concept experienced unplanned 
and uneven implementation, ranging from little to extensive accep 
tance in various parts of the mill. At the very least, "crew" and "team" 
language was familiar terminology to Pensacola employees by 1981, 
as it had permitted managers to streamline certain lines of progression, 
albeit with compensating wage rates.
Machine shutdowns and personnel layoffs occurred at an accelerat 
ing rate, however, as one pulp mill and three paper machines were shut 
down and one paper machine was converted to bleached kraft during 
the 1981-1985 period. By 1984, St. Regis' sinking return on invest 
ment was attracting unwelcome suitors. After some narrow escapes, 
the company agreed in 1984 to be acquired by the "white knight" 
Champion, a smaller paper company also invested in related forest 
products.
The Pensacola mill was clearly a money-losing proposition in its 
1984 condition, a place of silent, outmoded machinery, peeling paint, 
and a new, high-tech behemoth reeling out a product whose time 
apparently had passed. The P5 was by now a great technical success,
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but a strategic blunder. By the time P5 was running at full capacity, the 
market could not absorb its enormous output of a superior grade of 
high-strength kraft paper aimed at multiwall bag manufacturers.
Even before the merger was financially complete, officers of the two 
corporations began stock-taking and planning efforts with many conse 
quences for the mill. Champion already had embarked on a program of 
acquisitions and sales that emphasized the growing white paper market 
and had all but withdrawn from low-profit kraft manufacturing and 
converting operations.
Early in 1985, another of Pensacola's kraft machines and the entire 
paper bag plant were closed down. Many at Pensacola had understood 
Champion to be a company without interest in kraft operations, and 
these shutdowns reinforced that belief. In mid-1985, Champion began 
to assemble a team to explore the feasibility of converting P5 to 
uncoated white paper. Many engineers and managers came from other 
Champion mills, to join this team and to replace other Pensacola mill 
personnel.
With the three-year labor agreement (negotiated by the previous 
owner, St. Regis, in 1982) due to expire, Champion mill and corporate 
management met periodically early in 1985 to analyze the effect of the 
existing contract on the staffing flexibility and economies they deemed 
necessary to achieve profitable mill operations. The company saw 
these negotiations as a unique opportunity to regain control over staff 
ing patterns and work rules, capitalizing on local fears regarding the 
fate of the entire mill. The final company agenda reflected both local 
management's desire for far greater flexibility and control over labor 
relations, and a corporate focus on containment of medical care costs, 
the elimination of cold (shutdown) holidays, and elimination of a large 
accumulation of restrictive work rules and side agreements. The corpo 
ration was also prepared to insist on a "zipper clause" explicitly over 
turning all previous side agreements and past practices.
In addition to Pensacola's own unique history, general labor rela 
tions patterns in the paper industry also conditioned the unfolding pic 
ture in the mill. Traditionally, little contact had occurred between 
company and unions at the industry or company tiers. There had never 
been an industrywide contract, although many companies had followed 
the lead of International Paper. And on the union side, the national
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offices of the UPIU had begun to convene councils of representatives 
from all of its locals at a particular company.
1985 Negotiations—Hard Bargaining
While the 1985 negotiations, the first under Pensacola's new own 
ers, were traditional in both structure and process, the company's pro 
posals violated union expectations. Champion was prepared to press 
the advantages inherent in the mill's sense of having been snatched 
from the jaws of death, whereas the union was still accustomed to 
annual wage increases. Management surprised the union committee 
with its forty-nine-item agenda, which was longer than any company 
agenda in the history either of the Pensacola mill or, for that matter, 
Champion. The union agenda was a far shorter and less formalized 
"wish list," and this disparity coupled with the general sense that the 
corporation had the fate of the mill in its hands permitted the company 
team to dominate the negotiations. One company participant recalls:
We knew going in that this was going to be a flabbergasting expe 
rience for the union they were frustrated, irritated, and felt we 
were taking advantage of them. Correctly, I might add.
The company argued that the substantial investment that would be 
needed to return the mill to profitability required significant union con 
cessions in return. For its part, the union committee argued that lan 
guage such as the management rights clause was unnecessary in view 
of a local tradition of accommodative labor relations, that the staffing 
flexibility envisioned by management would lead to the very kinds of 
abuse that unions and work rules were in place to prevent, and that the 
long company agenda represented an attempt to do too much too soon.
As the negotiations progressed, the union negotiators avoided dis 
cussion of flexibility language while the company repeatedly insisted 
upon discussing the subject. The UPIU International representative 
expressed philosophical agreement with flexible staffing and participa 
tive management, but opined that some of the Pensacola managers with 
whom he had worked would be incapable of adhering either to the 
spirit or the letter of the company's new language. The union team con-
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tinued to refuse either to embrace flexible staffing or to propose lan 
guage modifications or substitutions. In the face of this resistance, the 
company negotiators insisted that flexible staffing language be 
included in the proposed contract to be presented to union members so 
that it would be voted up or down with the rest of the contract provi 
sions.
Finally, in September of 1985, after twenty-seven days of bargain 
ing, the union committee "nonrecommended" a contract embodying 
nearly all of the company's agenda items, including both economic 
concessions and work-rule changes. Not surprisingly, it was rejected 
by the locals. The parties returned to the table, a federal mediator was 
called in, and further discussions yielded a few minor economic gains 
for the union, but no substantive changes in language on flexible staff 
ing or in other noneconomic areas. In November, the only slightly 
changed contract was recommended by the union committee and rati 
fied by the membership.
The atmosphere at the final negotiating session, traditionally reflec 
tive of a mutual desire to move from the adversarial posturings of the 
bargaining table to the more congenial relationships characteristic of 
contract administration, was in this instance clouded by the union 
team's sense that the company had taken advantage of the mill's eco 
nomic crisis in order to take an unexpected and aggressive step toward 
gaining substantial control over labor deployment in the mill. While 
company negotiators expected that employees' elation over the large 
capital investment that Champion had made at Pensacola would over 
shadow negative union reactions to the strategy of forcing change in 
contract negotiations, the union team felt that it had been required 
without notice to play an old game by new rules. A member of the 
company negotiating team recalls:
They felt really used at that time. I can recall the final session that 
they had. ... it was a very depressing situation. Typically, final 
sessions there's handshakes, congratulations on a job well done. 
This one was very tense, cloudy, you could cut the air with a 
knife. Union people made comments to me to the effect that we 
just raped them. ... It was pretty bitter, that we had in essence 
shoved it down their throats.
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Company negotiators had written provision for a joint union-man 
agement steering committee into the new contract, but fear of the 
potential for vocal opposition in such a forum led managers to exclude 
union representatives from early discussions about implementation of 
the new agreement.
Meanwhile, in December of 1985, a corporate decision was made to 
move the Pensacola mill toward a "participative" or "commitment" 
model of management practices, in addition to the other contract 
implementation efforts already in motion. Consultants and corporate 
officers reasoned that the time had come to move their mills away from 
traditional tight supervisory control over hourly workers and their 
work and toward a more participative model that would encourage 
workers' commitment to productivity, quality, full utilization of work 
ers' time and knowledge, and the success of the corporation. Corporate 
officials reasoned that Pensacola presented them with an excellent 
opportunity to pioneer these changes with the hope that they would 
spread to the corporation's other unionized mills.
New Cooperative Initiatives
During 1986, a tension developed between the contract provisions 
designed to increase line supervisors' flexibility and control in utilizing 
labor resources (later called "Team Concept" or "Operations Efficiency 
Language" in some Champion mills) and "Participative Management," 
a management initiative aimed at the gradual development of a com 
mitted, involved, and innovative workforce. The contradictions inher 
ent in the hard bargaining required to introduce new management 
controls, the subsequent unilateral promulgation of the participation 
program, and the company's desire to roll these two initiatives into a 
single process were quickly perceived by many employees.
There was also some difference of approach to new work systems 
and philosophies among unionists. Although the international union's 
stance toward such innovations at the time was generally negative, the 
International Representative for the region had experienced similar 
changes in other paper mills and found himself in philosophical agree-
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ment with many of its features, as long as traditional union-protected 
safeguards against managerial abuse were maintained.
Contract implementation efforts were headed by the assistant man 
ager of human resources, who had been part of the company negotiat 
ing team. This provided some continuity between formal negotiations 
and the many informal negotiations entailed in implementing a con 
tract with many new provisions.
Management also decided that the new system had to be driven by 
line management to be successful, and that Sociotechnical Systems 
(STS) analysis introduced to promote participative management could 
also be used to implement the goals of team concept in an intelligible 
way, particularly in a context of rapid technological change. Several 
meetings were held early in 1986 to explain the new contract to super 
visors, to enlist the support of line management for fewer rules and 
more participation, and to assist department managers in presenting 
relevant information to their own departments.
During this period, consensus and integration of interests within the 
respective union and management organizations were achieved by 
management trips to mills with strong participation programs (includ 
ing a new Champion nonunion greenfield mill) as well as by atten 
dance by joint union-management teams at a series of labor 
management conferences. One conference that brought union officers 
from Pensacola and another Champion mill together under company 
sponsorship was unprecedented. (Indeed, the company previously had 
carefully avoided bringing leaders from different mill locals together 
with company personnel.) This conference featured the international 
union president, Wayne Glenn, as one of the presenters. The four union 
presidents from Pensacola returned to the mill enthusiastic about the 
prospects of labor-management cooperation. One local president (who 
eventually opposed company efforts to implement new contract lan 
guage and cooperative programs) remarked at the time that union-man 
agement cooperation sounded good "as long as it wasn't an excuse for 
the company to screw the people."
The meeting that most mill managers at Pensacola regard as the start 
of the fundamental reorientation was held off-site in March of 1986. 
While many leaders in the mill already understood the nature of partic 
ipative management because of numerous in-mill explanatory and 
planning meetings, this meeting reflected a recognition of the need to
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enlist the support of key managers at all organizational levels. The 
gathering convened forty Pensacola managers and supervisors. The 
lead corporate negotiator from the 1985 contract round and other per 
sonnel from headquarters were invited in recognition of the need for 
corporate support for such efforts. Discussions explained the concept 
of participative management and attempted to enlist the enthusiasm 
and informed support of the mill's managerial corps. Those attending 
received reading material contrasting traditional "control" manage 
ment with the desired "participative" style, as well as reading and dis 
cussing case descriptions of participative programs at other companies.
The attendees were encouraged to keep their discussions centered 
on specific plans for the Pensacola mill. At one point, the conferees 
broke into department groups to discuss action plans. The two manag 
ers from the converting, finishing and shipping, and technical depart 
ments immediately saw an opportunity to achieve reorganization along 
lines they each had long contemplated. At the same time, other depart 
ments favored a more limited application of the new philosophy. The 
papermill managers, for example, already in the throes of wholesale 
technical change, decided to postpone the initiation of participative 
management, although they agreed in principle with the long-term 
objectives.
A consultant who was present suggested that some managers might 
volunteer their own departments to be "pioneer departments" by rede 
signing their departments and encouraging all members to contribute 
more of their knowledge and experience. Six departments convert 
ing, finishing and shipping, technical, the power house, accounting, 
and production control volunteered, and a group was formed to write 
a "Pensacola philosophy" consistent with the newly articulated goals 
for the mill as a whole. Managers from other departments apparently 
decided that they were already overburdened with the enormous tech 
nical demands of the conversion. Those present also resolved that the 
next major meeting on participative management should include union 
officials if the effort was to succeed. In retrospect, the philosophical 
demands for wholehearted participation weighed more heavily than the 
mill's need for successful leaders, and the "pioneer department" desig 
nation merely represented their managers' desire to move ahead with 
STS redesigns and other participative mechanisms.
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The need to take a concrete step toward a new union-management 
relationship also was addressed. Management and union officials, with 
consultants in attendance, met (again off-site) in April of 1986. The 
agenda was similar to the off-site management meeting, adjusted to 
include a bid for union support. Significantly, the UPIU International 
representative spoke in support of participative management. Other 
union officials in attendance also expressed support for the plan to 
gradually move toward participative management.
The Emergence of New Structures and Process Norms
Once the joint steering committees and department-level redesign 
teams were instituted, many aspects of Pensacola's traditional indus 
trial relations system formal, bilateral, periodic, power-bargained 
contract negotiations followed by informal, bilateral, continuous, more 
accommodative mid-contract problem solving no longer seemed 
appropriate. The management and joint union-management off-site 
meetings had been designed to bridge the traditional gaps between 
contract language and daily operations, between formal and informal 
negotiations, between industrial relations professionals and line man 
agers, between union local committees and managers, and between 
corporate and mill managers.
Process norms needed to change as well, and the off-site meetings 
modeled these changes. Facilitators urged participants at both meetings 
to adopt a problem-solving orientation as they worked on mutual goals 
and shared plans.
Of the six departments that had volunteered as pioneer departments, 
three were directly involved in the technical changes to the mill associ 
ated with the conversion of P5 to white paper. The technical depart 
ment was in the throes of gearing up to test the new white paper 
processes and products. The finishing and shipping department needed 
to be substantially reorganized to deal with new products and to oper 
ate new automated equipment, and converting was an entirely new 
department whose hourly force had yet to be hired. Mill managers 
decided to postpone organizational redesign work in accounting, tech 
nical control, and the powerhouse.
In each of the pioneer departments, joint union-management design 
teams were formed utilizing the STS approach to redesign work and
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the associated compensation systems. The greatest successes were 
achieved where job tasks happened to be discrete, departmental culture 
was cohesive and positive, managers and union representatives genu 
inely desired a more participative and logical work system, and factors 
bearing on task assignment and pay were treated in a timely and sensi 
tive manner. In general, outcomes were mixed, however, because of 
several factors only visible with hindsight. Team selection processes 
were not standardized; some managers exerted excessive control; 
hourly workers in some cases floundered in their efforts, and major 
sources of anxiety, such as job-skill certification processes, remained 
unresolved. Preexisting disputes over jurisdictional and seniority issues 
were only magnified by the pressures and scrutiny inherent in the STS 
design process.
Many at Pensacola later observed that departments should not have 
been allowed to self-select, since unresolved issues in these already- 
contentious departments had thrown the entire participation program 
into question early in the implementation. There also was widespread 
recognition that enthusiasm and the desire to sell participation had led 
managers and facilitators to imply that wages would go up in every 
redesigned department, and these high expectations could not be ful 
filled.
The focus on STS as the sine qua non of progress toward participa 
tion also came to be seen as having limitations. Some departments, 
such as technical, adapted well to STS and achieved significant suc 
cesses. The P5 crew, with its sense of isolation and elite status, refused 
to embrace a process that implied that its efficiency and coordination 
were below par.
As the Pensacola plant community moved through the challenges of 
1986, events led many local observers to decide that norms about inter 
active process had to shift, from continuous mill-level negotiations of 
contract implementation issues punctuated by formal contract negotia 
tions (dominated by higher-level corporate and union representatives) 
toward more continuous negotiations processes, over both implementa 
tion issues and desired changes in contract language.
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Negotiating the STS Arrangements
The mid-contract wage adjustments required in the redesigned 
departments became the chief arena in which the need for new negoti 
ating structures and processes became evident. Finishing and shipping 
came up first, and the corporate regional negotiator and his counterpart, 
the union International representative, rolled into traditional wage 
negotiating routines as a reflex. After many rounds of high demands 
and low offers, the parties came within 25 cents of each other for a key 
job classification and hit an impasse: department members had come to 
expect higher wages as a quid pro quo for acceptance of the uncertain 
ties of the new work system, and the corporate negotiator had insisted 
on adhering to 1985 contract language that required rates to rise only 
when new tasks were added which in this case resulted in a zero 
adjustment to the top shipping job, according to the company's analy 
sis. The embittered local president took the wage package back to his 
membership as a nonrecommended proposal, and it was unanimously 
rejected by department members including the design team.
Management demonstrated quick reflexes. Despite contract lan 
guage that would have permitted unilateral establishment of new lines 
of progression for finishing and shipping, area managers quietly 
installed just those changes absolutely required for the upcoming start 
up of the rebuilt P5. Managers, both on the human resource and operat 
ing sides, also decided to change the format for upcoming wage negoti 
ations in the technical department. Talks began with an emphasis on 
integrative problem solving, moving into economics only on the sec 
ond day. The shop steward in this case was committed to the plan, and 
the existing wage schedule was clearly below industry norms. The 
UPIU International representative also drew on his experience in other 
companies to press for an agreement on composition of a joint certifi 
cation group, which met immediately and developed a workable plan 
that codified the new work system and posited higher wages.
Later, when the power house area was ready to begin work on its 
STS redesign, team members were accorded more time to work, more 
technical and facilitator assistance, and periodic meetings with the 
regional negotiator to discuss contract-related issues before they 
reached the more formal and distributively oriented wage negotiations 
table.
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Thus, despite the cooperative gains, the negotiations over change 
surfaced many differences within and between the parties. All agreed 
that they had underestimated the planning, training, and overall time 
their ambitious change agenda would require. The local president 
involved in the finishing and shipping imbroglio remained an implaca 
ble foe of redesign, joint committees, and participation in any form 
despite the International representative's efforts to move ahead. Philo 
sophical differences between mill-level and corporate-level human 
resource managers, first highlighted by the midterm wage negotiations, 
continued to be evident as preparations began for the 1988 negotiations 
at Pensacola and other Champion mills.
1988 Contract Negotiations—Mixed Bargaining
The 1988 contract negotiations demonstrated that hard distributive 
bargaining continued to be the dominant mode for formal, periodic 
contract negotiations, even if it looked inappropriate to many actors for 
periodic mid-contract wage negotiations, and to others for any and all 
negotiations.
Many company actions during the 1988 negotiations, however, 
reflected new attention to preserving the relationship, and new sensitiv 
ity to the intraorganizational consensus and ideological issues faced by 
union negotiators. Although company negotiators continued to depend 
upon the dominant and moderating presence of the UPIU International 
representative, they also (as we describe below) took local union poli 
tics into account in many of their proposals and reactions.
Pensacola had enjoyed a sense of independent and pioneering spirit 
since 1985, but emerging corporate and international union agendas 
created a major challenge to the lead negotiators: the human resources 
manager and the UPIU International representative. Each saw potential 
for a shift away from the absolute sway of hard, distributive bargaining 
in the approaching negotiations, but each had reason to be uneasy 
about this prospect.
The corporation had declared itself, both in word and deed, commit 
ted to eliminating premium pay for scheduled Sunday work. In an ear 
lier time, this might have been a difficult issue, but the negotiating
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norms would have been obvious. It would have seemed clearly appro 
priate for corporate officers to press for this rollback across the com 
pany, and mill-level negotiators would have followed this lead; debate 
would have been joined at the formal negotiating table in terms of rela 
tive power and quids pro quo.
In 1988, in a context at Pensacola of emerging joint experimenta 
tion, union members were infuriated by early corporate statements and 
actions about the Sunday premium. Corporate attempts to explain its 
position in an integrative bargaining mode by carefully crafted refer 
ence to mutual goals, the reasonableness of company negotiators, and 
the ostensible lack of an absolute company position caused even 
greater anger. Key leaders within both parties, both before and during 
the 1988 Pensacola talks, agreed that the Sunday premium was one 
issue that would in fact have to be presented and discussed in a fairly 
traditional, distributive bargaining spirit.
Corporate labor relations strategists also realized that many mill- 
level managers, both human resource and operating, perceived a con 
tradiction between the new stated methods of participative manage 
ment and what they feared was an inflexible corporate commitment to 
elimination of the Sunday premium regardless of whether or not 
equivalent, alternative reductions in labor costs could be developed by 
local union-management groups.
Company negotiators also realized that many earlier statements to 
Pensacola employees and their unions could be taken as a promise that 
their cooperation with management change efforts would eventually be 
rewarded with "a bigger piece of the pie." The paradox for some man 
agers was that the efforts to enlist employees' "sense of ownership" 
through shared information about company and mill performance had 
now borne fruit. As one manager put it:
Everyone knows that things have been going very well in the mill 
and in the company. May's production figures were very good.
Other issues affecting intraorganizational consensus were addressed 
in novel ways at Pensacola in 1988. Once the parties exchanged agen 
das, the union made an unprecedented distribution of both negotiating 
agendas to its entire membership. This action surprised company nego 
tiators, but the mill human resources manager also had moved quickly 
to acquaint foremen and department supervisors with the content of
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both agendas. Several operating managers formed part of the company 
negotiating team in an attempt to address intraorganizational consensus 
issues critical to successful implementation of new joint ways of man 
aging, and to bring technical operating expertise to the table. By corpo 
rate policy, the mill manager himself was not a member of the 
company committee. The unions also named an unusually large com 
mittee.
Talks began in May of 1988. After rapid consideration of "house 
keeping" issues such as contract dates, the committees moved to major 
noneconomic issues. These discussions can be characterized as a mix 
ture, on both sides, of "traditional" distributive and "new" integrative 
modes.
Discussions of one set of issues related to filling vacancies indicate 
the tenor of the 1988 talks. Under previous contracts, managers were 
required to fill vacancies in lines of progression as they occurred, by 
calling in off-shift workers in temporary circumstances. As part of the 
1985 drive to secure greater management control over labor use, the 
company had negotiated the right to use a setup from within a shift to 
fill a temporary vacancy. In 1988, the company proposed language that 
would permit managers to move people between departments located 
above the bottom of their lines of progression. At the same time, the 
union proposed reversion to pre-1985 contract language.
Company negotiators argued in favor of their proposal in terms of 
operating efficiencies, citing cases where workers known to have spe 
cific skills needed in their former departments had to remain in new 
assignments, while employees with needed skills were called in with 
extra costs and delays to replace absent workers. The UPIU Interna 
tional representative replied that "the company has more flexibility 
than they know how to use intelligently now," and he and other mem 
bers of the union committee cited examples of abuses observed and 
grievances filed under post-1985 company vacancy practices.
The parties reached an integrative resolution of their differences. 
They agreed to language that allowed for department-specific solutions 
to be worked out on their merits rather than attempting to specify a new 
set of mill wide rules.
During these early discussions, as both sides tried to sense the tenor 
of the relationship, the corporate negotiator was pleased to note a 
change from attitudes he had seen during the 1985 negotiations. He
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realized that the trend toward sharing business information, begun 
under the 1985 contract, could be a double-edged sword in negotia 
tions now that performance was rising rapidly, but he also thought he 
could see growing satisfaction in the success of the mill.
Generally people are pleased with the situation here in the mill. 
They like being involved, and the mill's making good profits. But 
the union is saying, "We've got more knowledge and you should 
pay us for that knowledge share the pie with us." But that in 
itself is very different from previous years. There's no more talk 
of "compensation for this terrible job."
After the end of the first week of negotiations an external event sig 
nalled the extent of change at Pensacola. By earlier arrangement, and 
despite fears that the negotiations would cause union participants to 
renege, a Pensacola union-management group attended an Ecology of 
Work conference in Louisville, Kentucky. Three effects could be dis 
cerned. Foremost in some minds was the fact that a joint group could 
attend a conference during the negotiating season indicating that an 
improved relationship was undamaged by the strains of formal negotia 
tions. Second, Pensacola managers and unionists alike were able to 
gauge their real progress against the struggles recounted by other par 
ticipants, and to share the pride felt by members of the converting 
department who were told that they should be presenting rather than 
just listening to others' achievements. Third, UPIU members from 
Pensacola were questioned closely by their union brethren from other 
Champion mills, wanting to know how the Pensacola group intended 
to react to company demands for an end to the Sunday premium. In this 
regard, members of the Pensacola group were reminded of company- 
wide interest in their progress, which extended not only to the efforts 
toward participation and commitment for which they had been congrat 
ulated, but to the outcome of their pending contract negotiations as 
well.
After the conference, negotiations continued in mixed bargaining 
style. Management evinced more consciousness of union officers' 
needs in achieving intraorganizational consensus by agreeing:
  to notify the union before outside contractors performed in-plant 
work, in order that union officials would be informed when asked 
about unfamiliar workers and vehicles; and
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  to postpone discussion of a controversial drug-screening program 
until after a labor agreement had been signed.
Company negotiators also took care not to undermine the UPIU Inter 
national representative's direction of the union negotiating committee:
These negotiations are pretty much following the standard for 
mat, but the approach is different because we're coming to a reso 
lution much more quickly than other locations I've negotiated. 
Things are tested maybe once, and then we'll get off of it. It's 
been pretty traditional. . . . because it is negotiations, and because 
[the UPIU International representative's] control would be lost if 
things were more participative, and this would not help the com 
pany at all.
Company labor strategists took the multitiered nature of labor-man 
agement relations into account in other ways. They delayed presenting 
their economic proposals until after a scheduled meeting of the UPIU 
Champion Council (comprising all Champion mill locals). No one 
from Pensacola had planned to attend, and the union committee did not 
request that negotiations be postponed. At the same time, the realiza 
tion developed that any show of corporate force could threaten a deli 
cate local negotiating balance.
Company negotiators dealt with several different compensation 
issues within a single new concept: the continuous process allowance. 
The Sunday premium originally had been established as an inducement 
to workers to abandon the traditional inviolability of Sunday as a day 
of rest in order to run the mills seven days a week. Meal allowances 
and shift differentials also had been established over time as compen 
sation for the demands of continuous process manufacturing.
By 1988, some nonunion paper mills had established "continuous 
process allowances" in lieu of the mechanisms described above. Cham 
pion proposed to install such an allowance at Pensacola in order to 
streamline its compensation system. The company's precise construc 
tion of this proposal was intended to do several things at once: avoid 
enumerating the pay practices to be replaced and avoid adding the con 
tinuous process pay to the regular paycheck to which many other bene 
fits were indexed. The union accepted the concept without major 
objection, but demanded, in traditional fashion, a far larger hourly
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increment (initially 70 cents per hour compared to management's offer 
of 17 cents per hour).
Union spokesmen also persisted in treating participation language as 
a rather undesirable company demand, rather than the mutually 
embraced declaration of philosophy that company negotiators hoped to 
achieve. As economic proposals appeared on the table, the union com 
mittee reiterated its opening position: Pensacola workers had taken 
wage cuts and had ceded areas of job control in order to save the mill in 
1985, and now the mill was profitable. Not only was it time to restore 
wages, in the union view, but those wages had already been promised 
in exchange for cooperation with both a corporate and plant change 
agenda of participation and union-management cooperation.
Negotiators on both sides proceeded to move between distributive 
and integrative modes in new ways, especially in recognition of their 
opponents' intraorganizational political needs and in view of the evolu 
tionary nature of the changes underway, and they tacitly evolved guide 
lines to assign issues to appropriate negotiating processes: integrative 
bargaining for participative and cooperative programs and distributive 
bargaining for wages, work rules, and other work-related policies. 
However, the distinction broke down somewhat when the union contin 
ued to insist that management itself had linked participatory programs 
with financial rewards and was trying to separate the two. Toward the 
end of negotiations, when the union announced that it did intend to 
propose participation language, it insisted that agreement in this area 
be linked to company movement on other issues, although by this time 
it was not specifying which issues these might be.
As the parties tackled the sensitive issue of Sunday premium pay, 
the process came close to reverting to the very traditional adversarial 
mode. The chief corporate negotiator had made the company's ada 
mant position clear in his opening remarks, but once he commenced 
negotiating the status of Sunday premium pay, he unfurled the com 
pany's major argument that the economic context of the paper indus 
try and competitor companies' reactions to that context had resulted in 
a trend toward elimination of Sunday and other premium pay. He 
argued that Pensacola had to follow the pattern, and he buttressed his 
arguments carefully with a host of statistics, as if he were relying upon 
persuading the union committee of the merits of the company's posi 
tion.
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Union reaction to this presentation reflected the perils of transitional 
relationships and processes. As the mill human resource manager 
recalled later:
As the week wore on, the more we talked about justifications for 
the Sunday premium, the madder the guys got.
The UPIU International representative charged that the company was 
disingenuous in using other paper companies' actions as a justification 
for its own, in view of the fact that the company had accepted compro 
mise arrangements in earlier negotiations at several other mills. It was 
also becoming clear that the union negotiators saw political advantages 
in being forced to accede to an unpopular and symbolically controver 
sial change. The Sunday premium had become an explosive issue 
among some Pensacola workers, and UPIU locals at other Champion 
mills anxiously awaited results at Pensacola as they prepared for their 
own negotiations in 1989. In this arena, an overt forcing strategy might 
work more to the advantage of both parties than would the difficult 
realignments and intraorganizational negotiations required to achieve 
the result by any other process. In fact, the corporate negotiator finally 
said, during a late session, "Let's not try to justify it, let's just work out 
ways to deal with it." The International representative, for his part, 
informed the company that the union had no intention of "just giving 
up" on the Sunday premium, and issued a barely veiled threat: He 
would hate to have the hard work it had taken to maintain this relation 
ship wasted, only to deteriorate into implemented contracts and lock 
outs.
At the same time, leaders of both committees acknowledged 
changed expectations for negotiations. They no longer saw formal con 
tract and informal mid-contract negotiations as different species. The 
international representative said later: "The point was not just getting a 
contract, it was getting a contract and maintaining a relationship."
A management observer pointed to the disposition of one union 
agenda item as an illustration of a new approach. The union had pro 
posed one day at a time (ODAAT) use of vacation time, which manage 
ment resisted on grounds of administrative difficulties with scheduling. 
The union finally proposed a side agreement which would permit a 
one-year experiment with ODAAT vacations and an assessment of its 
performance after one year. The company committee accepted the
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union proposal, at once as a reasonable compromise and as a way of 
reinforcing the union's problem-solving approach that led to integra- 
tive language sensitive to both union and management concerns.
The union's participation language, finally placed on the table dur 
ing the last week of negotiations, delighted company proponents of 
union-management cooperation. The proposal's significant clauses 
were: a strongly worded endorsement of the importance to the mill of 
commitment and participation; a call for the creation of a joint steering 
committee to oversee all participation programs; a requirement for 
union approval of all design committees' final proposals; protection of 
seniority during every design process; protection of existing grievance 
and discipline practices; no loss of employment or pay through the 
actions of participatory teams; and the union's right to terminate the 
memorandum on 60 days' notice without penalty.
Mill managers were willing to press the parent corporation for the 
employment and wage guarantees and argued only mildly against the 
union's request that the language be framed in a Memorandum of 
Agreement, preferring to have the principles included in the new con 
tract. The company argued successfully for exclusion of the union's 
seniority language, and the parties agreed to jointly written language 
recognizing the inevitability of change.
Many final economic proposals were negotiated in traditional fash 
ion, with offer and counteroffer accompanied by many feints and 
threats. The International representative reminded company negotia 
tors that package rejection would lead to a strike vote, which was only 
a reiteration of UPIU bylaws. The company negotiator declared that a 
strike vote would not affect the finality of the company's offered pack 
age, also a traditional remark. The union finally did accept a buyout of 
the Sunday premium, which consisted of a new continuous process 
allowance and lump-sum cash payments. The Sunday premium was, 
however, to be phased out with time and one-half pay for the first con 
tract year (in addition to the buyout) and straight time thereafter. There 
were general increases over the second and third years of the contract, 
and increases in many benefits.
At the end of the following week, 80 percent of the members of the 
four UPIU and IBEW locals approved and ratified the contract signed 
by their committee. The contract signing ceremony was a businesslike 
affair, neither the bitter, defeated event of 1985 for unionists nor a
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hearty celebration of a renewed relationship. The UPIU International 
representative took the opportunity to denigrate the financial settlement 
in view of company profit levels, and to warn his members against tak 
ing consultants' and facilitators' rosy promises too seriously.
Over the next several years, management continued to make head 
way by negotiating employee commitment and union-management 
cooperation. Participation continued to broaden in scope and deepen its 
penetration into the management of operations. Union officials gener 
ally became more trusting of participation, in particular and mill man 
agement's intentions in general. The union officials who were 
entrenched in their opposition to participation activities became less 
active and more neutral in their positions. Performance of the mill con 
tinued to improve in ways that drew high praise from corporate execu 
tives.
Outcomes
By 1994, the substantive and relationship outcomes at Pensacola 
had been highly favorable. Perhaps the most significant outcome was a 
shift in the frames of reference of the parties.
Prior to the 1985 contract negotiations, both parties took their stable, 
accommodative relationship for granted. However, the erosion of the 
profitability of the mill's kraft paper products and the sale of the mill to 
Champion were critical events that portended major changes. Manage 
ment indeed entered the 1985 negotiations with a new frame that 
competitive conditions called for major substantive changes in terms of 
employment and would require a forcing strategy. The size of manage 
ment's demands shocked the union negotiators. The union, for its part, 
did not see the need for the particular changes, but eventually accepted 
the power realities that enabled management to have its way. As a 
result, the accommodative relationship was soured.
In effect, management exploited their new-owner status and fol 
lowed a forcing strategy that was significant in several respects: (1) 
controls over costs and labor deployment were negotiated (via hard 
bargaining) before constructive labor-management relationships had 
been established, and (2) all four union locals were established as sig-
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natories to a contract whose provisions became integral to subsequent 
fostering efforts. As a result, even overtly antiparticipation union offi 
cials became engaged in participatory processes as a part of their inter 
est in effective contract administration.
The mindset that evolved for labor during the years between the 
1985 and 1988 contract negotiations included an expectation that the 
gains from commitment and cooperation would be distributed equita 
bly between labor and the company. This change in frame toward a 
more participative workplace counted on the cumulative effect of 
many activities, including the joint off-site meeting and the STS- 
related changes in the plant.
Management's choice of STS as the heart of its change processes 
made the company's simultaneous embrace of management-won flexi 
bility and employee involvement intelligible: department groups would 
use the STS approach to participate in their departments' implementa 
tion of hard-bargained contractual changes, and they might benefit 
financially from that participation as well. For Pensacola, in the throes 
of complex technological change during much of the 1980s, STS also 
had the potential not always realized for engaging union members 
in their changing worklives in a proactive way.
Pensacola's story also demonstrates the myriad dilemmas and diffi 
culties posed by the need for continuous, multilevel, negotiations. The 
process in the finishing and shipping departments, for example, ran 
aground on inadequate integrative bargaining and incomplete attention 
to intraorganizational consensus between design teams and the rest 
of their department, and between local leadership (on both sides) and 
corporate negotiators.
Then, in 1988, when management adhered to the corporate multi- 
mill bargaining agenda to take away Sunday premium pay as such, 
union officials felt compelled to revise their approach toward a more 
"realistic" notion of their relationship. Labor as well as mill manag 
ers were forced to recognize that both sides would not only cooperate 
to increase the size of the pie, but that each would compete to get 
favorable shares for their own constituents.
Other lessons emerge from the experience of the 1988 negotiations. 
Some issues were decided in small problem-solving groups, and man 
agement in particular attempted to positively influence union commit 
tee members through unprecedented information sharing. Although
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some management strategists had come to value consensus-seeking 
over power bargaining, it became clear that the intraorganizational 
consensus needs of elected union counterparts were sometimes best 
served by hard distributive bargaining. Specifically, the Sunday 
premium issue demonstrated the difficulties inherent in maintaining 
the pretense of integrative bargaining over an issue on which the par 
ties' interests as well as positions were fundamentally different, and on 
which one or both teams were at risk politically.
Lessons Learned
In most respects, the Pensacola story appears to be an exemplar. 
Despite some similarities with the Bidwell situation (new ownership 
arrangements, use of outside consultants, and implementation of 
QWL-type programs), the results at Pensacola far exceeded the aborted 
change efforts at Bidwell.
In retrospect, it is clear that the parties would not have been able to 
agree on fundamental changes in the contract in 1985 via a fostering 
strategy. Management needed to employ the power inherent in its "new 
arrival" and the urgency inherent in forcing to secure changes neces 
sary to justify its investment. In fact, it is interesting that the company 
did not make its purchase of the mill contingent on a revision of the 
contract, but elected to tackle this subject at the first negotiations after 
arriving on the scene. This willingness to work things out in the course 
of normal collective bargaining and to do so with key officials at the 
local level created a positive backdrop to the hard distributive bargain 
ing that was necessary.
The question should be asked whether the local unions at Pensacola 
could have responded differently. They found themselves managing 
many dilemmas. Similar to the DeRidder situation, management at 
Pensacola moved aggressively to involve rank-and-file workers in a 
series of activities aimed at increasing commitment and motivation. 
But the unions at Pensacola were not held at arm's length indeed they 
were afforded many opportunities to become co-sponsors of these pro 
grams. Local union leadership adopted, for the most part, a stance of 
supporting joint programs, but also bargained vigorously on behalf of
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member interests short of taking strike action. As a result, they were 
able to share some of the credit with management for improvements 
associated with the work redesign. Equally, management indicated the 
important role of the union in its efforts to temper the impact of forcing 
during the 1988 round of collective bargaining.
In all, the Pensacola case points out the complex mix of negotiations 
associated with fundamental changes in a labor-management relation 
ship. The parties' success reflects not only action taken, but also criti 
cal choices that prevented escalating conflict early on and that avoided 
a collapse in relations during hard bargaining after a period of foster 
ing.
INTERWEAVING FORCING AND FOSTERING STRATEGIES 
The Budd Company, the UAW, and the CAW
Over the past decade, labor-management relations between Budd 
and the UAW have moved toward social contracts based on worker 
commitment and union-management cooperation. 2 This case highlights 
plant-level forcing and fostering initiatives primarily in Budd's 
Detroit, Michigan plant, as well as tracing key developments between 
the international union and the corporation.
Specifically, in the early and mid-1980s, Budd engaged in forcing, 
as was the pattern for many auto supply firms. As a result, it received a 
number of important economic concessions. As a backdrop for the con 
cessionary pressure, the company had engaged in massive layoffs dur 
ing the early 1980s sometimes linking concessionary demands and 
threatened movement of work. Concurrently, Budd had initiated an 
employee involvement (El) program modeled on initiatives begun at its 
automotive customers. This focused on shop-floor participation in 
decision making on issues of safety, work organization, and other mat 
ters. Unlike many of its competitors, however, Budd did not seek to 
escape from union representation on any large scale even though the 
company did open a new nonunion facility in the late 1980s. The UAW 
worked closely with Budd management at plant and corporate levels,
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but an element of caution was always present, given the history of con 
cessions and concerns over the nonunion facility.
At the level of national negotiations, the company attempted in 
1987, to achieve concessions and mutually beneficial innovations by 
opening contract talks early and engaging in extensive communica 
tions. The first attempt failed, but a second attempt succeeded, and the 
parties signed a four-year agreement that set in motion a relationship 
characterized by quarterly meetings and continuous attention to com 
mon problems.
Significant Features
At the plant level, the Budd case illustrates several important dimen 
sions:
  A long list of company demands departed from past practice and 
presented a "procedural" challenge to the union apart from their 
content.
  Union leaders who were persuaded of the company's need for con 
cessions were rebuffed by members who were not persuaded. Sub 
sequently, both management and union adjusted their tactics and 
embarked on a major communication effort prior to a subsequent 
round of negotiations.
  The negotiation of a hit-to-hit agreement for die transition teams at 
the Detroit plant involved a shift of negotiating power from indus 
trial relations to manufacturing management.
  The juxtaposition of forcing (around the movement of work and 
layoffs) with fostering (around employee involvement and labor- 
management committees) helped to establish the importance of 
both the employee involvement and joint labor-management initia 
tives, and probably prevented even greater job losses.
At the national level, additional important dimensions include:
  Customers (especially the Big Three automakers) made demands 
on auto parts suppliers that the UAW found more credible than 
when the demands had originated solely with management.
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  The parties created a quarterly forum to deal with "quality issues" 
that subsequently was used for potentially contentious issues  
providing, in effect, a vehicle for continuous bargaining.
  Continued tensions were observable around the union's role in new 
production facilities located in "right-to-work" states.
The Budd case, then, is in many ways typical of mid-size firms fac 
ing considerable competitive pressures and saddled with histories of 
adversarial relations. While the parties at Budd generated many impor 
tant joint innovations, they also experienced numerous difficult con 
frontations in which the outcomes were not always mutually beneficial. 
Ultimately, a complex mix of negotiations was required for the parties 
to make the substantial progress that they experienced in transforming 
their relationship.
Background
The Budd Company, a large independent auto supplier, was founded 
in 1912 by Edward G. Budd. The company has expanded steadily, with 
a worldwide workforce of 14,000 and sales of $1.3 billion as of the 
early 1990s. Budd was organized into three main divisions: stamping 
and frame; wheel and brake; and plastics. The majority of production 
operations were located in Michigan and Ohio, but the company also 
had facilities in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, California, and Kentucky, as 
well as in Canada, Argentina, and Germany. The company was owned 
by the German conglomerate Thyssen AG at the time this case was 
written.
The UAW first organized workers at the Budd Company in the 
1940s, and the majority of Budd manufacturing facilities remained 
unionized. In Canada, the Canadian Automobile Workers Union 
(CAW) represents Budd workers. Historically, labor relations have fol 
lowed the pattern set by the UAW with the original equipment manu 
facturers (OEMs), including arm's length collective bargaining, high 
levels of wages and benefits, and very formal and adversarial contract 
administration.
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Early Forcing and Fostering Initiatives at the Plant Level
The decade of the 1980s began with massive layoffs throughout the 
Budd Company. The Detroit plant was among the hardest hit, with 
union membership declining from 2,800 to 1,200 between 1979 and 
1982. In this turbulent climate, the social contract between labor and 
management surfaced as a topic of negotiations.
Initial Concession Bargaining
Before the largest of the layoffs, which occurred in 1981, the com 
pany pressed for concessions. Many union leaders were persuaded that 
adjustments were needed and agreed to a mid-contract reopener. An 
agreement was reached, which involved significant wage and benefit 
concessions. This was presented to the membership, with the stated 
alternative being the loss of the plant's wheel and drum business, 
accounting for over half of the plant's workforce.
Although local union president, Norm Tunessi, recommended ratifi 
cation, the membership was not convinced of the need for change. A 95 
percent vote against the agreement devastated local union leaders, who 
had been persuaded that the company's situation was indeed serious. 
Following the rejection, jobs were indeed shifted out of the Detroit 
plant, resulting in a layoff of an additional 900 employees. As one 
union leader commented on the membership's vote against the conces 
sions:
We had a ferocious membership meeting. Talk about being scared, 
we had to be escorted out of the meeting ... They (the member 
ship) never believed it until the machines were disassembled.
This early forcing (with limited fostering) ended up costly to both 
sides. The union and the membership suffered the loss of jobs, while 
the company incurred the costs associated with shutting down nearly 
100,000 square feet of plant capacity.
The experience, which had parallels in other Budd facilities, illus 
trates the limiting effects of each side's frame of reference. Manage 
ment assumed that its statements of the need for deep changes would 
be taken seriously since, from its perspective, the need was self-evi 
dent. For many in the union membership, however, there was no prior
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experience to suggest that management's statements were anything 
more than stronger versions of past rhetoric.
Following the layoffs, an increased willingness by union members 
to make informal accommodations was evidenced. As the local presi 
dent recalls:
We had 2,800 people in 1979, and 1,600 got laid off by 1981. One 
of the biggest problems was with the job classifications. Jobs were 
merged, and it became a problem for the bargaining committee.... 
We had to modify classifications, not by contract but by the bar 
gaining committee and labor relations on a daily basis. You didn't 
know if the plant was going to survive, so the union was willing to 
move.
Employee Involvement and Statistical Process Control 
as Customer-Driven Changes
Beginning in 1982, the company and local unions in most Budd 
facilities agreed to establish employee involvement (El) programs and 
statistical process control (SPC) programs. Both initiatives were dic 
tated by the firm's customers, but in different ways. The adoption of 
the El program was an example of the connection across companies in 
the auto industry; GM and Ford had pioneered quality of worklife 
(QWL) and El programs, respectively, and Budd joined many other 
auto suppliers in adopting similar language in its collective bargaining 
agreements. In contrast, SPC represented one of the first domains 
where the OEMs insisted that their suppliers implement new work 
practices.
The structure of the El and SPC efforts at Budd were patterned after 
the respective programs at Ford and GM. Union appointees and man 
agement designees served as staff coordinators. Also, the entire El pro 
cess was administered by a joint committee that made decisions on a 
consensus basis a key shift in the norms of interaction. 3
The most challenging negotiations associated with El and SPC 
efforts, however, took place at the individual level. These involved 
negotiations over workers' voluntary participation and commitment to 
the new initiatives. As such, bargaining occurred between supervisors 
and employees, between QWL or SPC coordinators and employees, 
and among groups of workers. By the mid-1980s, the El effort had
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expanded to include approximately one-quarter of the workforce in the 
Detroit plant, but very few other workers were interested in the pro 
cess. This plateau in the number of volunteers occurred in other Budd 
locations and was typical of many El initiatives (Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 
Kochan, andVerma 1991).
Many comfort and hygiene concerns of the workers were addressed 
via the El process, along with some redesign of equipment and work 
operations aimed at greater efficiency. For example, an El team 
improved quality and safety by developing a custom piece of sheet 
metal feeding equipment, dubbed the "Goesinta," since it takes metal 
from one press and helps as it "goes into" another. The SPC efforts also 
contributed to improved product quality. However, management was 
convinced that these joint efforts alone would not be sufficient to meet 
the competitive challenges in the auto supply sector where customers 
had begun to pressure suppliers for annual price cuts of 1 to 3 percent.
For some union members and leaders, despite the history of layoffs 
and lost business, there was still considerable skepticism about the 
need for fundamental changes. For example, during the mid-1980s, the 
Budd Detroit plant was working high levels of overtime. As one union 
leader noted:
It's hard to get the membership thinking long term, especially 
when the people are working all the overtime they want, actually 
more than they want to. It is hard to convince them their jobs are 
in jeopardy.
There were also institutional-level pressures on the union. For 
example, in the Detroit plant, the company repeatedly indicated its 
desire to cut back on the number of full-time paid union positions 
(which had remained constant despite reductions in the size of the 
workforce). Finally, here as in other locations, there were tensions 
regarding the ability of union leaders to engage in new forms of dia 
logue with management while still being seen as independent from 
management (Cutcher-Gershenfeld, McKersie, and Weaver 1988).
This role conflict experienced in the union was vividly illustrated by 
deliberations over the shape of the table in a special meeting room used 
by the union bargaining committee. The bargaining committee rejected 
a square table as lending itself to competing sides, but also rejected a 
round table as "going too far." The result was an oblong table with one
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end squared for the union and management co-chairs of the joint 
effort illustrative of the parties's cautious commitment to a new 
social contract around commitment and cooperation.
Negotiating Flexibility and Autonomy in Detroit
In 1987, local negotiations began early at the Detroit facility paral 
leling early national negotiations (which are discussed below). The 
negotiations focused on a key aspect of economic performance in the 
stamping plant the time required to change dies. This was a process 
by which large metal dies (some weighing as much as 50 tons) were 
removed from presses at the end of a production run and replaced with 
new dies for stamping a different part. Addressing the issue posed a 
dilemma, since it was not clear that a solution could be found via tradi 
tional collective bargaining.
The focus of the discussions centered on the establishment of a hit- 
to-hit, labor-management committee that would provide oversight to 
autonomous teams of approximately twenty craft employees responsi 
ble for changing dies. The goal for the die transition teams was to 
reduce the time between the last good stamping or "hit" in one produc 
tion run and the first good "hit" in the next run.
In all, the local negotiations lasted about four months, with most of 
the time spent in discussions about the function of the hit-to-hit com 
mittee. Eventually the parties agreed to draft a letter of agreement that, 
in the words of the plant manager, required a new approach.
We tried to do it the old way, but it didn't work. It could not be 
developed in traditional bargaining language. Thus, we got rid of 
the "mays," which has always been interpreted as something I 
don't have to do and the "snails," which is something that I must 
do.
Yet drafting the letter proved difficult. The task initially fell on the 
plant's industrial relations department, but as the director of industrial 
relations commented:
The die transition letter was important. We really struggled with 
that and modified our proposal three or four times. They didn't 
like it. We told them "You do it! If you don't like it then you write 
one up." ... It was surprising, they came back with an almost per 
fect letter.
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A UAW International representative recalled that the union was able to 
draft the letter on the basis of experiences in other locations:
We put together language that was out of the norm for us. They 
acted like they won a million bucks. They called a caucus right 
away. We had a smooth flow after that point.
Critical to reaching agreement was a shift that occurred within the 
management team. It was the production manager (rather than the 
industrial relations manager) who took the lead. One union official 
characterized the role of local staff and line management in the bar 
gaining as follows:
In the local negotiations it was clear that local company IR guys 
were not running the show. The production manager had more 
clout than the local IR people. In the past there would be labor 
relations people and no one else in the room. Production people 
put positions across. This is still ongoing.
This tighter integration of line management into collective bargaining 
suggested some new requirements were being addressed for managing 
internal differences in the context of integrative negotiations.
Continued Complexities in the Management 
of Internal Differences
The split between line and staff management that emerged in collec 
tive bargaining continued during the administration of the new contract 
language, with line management taking an activist role in the adminis 
tration of the hit-to-hit committee. As one line manager commented:
Certain groups are excluded from hit-to-hit. You are better off 
without their [industrial relations] involvement. It eliminates face- 
to-face discussions because for some groups it is best not to com 
municate. All people have labels in the company. IR does not do 
well in certain situations. A group will assume the personality of 
the individuals. When it gets down to the nitty-gritty, the key is 
partnership. The relationship has been building. The union has 
trust in [production management].
We make sure that all the parties play by the initial rules cre 
ated by the union and company in negotiations. We rule on partic 
ular areas. I guess it has taken over the traditional union- 
management role. During the meetings there are a lot of discus-
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sions and negotiation. It's not really negotiations, it's mostly dis 
cussions. IR has no authority for hit-to-hit. What do you really 
need a labor relations department for in this setting?
The local union president echoed the manager's comments:
When I'm in the plant, sometimes I go through the right channels 
and sometimes I go directly to managers. I know my job is to go 
through IR managers and not to the floor, but I have an advantage 
having worked with most of the people before.
In a conversation with the production manager, these relations were 
confirmed:
I communicate with the union all of the time. I go with Herb (the 
local union president) to seminars and the union presidents in all 
three plants go to high-level quality and hit-to-hit meetings. It is 
difficult to get the okay for them to go. Vice-presidents and presi 
dents don't understand why you would want to bring the union. I 
get them involved in everything I do...I don't ignore IR, but I look 
to do the job myself.
The forging of stronger links between line management and union 
leadership implicitly established a new norm regarding interactions, 
namely, solutions were driven more by functional needs than by formal 
protocols. Thus, when a bargaining issue related to production opera 
tions, line management pushed to take the lead in addressing the issue.
In practice, the die transition teams were a dramatic success. Instead 
of the traditional linear sequence of trades handling the removal, instal 
lation, and setting of dies, a cross-skilled team of about a dozen indi 
viduals descended on a production line, and an almost choreographed 
process followed. The bottom line result was a reduction in downtime 
by over 50 percent.
The broad implications of expanded interactions between line man 
agement and the union were severalfold. On the one hand, the organi 
zation was able to perform more effectively, since decision making 
increasingly involved key stakeholders. On the other hand, bargaining 
was multichanneled, which meant that there were increased opportuni 
ties for destabilization via "end runs." As well, certain roles had the 
potential for becoming rigid and isolated in problematic ways. For 
example, the industrial relations function had come to be defined more 
narrowly around bargaining over wage and benefit issues and the pro-
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cessing of formal grievances and discipline all of which were issues 
that tended to be distributive. Thus, not only was management speak 
ing with more than one voice, but the industrial relations function 
became constrained in its ability to generate joint gains with the union. 
The new linkages also raised complex political pressures within the 
union. Like the splits within management, internal union tensions 
emerged around the role of staff appointees in programs such as El and 
SPC and members serving on die transition teams. The threat posed by 
the El, SPC, and die transition team programs lay in their creating 
channels of communications between management and labor that were 
separate from the grievance procedure and outside the formal manage 
ment hierarchy. The very success of these initiatives depended on the 
new channels successfully tackling meaningful issues, yet the potential 
for success made them threatening to others in the union.
Shifting Patterns of Interaction at the Level 
of the Corporation and the International Union
While issues stemming from manufacturing operations were being 
more directly integrated into plant-level negotiations, a broader set of 
economic issues were being integrated into the national negotiations 
between the Budd Company and the UAW. The process began early in 
1987, when Budd was pressured by customers who knew that the col 
lective bargaining agreement was scheduled to expire. As one execu 
tive noted: "The customers became antsy and wanted a buildup of 
inventory." This buildup would have set in motion the traditional cycle 
whereby inventory is expanded before bargaining, making it possible 
for the company to contemplate taking a strike or ensuring layoffs if an 
agreement was reached on schedule. Either way, there would be sub 
stantial costs for both sides.
In order to avoid the inventory dilemma, Budd approached the union 
regarding early negotiations indicating that an early agreement that 
avoided an inventory buildup might be sweetened with some of the 
resulting cost savings. This inducement to depart from arm's-length 
bargaining helped provide the union with an incentive and internal 
legitimacy for beginning discussions early. The union leadership was
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also persuaded that the competitive pressures were real. As a local 
UAW president commented:
In March, 1987, the company notified us of a desire to negotiate 
early in order to be able to bid better on new work with better cost 
estimation.... We were told that this would help get the company 
into a more competitive position. The window would be open now 
on bids. We were persuaded that this was a legitimate situation.
As another local union official commented:
In fact, part of what drove us to the table early was the fear of 
what would happen if Philadelphia lost 40 percent of their work  
that's a lot of work. We have the same problem in Detroit. It's all 
vehicle-specific work. If that's pulled with a new model, we are in 
trouble. We don't want Budd to lose customers. Time forces you 
to do different things.
However, in reflecting on the experience, union leaders also expressed 
some caution. As one senior UAW official commented:
We had ongoing discussion to make Budd more ... I don't want to 
use the word "competitive," but there were competitive issues, and 
as a result, we were willing to look into the contract.
While the request was legitimate, framing the effort solely in competi 
tive terms was uncomfortable for some union leaders.
Management Takes the Initiative
The bargaining process that followed was directly contrary to the 
established practice where the union made most of the opening 
demands in bargaining. Here, the company advanced a set of concrete 
proposals designed to improve the company's competitive posture. The 
shift was difficult for union leaders. One regional official in the UAW 
described the 1987-1988 UAW-Budd national negotiations as follows:
In the fall we started with local negotiations, which we couldn't 
resolve, then went to national negotiations. This was not tradi 
tional negotiations. The whole process was different. I was 
shocked by their demands. . . . They came out demanding and I 
don't like bargaining this way. It was "this or else," with the 
demise of a couple of plants as a possibility held over our heads. 
We got to the point of no return. I told them to bag their ass.
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In local negotiations, there was also a reversal of traditional patterns. 
As a personnel official in one of the Budd plants recalled:
The local agreement was very different from what I'd seen before. 
We had eighteen items on the table and the union had only one.
The decision by management to come to the bargaining table early, 
with its own demands, clearly represented a pivotal event. Manage 
ment's approach created a real dilemma for the union leadership. If the 
union engaged in negotiating the issues that management had initiated, 
it would be acknowledging the legitimacy of management taking simi 
lar initiatives in the future i.e., establishing a new norm. If the union 
refused to work on the new issues, then the existing norms would be 
reinforced, but a deterioration in the relationship would most likely 
result.
Thus, the challenge was first whether to bargain early and then how 
to do so. The parties met the first challenge, but had difficulties with 
the second. As one local union leader commented on these negotia 
tions:
We need a capacity to communicate in a different way. You don't 
know if they are reading your signals and we aren't sure what they 
say. The union is reactionary, and it depends on what the company 
does.
The formal negotiations began in the fall. Although talks continued 
for three months, the union broke off bargaining in mid-December 
1987. Even with the incentive of sharing the gains derived from not 
building inventory and the recognition of legitimate competitive pres 
sures, the union was uncomfortable with the discussions especially 
with the implied departure from an adversarial bargaining process. In 
retrospect, it is clear that the parties were attempting to make two 
potentially contradictory shifts in their pattern of interactions. First was 
the attempt to shift to a more integrated mode of interaction around 
what were acknowledged to be competitive pressures. Second, man 
agement's very efforts to enlarge the bargaining agenda carried distrib 
utive overtones. These complexities and dilemmas accounted for the 
union's withdrawal from early negotiations.
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Information Sharing and New Norms of Interaction
Following the holidays, the company began a campaign to educate 
the union leadership and the workforce on the economic pressures it 
was facing. The information sharing was designed not just to shape 
union leader attitudes, but, based on the experiences of the early 1980s, 
the company started to educate the union membership directly. One 
senior executive described the process as follows:
The communication process is the key element. One of our jobs is 
to meet the expectations of not only the UAW but also, for lack of 
a better word, the lowest member of the organization. We must 
communicate to individual workers, not just to Solidarity House. 
Our workers can't expect to get what Ford (workers) get and we 
have to communicate this.
As one union leader commented, the communications after the col 
lapse of the first round of early negotiations represented a significant 
break from traditional practice:
I was a bit surprised by the early negotiations, but more surprised 
by the company presentations. Roth and Harper [corporate and 
division executives] met with the hourly workers and let them 
know what was going on with the company. They were being hon 
est and that was different.
A labor relations official in the Detroit plant also discussed these meet 
ings:
Roth met with groups of about 100 employees in Detroit and 
Philly. He talked to them face-to-face about the potential loss of 
business for the Lincoln and Econoline models. Something hap 
pened here, I saw a reaction and many scared people.
Another labor relations official noted that it was not just the infor 
mation sharing, per se, but the fact that it was presented in a noncoer- 
cive way:
Jim Roth's talks helped considerably. They (the workers) were 
getting the company message and it wasn't filtered. There was a 
better feeling of trust in this negotiation because we gave them the 
facts. It would not have worked if we had just held out the ham 
mer.
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In all, the communications process included the following elements:
(1) initial management meetings with the union bargaining committee;
(2) plant meetings where the division president spoke to all employees;
(3) a shift in the content of the plant newsletter toward more business- 
oriented stories (and away from bowling scores); (4) Budd Bulletins 
issued at corporate level with further economic information; (5) UAW 
vice-president, Odessa Komer, spoke to management, helping to 
increase understanding regarding the UAW's interests; (6) state-of-the- 
plant meetings, and (7) additional meetings with high-level Budd labor 
relations staff and UAW-Budd department officers. One UAW Interna 
tional official concluded that:
These were the most updated long-run forecasts that the company 
has ever given us. Everybody's eyes were wide open going in. It's 
not like they said "trust me." When the top guy in stamping comes 
in and says "I'm not going to bullshit you," we knew what he was 
going to say. It was a sellable approach.
The emphasis on education signaled a different tone from manage 
ment, and brought the union back to the bargaining table. As one union 
leader on the national negotiations team commented:
After Christmas, we started on national negotiations again. They 
were not as demanding.... Some of the locals, like Philly, moved 
to consider work practices.
In fact, the simultaneous local discussions (which were discussed in 
more detail earlier) also set these negotiations apart. One local UAW 
president stated:
These were much different than in 1984. . . . This time there was 
no clear distinction between the national and local. It was a bundle 
of issues and one set of negotiations.
Elements of a New Contract
The parties settled in early 1988, over six months prior to the sched 
uled contract expiration. A key element of the agreement, beyond the 
early settlement, was the four-year term. As one union official 
explained:
We went with a four-year agreement rather than three years 
because Budd has the ability to say we have a long-term contract.
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Their ability to go in the market and bid for work is improved. A 
lot of their work was turning over. Work was especially being 
pulled out of Philly.
In fact, subsequent to the settlement, Budd was able to procure a long- 
term contract for business with Ford. Still, extending the length of the 
agreement raised a concern regarding bargaining issues that might 
arise during the term of the agreement. In response, the parties put in 
place a formal structure for quarterly meetings of the principals from 
both bargaining teams a significant departure from the approach then 
extant among the major auto manufactures.
In other respects the parties also departed from the pattern of the 
OEMs. In fact, given that the settlement was early, only Ford had 
reached an agreement at that point, so the terms of all OEM settle 
ments were not available for comparison (which would usually be the 
case). In the agreement, the union won wage increases but the incre 
ments for the second, third, and fourth years of the agreement were to 
be paid as lump sums (that would not be added to base wages). Also, 
while a holiday was added in the third year, there was a diversion of 
cost-of-living adjustment benefits and below-pattern settlements were 
reached on certain retiree benefits (reflecting the cost implications for a 
company with more retirees than active workers). These economic fea 
tures of the settlement were designed to provide value to the member 
ship while also enhancing the company's ability to bid on new 
business. The process also tightened the link between local and inter 
national negotiations. As one participant observed:
For the first time, all local agreements were settled on the same 
day as the master agreement. Locals were present at the national 
table. We shortened the process.
One insight into the workers' perception of the 1987 Budd/UAW 
collective bargaining agreement can be seen in the ratification vote, 
which was 82 percent (even though the wage settlement was less than 
half that at Ford). The union was careful to not characterize the agree 
ment as concessionary. As one union official commented:
We sat down and structured an agreement. There were increases in 
wages and pensions, but it was subpattern. It was not reduced 
cost it would be a mistake to call it that. But it did give Budd a 
better ability to project cost.
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This individual also outlined the approach taken by the union leader 
ship to the membership:
External pressures force all parties to rise above the past and 
above internal politics. We told our people straight, we won't tell 
you that you can't get it, but look at the long-range liability. You 
better start looking at the year 2000 if you want work in old facili 
ties.
A senior Budd executive commented on the same situation:
There was no backwash after ratification. Both sides are happy. 
It's an economic settlement that you have to make politically 
acceptable. The union and Budd must cooperate to create realistic 
expectation levels in order for the company to survive.
The ratification was, in many ways, a ratification not just of substantive 
terms, but also of the new direction in relations. Traditionally, a large 
"yes" vote is seen as a victory for the union and a bare majority as a 
victory for management. In this case, both sides sought a large major 
ity in favor of the agreement.
Thus, in the course of one round of national negotiations, the parties 
departed from their normal practice in terms of: the timing of bargain 
ing, the length of the agreement, the substance of the settlement, the 
relationship between local and national negotiations, the approach 
toward ratification, and the structure of subsequent relations.
Movement Toward More Continuous Bargaining
The agreement between Budd and the UAW to hold quarterly meet 
ings of the bargaining committees throughout the four-year contract 
was not part of the initial proposals from either side. Rather, the parties 
were caught in a distributive debate over wages that was resolved with 
a package proposal that established a new committee around quality 
issues. As Budd's vice-president for industrial relations recalled:
The last thing on the table was another $.10 for the plants. The 
spontaneous solution to this was that we decided to give a lump- 
sum bonus of $150 if a supercommittee addressed quality 
improvement. It will meet quarterly and has potential for long- 
range communication for the life of the agreement.
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These quarterly meetings of the labor-management committee were 
held on a regular basis. At the meetings, the parties used the forum not 
just for quality issues, but also for discussion of potentially contentious 
outsourcing issues and job security concerns. The broader scope of the 
quarterly meetings was reflected in the following description by a 
senior UAW official:
At quarterly meetings we want to take a high-level look at prob 
lems cost problems like insurance. We want to look at the long- 
range viability of the operation. Too often, neither side knows 
what to do with a problem. They haven't communicated the prob 
lem. You want to avoid the mentality that says, "Cross this line 
and I'll kick your ass." You want to avoid what might be a major 
stumbling block in upcoming negotiations.
Clearly, the function of the quarterly meetings was not just to foster 
discussion of issues of common concern it was also a forum to sur 
face potentially contentious issues that would only fester if left for the 
next formal contract negotiations. Further, so that the discussions at the 
quarterly meetings can be meaningful, both the company and union 
have assigned staff to work (independently and jointly) on issues that 
would be on the agenda for future meetings. Given the scope of issues 
addressed and the continuing nature of preparations to address these 
issues, the meetings represented a significant move toward more con 
tinuous collective bargaining.
The idea of continuous collective bargaining has been discussed by 
collective bargaining professionals for several decades, however the 
concept remains controversial. Both labor and management have been 
generally reluctant to see a signed agreement reopened during the life 
of the contract. In the case of Budd and the UAW, the parties were 
careful not to place the renegotiation of the economic package on the 
agenda for the quarterly meetings.
Still, the viability of this new forum underwent a severe test when a 
highly distributive issue entered the agenda. Specifically, when Budd 
opened a new facility in Shelbyville, Kentucky, the union status of the 
workforce in this facility came up for discussion at a quarterly meeting. 
Budd indicated that it was unwilling to grant to the union automatic 
recognition (with the same terms as other UAW contracts at Budd) 
since typical wages and benefits were so much lower in this area. The
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union was unwilling to accept any substandard agreement. Subse 
quently, a union recognition election was held in which local company 
officials campaigned strongly for a workforce vote against union repre 
sentation. When a majority of the workforce did indeed vote "no," the 
leadership from the international union took personal offense at the 
perceived inconsistency between espoused values and behavior on the 
part of management. While hard feelings about the election persisted at 
the national level, the parties did not abandon the quarterly meetings. 
Joint discussions even tackled new subjects, such as health care cost 
containment.
Analysis
The Budd case features both substantive and relationship outcomes. 
The outcomes can be summarized in tabular form.
Significant Outcomes—The Budd Company
Substantice
outcomes
Early economic
concessions
Work-rule
flexibility
Pilot work redesign 
initiatives
Management-
employee
relationships
Some movement
toward commitment
under El
Sustained
movement toward 
commitment within
die transition teams
Management-
union relationships
Movement toward
more continuous
bargaining and use
of joint
subcommittees 
Continuing tensions
over union status in
a new facility
Other outcomes
Modest
improvements in
economic
performance
Massive layoffs in 
the late 1970s and
early 1980s
Unlike many of the other large, independent auto suppliers, Budd 
has not systematically sold older unionized facilities and purchased or 
built newer nonunion facilities (i.e., the company has not engaged in 
wholesale escape from the union). Early on, it relied on a mix of forc 
ing and escape as primary change strategies. While these options were 
operative in the early 1980s, the middle 1980s saw increasing reliance 
on a set of narrowly defined fostering initiatives around employee 
involvement, safety, and statistical process control. Consequently, the
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most important shifts in negotiations occurred at the plant level around 
issues of employee commitment and compliance, as well as instituting 
local union-management cooperation.
Both parties came to see the narrowly focused fostering efforts as 
inadequate to fully address their core interests, and consequently the 
locus of negotiations broadened. In both local and national negotia 
tions, culminating in agreements in 1988, the parties joined a set of core 
issues around compensation, benefits, employment security, and flexi 
bility. As a result, labor-management negotiations now occur on a more 
continuous basis, via multiple channels, raising a host of internal issues 
for both labor and management.
In the case of the Detroit plant before relations turned the corner 
there were rejected contracts and substantial cutbacks in employment. 
Even the employee involvement program did not serve as a sufficient 
catalyst for fundamental change. No one event or driving force can be 
identified as responsible for the shift in approach that emerged in the 
late 1980s and carried forward into the 1990s. The timing of the change 
can be associated with the shift in leadership for many agenda items 
from industrial relations to line management and by the breakthrough 
work of the hit-to-hit committee. It took a decade of mounting eco 
nomic pressures and a trial-and-error approach to change before the 
conditions were right for a "sea change" in labor-management rela 
tions.
Similarly, at the national level it appeared that matters had to get 
worse before they could get better. While the company's initiative to 
open negotiations early failed at first, it set the stage for an extensive 
communication program and an eventual agreement that brought the 
parties together on a continuing basis to deal with a range of common 
concerns such as health care and pensions.
Could Budd and the UAW have reached an accommodation 
earlier in the decade? Possibly. Several factors might have made a dif 
ference. First, if the customers had exerted pressure earlier, change 
might have happened sooner. Second, if union leadership, both locally 
and nationally, had taken a stand with the membership calling for 
changes, then the revised contracts might have become a reality sooner. 
But this is not certain. The Budd story features a reappraisal process 
that slowly grows in intensity and it is not clear that the preparation 
phase would have been shortened by any of the above tactics.
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Lessons Learned
To observe that it takes a decade of halting attempts before signifi 
cant progress can be made does not alone make for a very noteworthy 
conclusion. Are there some aspects of the Budd story that stand out and 
that might have relevance in other situations? Several possibilities can 
be identified:
  Management's campaign to educate the membership helped union 
leadership in resolving internal differences.
  The addition of financial managers at the table enhanced the per 
ception within management of the importance of the terms of the 
new agreement.
 The joint research conducted within the various subcommittees 
created a common information base and facilitated an attitudinal 
shift that important issues needed to be approached as problems to 
be solved.
  The active involvement of line management was instrumental in 
labor's willingness to go ahead with an open-ended experiment on 
new procedures for die transition.
  Continued competitive pressures provoked episodes of hard dis 
tributive bargaining within an ongoing fostering initiative.
Thus, the Budd case offers many tactical insights into the dynamics 
of strategic negotiations. Unresolved, however, are larger questions 
regarding alternative paths available to the parties. In many ways, the 
broad strategies of forcing and fostering were driven as much by mar 
ket pressures and specific customer pressure for substantive gains as 
they were by the reinforcing evidence of relationship improvement.
CONSTRUCTING NEW SOCIAL CONTRACTS 
The Case of Packard Electric and the IUE, Local 717
The Packard Electric division of General Motors produces the vast 
majority of wiring harnesses and related components used by GM. The
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home manufacturing facility is located in Warren, Ohio, where about 
half of the division's 25,000 employees work. All production workers 
in Warren are represented by the International Union of Electrical, 
Radio and Machine Workers (IUE), Local 717.
For many years, Packard Electric and the IUE had engaged in tradi 
tional arm's-length labor relations, which had deteriorated steadily. 
Morale was low, absenteeism was high, and economic performance 
was declining. During the summer of 1977 alone, for example, there 
were three work stoppages. That same year, 97.9 grievances were filed 
for every 100 hourly employees. This statistic increased slightly in the 
next year, and then declined steadily thereafter, reflecting a shift in 
labor-management relations that began in the fall of 1977.
Indeed, as a result of a series of joint activities initiated in 1977, 
Packard Electric and the IUE moved to the forefront of U.S. employers 
and unions seeking a new social contract via a fostering strategy. The 
company and the union were among the early pioneers in the applica 
tion of QWL principles in unionized locations in the United States. 
Like most QWL efforts, the initial focus was on shop-floor employee 
involvement, later expanding to include notable instances of work 
redesign, the joint design of new manufacturing facilities, and a dra 
matic quid pro quo linking a multitier wage system with unprecedented 
job security.
Significant Features
There are many significant dimensions to the Packard Electric case, 
including the following:
 The initial combination of forcing and fostering hinged on the 
credibility of management in arguing that cost competition was 
threatening the business. Ultimately, it took a loss of jobs before 
this message could be heard and affirmed.
  The education of the rank and file regarding the economic situation 
was critical to the union's handling of internal differences.
  The provision of employment security was an important quid pro 
quo to the creation of a multitier wage system.
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  The union made strategic choices expressed in its willingness to let 
certain work go offshore in exchange for job security for the 
remaining, high-value-added work.
  The independence of the IUE from the UAW pattern created a con 
siderable degree of freedom for the union leadership.
Among our cases, the Packard Electric case covers the longest time 
frame within which negotiations served as the vehicle for transforming 
the industrial relations system. Although it began with a fostering ini 
tiative, this quickly became a combined strategy as a result of the com 
petitive pressures in the auto supply industry. Ultimately, a substantive 
accord addressing core economic concerns for both labor and manage 
ment provided the turning point for a predominantly fostering strategy. 
Even within the fostering context, however, key distributive episodes 
created ongoing negotiating challenges. Ultimately, this transformation 
of a labor-management relationship turned on a combination of pivotal, 
high-profile negotiations, combined with a host of day-to-day negoti 
ated exchanges.
A New Labor-Management Relationship—Initiation to 
Institutionalization
Packard Electric and the IUE first negotiated language on improving 
QWL in 1973, modeled on the pioneering letter of intent agreement 
signed by General Motors with the UAW in the same year. The initial 
efforts at Packard Electric emphasized easily identified areas of com 
mon concern, such as a toys-for-tots program, a joint safety communi 
cations program (featuring company and union logos), a joint United 
Way drive, voter registration, and credit counselling.
Broadening the Focus of the Cooperative Efforts
In 1978, the company established a management task force to 
increase productivity in the Warren operations. In response, the union 
leadership called for direct union involvement, which led to the forma 
tion of the Jobs Committee in May 1978 a pivotal event. The purpose 
of the committee was to "develop an ongoing union-management
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approach that will maintain job security and identify opportunities for 
hiring in the Warren operations." There were three ground rules: (1) 
Discussions regarding quality of worklife projects must be open and 
off-the-record; (2) No employee would lose employment as a direct 
result of a project; and (3) Bargaining must be reserved for the bargain 
ers. As one of its first activities, the Jobs Committee jointly designed 
and administered a QWL survey in September, 1978 the first joint 
survey undertaken in a GM facility.
In February 1979, the Jobs Committee reached an agreement on a 
plan to hire 100 new employees the first new hiring in the Warren 
plants of Packard since 1973. These employees, the first hires under the 
auspices of the Jobs Committee, demonstrated that jobs could be com 
petitively placed at branch plants in Warren, Ohio rather than in com 
pany facilities in Mississippi or Juarez, Mexico. Under this agreement, 
the branch plants reduced job classifications, implemented job rotation, 
and introduced an emphasis on teamwork. At the union's urging, the 
facilities were located in the outlying communities to be more accessi 
ble to the residences of many employees.
Top union and management leaders spent many hours Grafting the 
"operating philosophy" statement for the new Warren branch opera 
tions:
We believe every business has a responsibility to its customers, its 
employees, and the community in which it exists, and shall strive 
to satisfy the needs and security of each.
We share in the belief that a successful business provides and 
maintains an environment for change and is built on a foundation 
of trust, where every person is treated with respect and offered an 
opportunity to participate. We are totally committed to the 
patience, dedication, and cooperation necessary to build this foun 
dation.
We also believe that this can be accomplished through a function 
ing partnership built on the wisdom, the knowledge, and the 
understanding of the employees, the union, and management.
With this statement, the parties put into words their emerging social 
contract.
Following the establishment of the branch operations, the Jobs 
Committee addressed ways to retain the plastic molding business and a
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series of other related issues. Altogether, by June of 1981 the Jobs 
Committee had played a role in the addition of 850,000 square feet of 
floor space, $100,000,000 of new investment, and 379 new jobs. In the 
1980 model year alone, Packard Electric distributed $454,000 in 
awards to Warren employees for suggestions that saved a total of $2.36 
million.
A close look at the process by which these gains were achieved sug 
gests that, in addition to extensive joint problem solving, several 
important distributive moves occurred. First, it took a union confronta 
tion to establish the joint Jobs Committee as an alternative to a man 
agement-only effort. Then, at a number of critical junctures (such as 
the deployment of the Warren branch facilities), the union pressed for 
joint analysis and successfully halted management from implementing 
announced plans to locate work elsewhere. For its part, management 
pressed hard in the committees for flexibility and other changes bear 
ing on cost competitiveness. Thus, interest-based confrontations by 
both sides played a key role in arriving at the "cooperative" gains.
Continued Competitive Pressures
Despite productivity gains achieved via the union-management 
efforts, it became clear to management in late 1981 that the Warren 
operations could not remain competitive in the face of declining auto 
sales and the cost advantage of doing business abroad particularly in 
Mexico.5 In the late 1970s, wages and benefits in Mexico were around 
$2.50 per hour, compared with over $19.00 an hour in Ohio, and this 
gap grew wider when the peso was devalued in the early 1980s.
In December of 1981, the company's executive committee and the 
union's bargaining committee met for a two-day, off-site session. This 
was a pivotal event in which management presented to the union a 
long-range analysis showing that, under current trends, only 64 percent 
of the business would remain cost-competitive within five years (leav 
ing 3,800 jobs at risk). The result of the session was a jointly developed 
five-year business plan entitled the "Plan to Compete." It featured the 
twin goals of keeping jobs in the Warren area while being cost-compet 
itive in all lines of work by 1986. Under the plan, the more labor-inten 
sive final assembly work would be moved to low-wage-rate locations, 
while lead wire preparation would be brought back from Mexico to
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Warren (with investments in new technology). In addition, early retire 
ment options would be developed with an attrition goal of 1,650 direct 
labor jobs.
As the parties prepared for the 1982 collective bargaining negotia 
tions, Richard Huber, then director of personnel and public relations, 
made the suggestion that the parties move the relationship to a new 
level. He suggested a problem-solving process be used in collective 
bargaining, wherein both sides would brainstorm options rather than 
resorting to the traditional exchange of demands. While some bargain 
ers on both sides were skeptical, they agreed to try the new approach. 
Scott Copeland, manager of employee development, designed a train 
ing program for both sides and facilitated the new process.
In April 1982, negotiations over the national GM-IUE agreement 
concluded prior to the deadline with a number of cost-reducing 
changes, including cutting paid absence allowance (PAA) days from 14 
to 5 and freezing the cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) until Decem 
ber 1983 paralleling changes in the national GM-UAW contract. 
Locally, for the Warren operations, the parties discussed a final assem 
bly option (FAO), which would involve deep wage reductions (as large 
as $6.00 per hour) for new employees hired on any final assembly 
work that remained in Warren (in branch facilities). The FAO proposal 
was resisted by the union, and (on management's insistence) it was 
presented to the membership for a vote, where it was rejected by nearly 
a 3 to 1 majority. The rejection created dismay, not just within manage 
ment but also within the local community. The Mahoning Valley was 
experiencing some of the highest unemployment in the nation at this 
time, and the Packard employees were criticized as "snobs" for reject 
ing an opportunity for expanded employment.
Consistent with the earlier "Plan to Compete," Packard continued to 
shift labor-intensive work from Mexico. However, it did not expand the 
number of jobs in Warren. In fact, by the end of 1982, about 2,400 
employees were on permanent layoff and about as many were on tem 
porary layoff. While all union leaders were critical of the layoffs, one 
zone committeeman, Nick Nichols, tackled the issue with a near reli 
gious fervor. He charged that the company was violating promises 
made back in 1977 that no one would lose their jobs as a result of work 
being shifted from the Warren operations or as a result of the use of 
new technology. It was based on such promises that he had become a
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leading advocate for QWL programs (abandoning what he termed the 
traditional "macho knight in shining armor role").
Nichols took the position that no work could be moved until all laid- 
off Warren employees were brought back to work. The company 
responded that there had not been any formal job loss laid-off 
employees were still receiving supplementary benefits and maintained 
rehire rights with GM. Other union leaders backed away from Nichols' 
strong stance, reportedly because they judged it to be unfeasible, which 
created a split in the union.
In the fall of 1983, when local union elections occurred, the layoffs, 
the company's approach to QWL, and Nichols' insistence on the job 
security guarantees became the main issues. The outcome illustrated 
how pivotal intraorganizational developments could be: with the 
exception of Nick Nichols, all union officers and bargaining committee 
members were voted out of office. Many of the successful candidates 
ran on anti-QWL platforms. Nichols, was elected as chair of the bar 
gaining committee.
A Crossroad in the Relationship
With 1984 negotiations on the horizon, management paid close 
attention as an internal debate unfolded among the newly elected union 
leaders. Many argued that the union should withdraw from all coopera 
tive activities feeling that there was not sufficient trust to sustain a 
social contract based on cooperation. Nichols, as chair of the bargain 
ing committee, took a different stance. He indicated that he was still 
supportive of the idea of cooperation and that he recognized the com 
pany's concern with being competitive, but that the union was also 
concerned about job security. He further stated that, without attention 
to the union's concerns, "we were both headed for the ditch" (that is, a 
hard strike). In explaining the mixture of support for cooperation and 
the use of a strike threat, Nichols stated:
There will be conflicts and you have to take them on the merits. 
It's like a marriage two don't become one, you are still individu 
als it's just that you are now both part of a family. It's a matter of 
learning how to deal with the conflict. You can't be caught half- 
stepping, but nor can you just roll over and play dead.
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Following the union election, the personnel director invited Nichols 
to a private dinner to discuss the situation. A series of informal meet 
ings followed, involving about a dozen top union and management 
leaders. They called themselves the Resource Group since they were 
exploring ways to address two core sets of interests a union interest 
in job security and a management interest in flexibility and competi 
tiveness.
While the actual 1984 negotiations were carried out in a traditional 
form (complete with opening positions and offers and counteroffers), a 
new spirit emerged from the Resource Group discussions and repre 
sented a dramatic departure from the concurrent 1984 negotiations 
occurring between the UAW and GM. Ultimately, the union agreed to a 
lower starting wage for new employees (at 55 percent of the base wage 
as well as 55 percent of COLA), which would increase over ten years 
to parity with the rest of the workforce. As a quid pro quo, the contract 
included a special section entitled the "Lifetime Job and Income Secu 
rity Agreement for the Warren Operations," which featured the exact 
language that Nichols felt had been accepted back in 1977:
A. No employee will lose his/her job due to a shift of work from 
Warren operations to other locations or because of technologi 
cal change.
B. The parties will manage the Warren operations workforce so 
that a layoff of protected employees for other than temporary 
reasons will not occur.
C. Opportunities to maximize employment for employees will be 
provided by training employees and reassigning employees 
and/or work with the Warren operations and pursuing new 
business so that income security will be provided.
The contract also included the phrase, "This agreement will remain in 
full force and effect forever." As such, the contract became one of the 
present era's earliest "living agreements."
Clearly, the 1984 negotiations represented a pivotal event. If the 
core issues of job security and compensation costs had not been 
addressed, the entire social contract would have been undermined. 
Once addressed, however, the parties in effect had fundamentally 
departed from the industry pattern (in which there was relatively little 
wage flexibility, with the compensating option to lay off workers).
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The parties did not come to this unique combination of social and 
substantive contracts merely through an incremental set of cooperative 
adjustments, building on the QWL base. Each major advance in the 
scope of the social contract was preceded by a pivotal event where uni 
lateral actions or past understandings were challenged. Expanded prob 
lem solving then followed. Critical to the success was the ability of the 
parties to engage in problem solving. Equally critical, however, was 
their willingness to utilize distributive tactics when necessary.
Emerging Challenges Around Temporary Workers
By the late 1980s, the union at Packard Electric proudly pointed to 
the fact that it's contract with multitier wages, the no-layoff pledge, 
and the joint approach to strategic planning had succeeded in bringing 
all workers back from layoff and on the job. This was in contrast with 
other GM divisions that were struggling with large numbers of 
employees either on layoff or in holding status under the JOBS bank 
provisions of the UAW contract. Still, the parties faced many chal 
lenges as illustrated by their experience with temporary workers.
Among the quid pro quos for the no-layoff pledge was an arrange 
ment that allowed management substantial flexibility in the use of 
short-term temporary workers. This was designed as a buffer to allow 
management to handle temporary increases in volume without hiring 
workers who would then make it hard to maintain the no-layoff pledge. 
The first group of temporary workers was brought in during February 
of 1985, and their departure surfaced tensions in the workforce with an 
intensity that surprised both union and management leadership. Essen 
tially, many of the workers with the job security guarantees did not 
think it was fair to make these temporary workers leave.
Three years passed before management again attempted to utilize 
the flexibility available to it under the contract. By bringing in a group 
of temporary workers it would be possible to keep a partially utilized 
facility open which was important to all parties. This time more com 
prehensive attempts were made to clarify expectations with the tempo 
raries and with the regular workforce. Still, however, upon their 
departure there were the same difficulties. In reflecting on manage-
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ment's original request for this flexibility, one union leader com 
mented, "there are certain things that you just shouldn't ask a friend to 
do, and this is one of them."
In the end, the union was far more divided internally on the issue of 
temporary workers than it expected. At the same time, management 
was less able to use the contractual flexibility that it negotiated. Thus, 
the many successes experienced by the IUE and Packard Electric man 
agement did not prevent the continued emergence of complicated and 
divisive issues as well.
Analysis
Subsequent to the signing of the 1984 contract, substantial reinvest 
ment occurred in the Warren operations (totalling over $300 million). 
There also was extensive joint problem solving on the shop floor (via 
employee participation groups) and through higher-level union-man 
agement dialogue. Employees hired at the lower starting wage pro 
gressed toward parity and, as of the early 1990s, there were no longer 
any employees on layoff. It is interesting to note that the parties were 
aided by the increased use of electronics in automobiles, which assured 
an ever-rising volume of orders.
The following chart summarizes the main results of the Packard 
story.
Significant Outcomes—Packard Electric
Substantive 
outcomes
Management- 
employee 
relationships
Management-union 
relationships Other outcomes
Multitier wage
system
No-layoff guarantee
Work-rule 
flexibility
Management ability 
to utilize a buffer of
temporary workers
Movement
toward
commitment 
with temporary 
setback (after 
layoffs) and then 
sustained 
movement
subsequently
Movement toward
cooperation
Early turnover of union 
leaders on cooperation 
issue
Sustained movement 
toward cooperation
subsequently
Negotiations around
business strategy
Joint design of new
work facilities
New tensions 
around the 
utilization of 
contract language on 
temporary workers
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In many ways, the Packard Electric case is unique. Massive capital 
investment was possible, and early workplace innovations (around 
QWL) were available both as a result of the company being a divi 
sion of General Motors. At the same time, it enjoyed more autonomy in 
labor relations than other parts of the corporation, since the IUE was 
not as bound by the UAW pattern and since it was in a line of business 
experiencing steady growth. Yet these circumstances alone did not 
account for the parties' success. Equally important were their 
responses to a series of critical events.
Early on, the parties tackled some easy-to-resolve subjects and cre 
ated some win-win arrangements that expanded employment. How 
ever, the competitive situation continued to deteriorate, and the 
company attempted to bargain major changes in its labor costs. This 
effort failed, and the company commenced a partial escape strategy by 
moving work out of Ohio and laying off the affected workers. Here we 
observe a common sequence: limited fostering, the environment wors 
ening, the company asking for big changes, and then the union and the 
workers saying "No, thank you." We observed this sequence in AP 
where at a similar juncture the parties plunged into a bitter confronta 
tion.
In the case of Packard Electric, the response to the crisis was differ 
ent. Early responses included the Jobs Committee and the opening of 
the branch plant operations. Ultimately, even these innovations were 
not able to satisfy the need that management felt to force reductions in 
labor costs. After a round of layoffs, the rank and file replaced the 
union leadership. While the new group came into office on a platform 
of stopping the outflow of jobs, the union leadership took a pragmatic 
approach and quickly joined the issue, leading to the innovative 1984 
agreement.
In subsequent years, negotiations containing both forcing and fos 
tering elements occurred not only in collective bargaining, but on a 
host of contract administration matters. Ultimately, the Packard Elec 
tric case provides insight into the complex array of negotiations associ 
ated with a set of change initiatives occurring over more than a decade 
and a half.
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COMBINING FORCING AND FOSTERING 
Mastering Complexity
The final three cases in this book have featured the most complex 
combinations of change strategies. They also embody some of the far 
thest-reaching change initiatives. To some extent, the complexity in 
these cases arises from external circumstances beyond the immediate 
control of union and management leaders at the plant level. Yet, the 
complexity also reflects conscious choices and artfully executed bar 
gaining tactics that enabled the parties to combine what would other 
wise be opposed strategies.
The complexity also mirrors the extended time periods under exam 
ination. Packard Electric, for example, was one of the early QWL initi 
ators in North America so a complex series of negotiations over a 
decade and a half around change issues is not surprising. However, in 
earlier chapters we examined cases that involved a single strategy over 
equally extended time periods. In particular, the Anderson Pattern case 
covers nearly a decade of sustained fostering. By contrast, we also 
have examined instances of fostering, such as Bidwell, where the ini 
tiative proved short-lived. So what accounts for these complex com 
bined strategies?
In two of the cases Budd and Packard Electric a combined strat 
egy in the early 1980s was responsive to the coincidence of external 
market pressures and customer insistence on evidence of labor-man 
agement cooperation. At Pensacola the use of a combined strategy was 
more internally driven. The forcing reflected pressure from the corpo 
rate parent and the intraorganizational realities within the union (it was 
politically better to be forced to agree to economic concessions), while 
at the same time Pensacola management was committed to reinforcing 
and sustaining its fostering initiatives. Thus, combined strategies may 
reflect the intentional juxtaposition of forcing and fostering, or the two 
change strategies may occur simultaneously as a result of different (but 
concurrent) driving forces. Either way, we are learning important les 
sons about this new phenomenon.
200 Combined Strategies
Significant Lessons
Many of the lessons identified in the analysis of sequential strategies 
in chapter 4 also apply to these more complex combinations of strate 
gies. For example, key leaders from labor and management played 
important roles in these three cases, just as they did in the three cases 
featuring sequential strategies. Similarly, information sharing, persis 
tence, and a learning orientation were also critical here. In addition to 
these lessons, further insights emerge from the analysis of the cases 
with combined strategies.
In all three cases, episodes of hard distributive bargaining occurred 
after sustained periods of fostering. Indeed, in the Pensacola case, the 
intensity and scope of the distributive bargaining around the Sunday 
premium led us to classify this phase as a combined forcing/fostering 
strategy. While a number of issues were also highly contentious at 
Packard Electric, they did not involve the sort of sustained pressure in 
the face of worker and union resistance that would constitute a forcing 
strategy. When management at Budd failed in their first bid to reopen 
the contract, they might have been expected to use force on the issue, 
but instead chose an educational path followed by a mixture of integra- 
tive and distributive bargaining.
Thus, forcing is not, in itself, inconsistent with concurrent or prior 
fostering, but many forcing tactics are. When distributive bargaining 
(or forcing) follows sustained fostering, the history of fostering leads 
to a tempering of hard bargaining tactics and to a focus on long-term 
objectives. For example, it would be inappropriate to undermine the 
credibility of the other side during forcing that is concurrent with fos 
tering even though this is a common tactic in a pure forcing strategy. 
Instead, the forcing must literally be justified to the party being forced. 
The party must be persuaded of the need, for example, for economic 
concessions and be disabused of any suspicion that management is just 
exploiting a power advantage.
A related lesson is that sometimes forcing is even desirable in a fos 
tering context as a requirement for resolving intraorganizational differ 
ences. As we have already indicated, this was vividly illustrated by the 
Pensacola case, where the union could not politically agree to loss of 
the Sunday premium even if it granted the point that management had
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no alternative but to press the issue. In this situation it was politically 
better for the union to have been forced to accept the change.
The same is true when the union forces. For example, when the 
union at Packard Electric forced over the issue of job security, manage 
ment was not pleased, but it did understand why the subject was of par 
amount importance to the union. Local managers would have had a 
difficult time persuading corporate officials to endorse a lifetime job 
security guarantee, but they could make the case for the arrangement in 
the face of union insistence and especially when there were attractive 
quids pro quo in the offing (such as wage flexibility and use of tempo 
rary workers).
Not only is forcing tempered by concurrent or prior fostering, but 
the fostering may actually be enhanced by the forcing. So long as the 
forcing is seen as legitimate and even as unavoidable, it signals core 
interests i.e., issues on which they are willing to "go to the mat." If 
these issues are not surfaced explicitly, they will resurface ultimately in 
the form of hidden agendas. For example, when Budd initially began to 
use possible job loss as a threat in order to get wage concessions in the 
early 1980s, it did not coordinate this forcing with the concurrent El 
efforts. As a result, it encountered disbelief on the part of the work 
force, and the entire slate of union leaders was voted out of office. 
Later when Budd wanted to open the contract early, it learned the les 
son: hard bargaining requires substantial and deep education on the 
underlying business circumstances giving rise to these issues. In this 
context a controversial issue such as health care costs could become 
the focus of a joint problem-solving task force. Thus, the forcing pro 
vided an outlet and structure for engaging issues that might otherwise 
have undercut the fostering and even provided new direction and 
energy to the fostering initiatives.
A combination of forcing and fostering is thus likely where one or 
both parties is looking for major substantive changes and where one or 
both also value worker commitment and union-management coopera 
tion. Where there is a well-established history of fostering, the hard 
issues are more likely to be raised in the context of distributive epi 
sodes rather than a sustained forcing campaign. The one exception, of 
course, is where the hard issues are highly objectionable to the other 
party and only likely to be achieved via forcing. Either way, the analy 
sis in this chapter suggests that it is accurate but incomplete to classify
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the three cases in this chapter as exemplary examples of labor-manage 
ment cooperation. Ultimately, they should be viewed just as much as 
far-reaching examples of conflict resolution. It is in the throes of nego 
tiations associated with transformation and change that we see an inev 
itable and critical interweaving of cooperation and conflict.
NOTES
1. Valuable research assistance was provided by Kathleen Rudd Scharf in the preparation of 
this case.
2. The majority of the material for the case study of the Budd Company, the UAW, and the 
CAW have been derived from field interviews. Also helpful were Herzenberg (1988) and Murphy 
(1988). Valuable research assistance was provided by Pat McHugh in the preparation of this case.
3. A vivid example of the consensus process arose when one of the authors of this volume ini 
tiated research in the facility in 1985. At that time, all but one of the twenty-member steering com 
mittee agreed to be part of the project. The individual (a shop steward) who had reservations about 
the research withheld approval for almost two hours, during which time he surfaced a number of 
important concerns about the parties being part of a research project. It was only after these issues 
were addressed that consensus was achieved and the research was able to begin.
4. The material presented in this case draws on "Packard Electric A and B," written by Elisa 
beth Ament Lipton under the supervision of D. Quinn Mills, Harvard Business School Case 9- 
484-109 (1984), other secondary materials, and our own interviews with current and former local 
union and management leaders. Valuable research assistance was provided by Pat McHugh in the 
preparation of this case.
5. The location of plants in the South no longer served as a lower-cost alternative since the 
IUE and the UAW had successfully challenged GM's "Southern strategy," namely, building new, 
nonunion facilities in the South. Attempts to organize these facilities, which featured autonomous 
work groups and other sociotechnical innovations, had not been successful and the UAW insisted 
that GM agree to a neutrality pledge in the late 1970s. This set the stage for the successful organi 
zation of most of these facilities including several Packard Electric facilities in the deep South  
and the achievement of wage parity.
6 
Understanding the Context
and 
Choices for Strategic Negotiations
What is the terrain on which strategic negotiations unfold? How do 
these contextual factors shape the negotiations? In addressing these 
questions, this chapter will focus on eight major topics: (1) the need for 
change, (2) the role of vision, (3) the role of leadership, (4) the role of 
third parties, (5) the requirements of internal alignment, (6) the oppor 
tunity for negotiations to engender a long-term learning process, (7) 
assessment of management's strategic alternatives, and (8) assessment 
of strategic alternatives for unions. We will also examine the strategic 
option of escape and its implications for strategies of forcing or foster 
ing.
A Compelling Need for Change
Among labor and management practitioners, there is great debate 
over the relative importance of a crisis in motivating change. The social 
theorist Kurt Lewin (1951) highlighted the importance of "unfreezing" 
existing social relations as the first step in a change process. In today's 
parlance, this is referred to as a "significant emotional event." Simply 
put, the question arises as to whether a significant emotional event is a 
necessary prerequisite to fundamental change.
As we look across our cases, nearly all of them feature significant 
emotional events. For example, there were massive layoffs and move 
ment of work out of factories in the Budd, Packard Electric, Adrian 
Fabricators, and AP Parts cases. Two of the firms we studied Conrail 
and Adrian Fabricators went into bankruptcy. Long and emotionally 
charged strikes occurred in nearly all of our forcing cases. Further, in 
some cases where there was no major significant emotional event 
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such as Bidwell the change efforts were easily stalled by disagree 
ments around the pace and sequence of training activities. Thus, a 
superficial review of the cases would confirm the importance of signif 
icant emotional events as forces driving fundamental change.
A closer look at the cases, however, reveals that these significant 
emotional events were neither a necessary nor sufficient factor driving 
fundamental change. For example, in one case, Anderson Pattern, the 
company and the union engaged in a series of interactions that led to a 
gradually increasing acceptance of the need for fundamental change. 
There were some important learning events, such as a trip to a trade 
show by the majority of employees to take a closer look at proposed 
new technologies, but no single defining moment that accounted for 
what came to be a shared sense of a compelling need for change. In 
fact, perhaps the single most important driving force was the success 
that resulted from early pilot initiatives and the fact that each side gen 
erally lived up to promises made at each step of the way.
There are many reasons why the Anderson Pattern case may not be 
typical, however. It is a small, unionized firm with a highly skilled 
workforce and an owner who began his career as a skilled tradesman. It 
is also in an industry and a community where many other unionized 
firms have either gone out of business or the unions have been decerti 
fied. Still, the case suggests that a single defining emotional event is 
not a necessary requirement for the generation of a perceived need for 
deep change.
A closer look at the other cases supports this conclusion. While 
bankruptcy was certainly a key driving force for change in the case of 
Conrail, the same event did not mark a fundamental shift in the case of 
Adrian Fabricators. It was only after a strike and a change in manage 
ment leadership that a shared perception of the need for change 
emerged at Adrian Fabricators.
Even where a crisis does trigger change initiatives, it is not always 
clear that such a crisis will continue to serve as a sustained driver for 
change. For example, prior to the acrimonious strike at AP Parts, there 
had been earlier rounds of concession bargaining. The concessions by 
labor were made in response to management concerns over competi 
tive pressures. The concessions were not accompanied, however, by 
fundamental changes in the production process that led workers and 
union leaders to believe that management was itself changing in
Understanding the Context and Choices for Strategic Negotiations 205
response to competitive pressures. Even though management was 
probably accurate in stating that competitive pressures were still 
present when they sought nearly $6.00 an hour in additional conces 
sions in 1984, that argument in itself was not sufficient to sustain con 
tinued substantive change. In fact, with the lack of change in 
management itself and its continued requests for concessions, the 
deepening of the competitive crisis became a barrier rather than a moti 
vator workers felt that they had already given enough and resented 
management's demand for more.
In all the cases where fundamental change occurred, a perception 
developed on the part of one or both of the parties that there was a 
compelling need for change. In many cases, this perception was shaped 
by significant emotional events such as layoffs, lost work, and strikes. 
Even though our cases do, therefore, confirm that significant emotional 
events can be a compelling force for change, they also suggest that 
these emotional events will not necessarily produce change if they are 
not interpreted as providing compelling reinforcement of the need to 
change. Further, we see that change is possible even in the absence of 
such traumatic events where a compelling need is appreciated 
through education or reinforced through restructuring of resources and 
rewards.
A Clear Vision of the Direction for Change
Given the turbulence confronting most labor and management lead 
ers, as well as most employees (both exempt and nonexempt), a clear 
vision of the direction and goals of change represents one of the most 
elusive commodities in the present era. Since we only selected cases 
involving the potential for fundamental change, all of our cases feature 
at least one (or a few) individuals who possessed some degree of vision 
about the desired direction for change. A close look at the cases 
reveals, however, that in nearly all of the cases there were gaps in the 
initial visions that required learning and adjustment during the change 
process which sometimes did and sometimes did not take place.
What constitutes a clear vision of the direction of change? In part, 
our cases suggest that a clear vision of the direction of change first
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requires a clear vision of the terrain over which the change process 
must travel. This terrain is composed of multiple stakeholder groups 
with a mixture of common and competing interests. Those change ini 
tiatives that more completely take into account the underlying interests 
look, in retrospect, to have been guided by a clearer vision. For exam 
ple, the forcing at DeRidder centered on work rules, not wages. Indeed, 
the combining of classification resulted in substantial wage increases 
for nearly all employees. In this case management held a clear vision 
of its own interests (which centered on decreased grievance activity 
and increased equipment utilization rather than cutting labor costs) and 
an understanding of the interests of the workforce (which included 
both safety and continued economic stability and growth). As a result, 
just two years after the strike the plant was experiencing record levels 
of efficiency and profitability.
The union's interests in this instance (the DeRidder case) were com 
promised, however, by the forcing that occurred around work rules. In 
the short run, management had a relatively clear vision of how it 
wanted to align its interests with those of its employees. In pursuing 
this vision the union was marginalized, but not eliminated. Thus, at the 
time we concluded our case study, corporate management had decided 
to adjust the vision to address the union's interests for realizing institu 
tional legitimacy and efficacy. It decided to work on union relations in 
all of its mills because in many of them it could only achieve employee 
commitment if it also worked toward institutional cooperation with the 
union.
A clearly stated position does not necessarily constitute a viable 
vision. If that position directly threatens the interests of one or more 
stakeholder, and if the change strategy does not fully anticipate the 
degree to which these interests are threatened, then we would argue 
that such a vision is not well formulated. For example, AP Parts took 
very clear positions in the negotiations, but it apparently underesti 
mated the degree to which the union would interpret these positions as 
a threat to the local and international union (and even to other unions). 
It also apparently underestimated the degree to which its stance would 
polarize the community and surface concerns among its major custom 
ers. With a clearer understanding of this range of interests, it is possible 
that AP Parts might have modified its strategy in important ways.
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In cases where multiple unions were involved, the task of construct 
ing an effective vision for change proved enormously complex. In fact, 
disagreements among multiple unions at CSX and at Bidwell ulti 
mately undermined management efforts to implement their respective 
change agendas. Instead, a more realistic vision might have called for 
joint interactions with some unions and separate dialogue with the 
remaining unions, thereby getting underway with the change process 
rather than ending up in a stalemate.
Leadership Throughout the Change Process
In negotiations over fundamental change, leaders play pivotal 
roles. It is leaders who generally present (or fail to present) a clear 
vision of the direction of the change process, and it is leaders who gen 
erally have the primary role in articulating and gaining recognition for 
a compelling need for change. Yet, it is also leaders who are most at 
risk of becoming lightening rods for discontent during the change pro 
cess.
The task of leadership is fundamentally different for union and man 
agement leaders. Union leaders are elected officials leading political 
organizations. Management leaders are appointed officials leading 
bureaucratic organizations. The dilemmas that each faces under forcing 
and fostering regimes reflect the different contexts in which each 
leads a distinction that is central to understanding internal dynamics 
within labor and management.
Union leaders in the fostering context face a core dilemma that 
involves simultaneously maintaining their independence and working 
jointly with management. The dilemma is particularly acute given the 
political nature of unions elected union leaders who work jointly 
with management are always vulnerable to the charge that they have 
moved too close to management and ignored union priorities. This is 
exactly what happened in union elections at Budd and Packard Electric 
where the entire slates of union officials were thrown out of office on 
the basis of the perception that the leaders had become too soft as a 
result of cooperative programs. Thus, in order to work effectively with
208 Understanding the Context and Choices for Strategic Negotiations
union leaders, managers must educate themselves about the nature of 
these political dynamics.
Leaders on the management side in a fostering context face a some 
what different dilemma that involves ceding joint decision-making 
authority on matters for which they are still hierarchically accountable. 
The dilemma is particularly acute in that other management officials in 
the organization may not necessarily accept union input as legitimate, 
especially when it produces different results than would have occurred 
in the absence of such input. Yet the test of added value from union 
input must hinge on whether the process has raised new options and 
generated different decisions.
By the same token, union leaders must educate themselves about the 
nature of administrative processes (such as cost-benefit analysis and 
strategic planning) in order to work effectively with managers. While 
union input may differ from what managers unilaterally would imple 
ment, providing the input in a language familiar to managers avoids 
being rejected out of hand.
In the forcing case, both union and management leaders must strug 
gle with the potential negative consequences of an escalating confron 
tation. The stakes are very different for the two sides, however. For 
management leaders, the core dilemma involves engaging in a strong 
enough confrontation to produce desired change without creating a 
legacy of resentment that precludes future movement toward employee 
commitment. This involves making critical and often subtle decisions 
about what is necessary change as compared to what is desirable 
change with the former being much easier to defend as a legitimate 
change agenda.
For union leaders, the continued existence of the plant and the union 
local is very much at stake in such confrontations. Thus, union leaders 
in the early stages of a forcing campaign will be studying every move 
made by management in an effort to determine what are legitimate 
(albeit controversial) requests for concessions versus opening moves in 
a campaign to destroy the union. Once a union leader has reached a 
conclusion on this threshold issue, a fork in the road is at hand. Manag 
ers contemplating fundamental change need to be mindful of the piv 
otal importance of the responses that come from union leaders at this 
early stage of the change process.
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Managers demonstrate leadership initially in the way they frame the 
debate. At least in the present era, it is primarily management who has 
the choice of defining the agenda as broad or narrow, and it is manage 
ment who is or is not making a concerted effort to ensure that the 
agenda is seen as legitimate. Yet, union leaders have opportunities to 
frame the debate as well. Following the initial management request for 
change, union leaders can convert the issue into a larger contest over 
survival or keep it at the level of a problem-solving dialogue. Thus, a 
key function of leadership from both sides is in framing the debate rel 
ative to the interests at play. The way each side engages in this task will 
have important implications for the process of change.
The Role of Third Parties
While the leadership requirement for effective change is for the 
most part the responsibility of key management and labor officials, in 
certain crucial circumstances an important role can be exercised by 
third parties. In fact, the potential for third parties to play a constructive 
role was underrealized in several of our cases. While the two-party lan 
guage of labor-management relations still captures most important 
interactions, a potential exists for additional parties, at least to some 
degree, to convert the bilateral interaction into a multilateral situation. 
Included among the additional parties are customers/suppliers, com 
munities/governments, and third-party consultant/facilitators.
Current shifts in manufacturing operations toward just-in-time (JIT) 
delivery arrangements dramatically alter the links between a plant and 
its customers and suppliers. In a highly competitive industry such as 
auto supply, the impact of customers and suppliers on labor-manage 
ment relations can be significant for example, an increased emphasis 
on quality and flexibility. Customers shape the bargaining agenda by 
insisting on evidence of labor-management cooperation (prompting 
fostering initiatives), while at the same time insisting on price cuts 
(often prompting forcing strategies). Some of the customer-driven 
changes have the potential to radically rebalance the power equation. 
For example, just-in-time delivery arrangements imposed by customers
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can make management more vulnerable to various forms of collective 
action by unions.
Communities play particularly key roles in our forcing cases. As the 
forcing disputes worsened at International Paper and AP Parts, for 
example, community leaders became increasingly alarmed over the 
potential loss of jobs. Local officials often ended up taking sides and 
sometimes even supported partisan legislation, such as constraints 
being placed on replacement workers in Jay, Maine. Thus, in many 
cases, communities represent key stakeholders who become central to 
a full understanding of negotiations over fundamental change.
There is also some evidence regarding community and government 
roles in our fostering cases, such as the use of community training 
resources and multiemployer coordination at Anderson Pattern. 
Another example was Conrail, where the federal government played a 
central role in defining the framework for the entire fostering initiative. 
In most fostering cases, however, communities and governments were 
more notable by their absence.
It is clear that third-party consultants and facilitators are central to 
many of the fostering cases. These outside parties provide technical 
assistance via skills training, meeting facilitation, and organizational 
redesign, and by conferring legitimacy on what are highly ambiguous 
processes. Most labor and management practitioners in the United 
States look upon third-party assistance with great skepticism, however. 
Calling in a mediator during collective bargaining negotiation is gener 
ally considered a last resort prior to impasse. 1 As a result, most practi 
tioners have not experienced the potential value that outside 
consultants and facilitators can provide in an ongoing relationship, nor 
are they skilled in managing the potential complexities in working with 
these outside third parties.
The Importance of Internal Alignment
Certainly, a need for change, an adequate vision, and effective lead 
ership are key ingredients of a successful change effort. They clearly 
represent necessary conditions or prerequisites, but are they sufficient! 
In exceptional cases, the answer may be yes, but typically the answer
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would be that additional competencies must be present to deal with 
internal alignment.
It is often said in labor negotiations that it takes three agreements to 
get one one agreement within labor, one within management, and 
one between the parties (Dunlop 1958). This internal or intraorganiza- 
tional bargaining is often more difficult than the negotiations between 
the parties. In examining negotiations that occur at the cooperative and 
conflictual extremes, we find that internal dynamics are, if anything, 
further magnified.
In our cases, one of the greatest barriers to management effective 
ness was fear, resistance, and contrasting priorities within its own 
ranks. The intraorganizational implications of fostering derive from the 
inherent challenge to the hierarchical structure. Most fostering initia 
tives create new channels for communications and problem solving, 
while pushing certain forms of decision making to lower levels of the 
organization. Such initiatives are not only threatening to middle man 
agers and supervisors, but they can prompt a realignment of power 
relations across management functions. Moving too quickly with the 
change process, as occurred in the Bidwell case, for example, does not 
allow sufficient time for factions within management to sort out these 
implications. In the Budd case, the link between the union and line 
management at the expense of the labor relations function is 
another example of a shifting communications patterns creating ten 
sions within management.
Similarly, as union leaders grappled with fundamental changes, one 
of the greatest barriers they faced was fear, resistance, and contrasting 
priorities within the ranks of union members. Union leaders were at 
risk both from being accused by members of working too closely with 
management and of not working closely enough to preserve jobs. For 
example, at the Budd Detroit plant, local union leadership became con 
vinced of the competitive pressures facing their plants, but when they 
proposed a concessionary agreement to the membership, it was 
rejected by over 90 percent of the voting members, and the president of 
the local subsequently resigned.
The internal dynamics become even more complex where multiple 
unions are involved, such as in the railroad industry. In these cases, 
negotiations occurred within each union, across the different unions, 
and then between the unions and employer. Thus, the political nature
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of unions as organizations ensures that internal dynamics will be criti 
cal factors in the success or failure of change initiatives.
The internal dynamics were equally important in both forcing and 
fostering contexts, although they were played out in different ways.
A traditional distributive tactic involves building internal solidarity 
while looking to divide the other side (Walton and McKersie 1983). All 
of our forcing cases featured sustained efforts to maintain internal soli 
darity during the forcing campaigns. The cases differed sharply, how 
ever, in the degree to which efforts had the intent to divide-and- 
conquer the other side. In the cases that involved more restrained forms 
of forcing, the internal splits within the other side were not exploited to 
the fullest extent possible.
The approach to potential splits in the solidarity of the other party is 
very different in the unrestrained forcing contests. The forcing at AP 
Parts and at International Paper not only featured sustained efforts by 
labor and management to build internal solidarity, but both sides 
exploited every possible division they could find in the other side. 
Management sought to divide the unions in both cases with the threat 
ened and then actual use of replacement workers. The unions sought to 
divide management with corporate campaigns, direct appeals to cus 
tomers, and community pressure on local managers.
A clear lesson emerges from these cases. Neither managers nor 
union leaders will begrudge the necessity for the other side to build its 
own internal consensus. However, given the volatile context of indus 
trial relations where concerns about a company's financial stability 
and a union's institutional security are always just below the surface   
each side is likely to react defensively and vigorously when its internal 
divisions are targeted by the other side. What starts as a traditional dis 
tributive bargaining tactic becomes a clear trigger point that distin 
guishes restrained forcing from unrestrained, escalating battles.
Internal alignment was also pivotal in the fostering cases, but in a 
very different way. The robust fostering cases all featured extensive 
educational campaigns to build shared understanding at all levels of 
labor and management about the importance of change. For example, 
at Anderson Pattern the education included fact-filled monthly newslet 
ters, a pivotal trip to a trade show to learn more about proposed new 
technology, presentations at annual dinners and other events, and
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extensive training programs developed in conjunction with a local 
community college.
At the same time, initiatives that produced little change were charac 
terized by inadequate efforts to address divisions within union and 
management ranks. For example, many managers and supervisors at 
Bidwell felt little ownership for the QWL initiative (they viewed it as a 
corporate agenda item), and there were splits among the unions regard 
ing the wisdom of working jointly with management on this subject. 
These splits fed off each other with each side's ambivalence provid 
ing justification for the other side to withdraw.
Interestingly, internal solidarity (achieved increasingly through edu 
cation) represents the primary resolution to the classic dilemma that 
fostering poses for union leaders. So long as union members are 
divided in their views about change initiatives, a union leader who sup 
ports them will always be vulnerable to the charge that the union has 
grown too close with management. On the other hand, where there is a 
broad awareness and understanding of the competitive pressures and 
business requirements, the debate will focus on specific programs and 
decisions rather than on the merits of participating or not participating 
in the fostering initiatives.
Equally interesting are the implications of solidarity within the man 
agement ranks. As the DeRidder case demonstrates, if supervisors and 
middle managers have bought into the change agenda, they will behave 
in ways that reinforce the initiative. Alternatively, where there is inter 
nal disagreement within management ranks, workers and union leaders 
will observe this inconsistency they will accuse management of "not 
walking the talk" and lose faith in the initiative as a real vehicle for 
improving operations. It is therefore in the interest of each side for the 
other to have high levels of internal education and solidarity regarding 
the fostering initiatives.
Thus, internal dynamics within either side represent pivotal ele 
ments in the change process. When ineffectively managed, the internal 
dynamics can drive a forcing campaign out of control, and they can 
bring a fostering initiative to a halt. When skillfully managed, the forc 
ing around fundamental changes can at least be acknowledged as legit 
imate and the fostering can generate high levels of enthusiasm and 
commitment.
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Change as a Process of Continuous Learning, Marked 
by Pivotal Events
A key perspective for framing the context for change is the aware 
ness that fundamental change usually does not occur in one program 
matic burst but is more often a series of steps marked by pivotal events.
Viewed from a short-time perspective, the results of a particular 
change effort may not be impressive. However, from a longer-term 
point of view (one embracing a sequence of time periods and strate 
gies), the results may be much more noteworthy. This perspective 
applies especially well to Pensacola and Budd. It was essential for the 
key leaders to take the long view, remaining steadfastly interested in 
both substantive and social contracts and not allowing the results of a 
particular time frame or phase to diminish the commitment to move 
forward with change programs.
The effectiveness of the step-by-step approach to change is illus 
trated by the progress that occurred at Adrian Fabricators. Ultimately, 
it was necessary for the union to see management as a partial ally and 
for the membership/owners to see management as concerned about 
their interests. Fortunately, there was time for these changes to take 
place. (If there had been a sharp downturn in the business, however, the 
past history may have been a blinder to the union and the membership 
for discovering this potential.)
The long-term view recognizes the potential for the parties to learn 
as they go. The journey is marked by what we have called "pivotal 
events." These are events or moments in which the very direction and 
tone of the relationship are, in effect, "on the table." They are truly piv 
otal in that there is more than one possible outcome and at least one of 
the alternatives represents a new direction for the relationship.
Returning for a moment to the example of Budd, when the parties 
shifted the bargaining process away from specifying the details around 
improving die changes, they had just completed a pivotal dialogue. By 
deciding instead to agree on the principle and leave the specifics to be 
worked out in a joint committee, the overall climate of labor-manage 
ment cooperation was reinforced, line management took on a more 
central role in labor relations (at the expense of the personnel func 
tion), and a key aspect of business operations became a subject of
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shared oversight. It is clear that if they had not been able to find a way 
to jointly address the die transition issue, then the relationship could 
have shifted in an opposite direction.
We have discussed the strategies of forcing and fostering (as well as 
escape) and sequential and concurrent combinations of strategies as 
general characterizations of different paths down which negotiations 
might travel. In fact, progress along these paths is rarely smooth, con 
tinuous, or one-directional. If the events are consistently resolved in a 
certain way, then tactical moves take on a larger significance they 
aggregate to become a strategy. For example, when the president of 
Anderson Pattern first approached the union about adding profit shar 
ing to the compensation package, this tactical move did not yet consti 
tute a fostering strategy. However, when the parties subsequently 
crafted an ad hoc agreement matching flexible work rules with the pur 
chase of specified new technology (after extensive information shar 
ing), a fostering strategy was beginning to fall into place. Later, this 
strategy took on clear form when a general agreement was reached 
allowing broad flexibility in exchange for certain job security and 
training guarantees. Subsequently, conflicts around the administration 
of training (which were also pivotal), were addressed in what had 
emerged as an explicitly fostering context.
We conclude that change is not a one-time event. Negotiated change 
then becomes a series of interactions in which the linkages across time 
are as important as the issues on the table at a given moment.
Assessment of Management's Strategic Alternatives
By this point, the advantages of a strategy that combines both 
restrained forcing and robust fostering should be apparent especially 
when they are interwoven, as was illustrated in the three cases pre 
sented in the last chapter. To the extent that it is possible for the parties 
to wisely manage these sequences of pivotal events along lines illus 
trated in the Budd, Packard Electric, and Champion-Pensacola cases, 
then a superior strategic alternative is in place. However, in many 
instances such a combination is not feasible and other pathways must 
be chosen.
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In this section, we examine three strategic options for parties initiat 
ing change which in the present era is usually management. The 
three alternatives include: escape, forcing followed by fostering, and 
fostering followed by forcing. Note, however, that the lessons (espe 
cially on the later two alternatives) would apply equally to unions 
developing strategies to guide change initiatives.
Perspectives on the Strategy of Escape
In the next chapter we will summarize best practice regarding the 
primary change strategies of forcing and fostering, taken singly and in 
various combinations. At this point, there is one other threshold subject 
that merits consideration, namely, the strategy of escape.
While we certainly do not advocate a strategy of escape, it is impor 
tant to consider the use of this strategy if only as a tactic to enhance 
the effectiveness of forcing and fostering strategies. Several cases 
explicitly involved the escape strategy. Also, escape lurked in the back 
ground as an option in most of the other cases.
Escape strategies sometimes permit labor-management innovations 
that might not otherwise have emerged. However, they can also incur 
large social costs for individuals and communities.
The escape option was not equally available in the three industries 
we studied. Clearly, it was pursued much more readily in auto supply 
than in paper and railroads, where the heavy investment in infrastruc 
ture limited geographic movement. However, other forms of escape 
were available, as illustrated by IP's replacement of strikers with non 
union workers in its Jay mill and Guilford's transfer of assets from one 
legal/financial entity to another.
Increasingly, key decision makers (e.g., managers, boards of direc 
tors and partners in joint ventures) are making proposed investments 
for modernization or new capacity contingent upon specified changes 
in work rules. Such quid pro quos were central to the innovative labor- 
management relations that emerged both at Anderson Pattern and 
Packard Electric. The linkage of a commitment to continue operations 
(and to reinvest capital) with changes in work rules and labor-manage 
ment relations makes considerable sense. Thus, we conclude that when 
business conditions require consideration of options such as possibly 
closing a facility or contracting work out, labor and management
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should attempt to negotiate changes that would make such operations 
viable on a continuing basis.
Unfortunately, some companies often give up on securing changes 
within the existing relationship and resort prematurely to the escape 
strategy. In essence, this means that these firms have opted out of nego 
tiations forcing, fostering, or some combination of the two and 
have decided to abandon the relationship (either by turning over the 
facilities to some other owner or by starting from scratch at a new loca 
tion).
The auto supply industry is replete with examples where companies 
approached the union, received a negative answer, and then decided to 
move the facilities; or where companies did not even approach the 
union (assuming that the answer would be no) and made strategic deci 
sions unilaterally to disinvest, closing down or selling existing facili 
ties and starting anew at greenfield sites.
The effective use of escape as a strategy to set the stage for either a 
forcing or fostering strategy can be very demanding. First, the threat to 
escape cannot be a bluff. In other words, the alternative to continuing 
the relationship with the union must be available and creditable. Sec 
ond, in underscoring the escape alternative, management must present 
the realities in a way that does not permanently sour the existing rela 
tionship. The union will always feel threatened by any reference to 
escape. However, if it is done in a way that creates understanding (for 
example, by persuading labor that "You would do the same thing if you 
were in our shoes"), then it may be possible to prevent serious deterio 
ration of the existing relationship. Third, the skillful use of escape 
requires considerable precision in proceeding step by step but ulti 
mately avoiding a "point of no return" unless all else has failed. In the 
case of DeRidder, for example, management trained replacements but 
waited for the striking workers to reassess the situation before making 
any decision to bring the replacements on board. As a result, manage 
ment was able to maximize the pressure on the union without turning 
its tactic into a strategy.
Forcing Followed by Fostering
A strong case can be made for launching a change effort by first 
confronting whatever painful bargaining work needs to be done and
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later proceeding to improve the relationship. Forcing, if successful, can 
produce more immediate and certain benefits, but the net advantage of 
starting a change effort with forcing depends upon how the forcing 
campaign affects negotiations in subsequent phases.
First, this sequence has particular attitudinal effects. Forcing will 
put pressure on existing accommodation between labor and manage 
ment to the extent that management agendas and pressure tactics are 
viewed as more aggressive than past practice, a point underscored by 
several of our cases, especially Jay, Guilford, and AP Parts. However, 
this shock to established attitudes, if not too severe, can set the stage 
for a favorable response to subsequent fostering activities. This helps 
explain the improvement in attitudes after the strike at DeRidder.
Second, the sequence has potential educational benefits. Forcing 
substantive changes can dramatize competitive pressures, thereby set 
ting the stage for a fostering approach to an array of other agenda 
items. This attention to economic imperatives may help labor resolve 
some of its internal differences. Moreover, the social contract may be 
redefined to incorporate competitiveness as a legitimate criteria for 
change.
Third, successful forcing can serve to confirm realities about the 
power equation. In many situations today management has gained a 
power advantage vis-a-vis trade unions, and organized labor finds itself 
in a position where its ability to serve its members depends more on its 
integrative bargaining skills than its distributive bargaining prowess. 
Thus, an initial forcing strategy can help labor adapt constructively to 
the new economic power realities sooner rather than later. Finally, of 
course, for management intent upon renegotiating the social contract, 
the ideal culmination of a forcing episode is contract language that 
either enables participation and cooperation (as happened in 1988 
Pensacola contract negotiations), or provides for continued negotiation 
of flexible work practices (as illustrated by the pay-for-knowledge 
scheme won by DeRidder in its 1983 strike).
Thus, the initial forcing can be far-reaching when it occurs within a 
context characterized by an adversarial social contract (so there is not a 
violation of expectations). While subsequent fostering may be ham 
pered by the adversarial aspects of forcing, the fostering that follows 
can be aided by the learning and the contrast that derive from the forc 
ing experience.
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Fostering Followed by Forcing.
Another option is for management to first attempt to elicit the volun 
tary cooperation of employees and their representatives and then sub 
sequently reach agreement on substantive matters, e.g., reducing 
payroll costs and increasing contractual flexibility via distributive bar 
gaining. It is possible that the fostering approach will be adequate, but 
the forcing alternative remains available if the need for substantive 
change becomes urgent. Management can explain the subsequent shift 
in strategy (if required) by stating, in effect, "We tried the persuasion 
approach first, and since that has not worked we have to insist on the 
changes."
What are the potential advantages of this sequence? Assuming they 
are implemented effectively, fostering activities, such as joint commit 
tees and communication programs, can provide labor with a better 
understanding of competitive realities, including the need to control 
payroll costs. Fostering activities can also produce attitudes that make 
it easier for the parties to develop integrative solutions to substantive 
issues. For example, the experience of jointly designing and adminis^ 
tering QWL and El programs can produce positive spill over effects, 
enhancing the parties' abilities to work together within the larger con 
text of collective bargaining.
This attitudinal effect on subsequent contract negotiations is not 
assured, however. If the apparent motivation driving the subsequent 
forcing strategy is either not compelling to labor or is seen as inconsis 
tent with the new social contract (and instead viewed, for example, as 
motivated strictly by superior bargaining power), then fostering fol 
lowed by forcing can produce resentment and disillusionment. While 
not featured in our cases, this outcome characterizes the experiences of 
many companies in the paper industry during the mid-to late 1980s 
because management's case for work-rule changes and economic con 
cessions had not been made credible to labor. Similarly, the use of 
mass layoffs at Packard Electric went far beyond the union's percep 
tion of the appropriate response to competitive pressures; as a result, 
the entire cooperative relationship was called into question.
After initial fostering has moved the relationship toward a new 
social contract, subsequent forcing may be required, but it can only be 
effective within the framework of a new social contract. Thus, while
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beginning with fostering does not preclude subsequent forcing, it does 
change its character. The changed nature of the process that follows 
intense fostering is illustrated by the handling of the Sunday premium 
issue at Pensacola. Management knew the issue was controversial and 
tried to utilize integrative bargaining to be consistent with the overall 
fostering strategy. For intraorganizational reasons, the union would not 
engage the issue on an integrative basis. Even though management 
then felt compelled to force the issue, it did so with restraint and 
accompanied its approach with explanations of the business rationale 
and a concurrent improvement in compensation via a 401k benefit 
plan. Labor did not like the change, but it did not allow the forcing to 
undermine the overall fostering momentum.
An important practical advantage of forcing within an overall con 
text of fostering is that the drive to reach agreement on substance on a 
specific timetable allows the union leadership to characterize the pro 
posed changes as a fait accompli. Thus fostering is used to communi 
cate relevant information and to create as much understanding as 
possible, and then forcing is used to press for agreement.
Assessment of Strategic Alternatives for Unions
Today's union leaders find themselves on the receiving end of vari 
ous corporate- and plant-level change initiatives. The following analy 
sis is targeted for these union leaders, though many of the principles 
apply to any party confronted by a strategic change initiative.
For union leaders, the first and most basic point is that unions gener 
ally do not have any viable alternative to the existing relationship. The 
prior discussion of the option of escape underscored the possibility that 
in many circumstances management can shift (or at least threaten to 
move) to other locations. Such a scenario is only feasible for a handful 
of unions who are in a position (by virtue of stock ownership or other 
forms of strategic influence) to drive the sale of a company or the 
replacement of the management leadership team.
When we review the stance taken by unions in the cases where forc 
ing was dominant, several conclusions are apparent. First, a strategy of 
mild resistance combined with flexibility appears to have been effec-
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live in several instances. For example, at Pensacola and Budd, where 
the unions accepted concessions, the strategy consisted of opposing the 
employees' proposals, but doing it in a way that preserved the relation 
ship and enabled the leadership to deal with internal differences by, in 
effect, saying to the membership, "We did all we could to resist these 
demands of management. However, our only course of action is to 
accept some of the changes and to get on with preserving the business 
and our jobs." Specifically, during the 1985 negotiations at Pensacola, 
the UPIU attempted to avoid discussion of flexibility issues, and when 
the company's final proposal went to the membership, the leadership 
took a stance of "nonrecommendation."
Such a posture could be viewed as a very pragmatic response by 
unions to economic pressures. In the same vein, unions often advance 
their own agendas in order to achieve quids pro quos for the economic 
relief sought by management. In many of our cases, we saw the 
increased attention given to employment security and joint training 
programs, as well as the incorporation of unions into strategic levels of 
the business via various arrangements to facilitate consultation.
On the other hand, where unions exhibited strong resistance to a 
forcing initiative by management, the matter escalated rapidly. The 
response usually was triggered by a perceived threat to the integrity of 
the contract and the institutional security of the union. And internal 
solidarity within the union was usually enhanced as a result of the 
tough stance by the union, at least during the early phases of the con 
frontation. But ultimately the unions lost badly, as illustrated by the 
Jay, AP Parts, and Guilford stories.
Turning to the fostering strategy, most union leaders in our cases 
preferred to adopt a stance of cautious support for the initiatives. For 
political reasons (similar to the strategy of mild resistance), the safest 
approach for union leaders in terms of internal differences was to keep 
the fostering limited to a narrow agenda such as quality of worklife 
programs and to proceed on a step-by-step basis rather than embarking 
upon wide-ranging joint programs. The subject of new technology can 
serve as such an opportunity for the initiation of fostering; the step-by- 
step approach that the parties at Anderson took to this subject illus 
trates one very viable pathway for union leadership where manage 
ment is also proceeding on a step-by-step basis.
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However fast or slow the management is fostering change, in time 
the initiative either fails or becomes robust. In the later case, the foster 
ing typically becomes integral to the union's self-identity. Cases rais 
ing these issues include CSX and Packard Electric. The biggest 
challenge for union leadership in this context is to deal with internal 
differences, since it is likely that at least a few members will question 
the ability of the union to maintain its independence and to differ with 
management when the occasion requires such a stance. Thus, robust 
fostering is a viable strategy only when rank-and-file members are 
involved in various joint processes. Size then becomes a key correlate 
of the feasibility of this approach. Anderson, a small employer, pos 
sessed the ability to involve rank-and-file members much more easily 
than CSX, where intense fostering took place at the institutional level 
between company and union representatives but did not involve local 
union chairmen, let alone rank-and-file members with the result that 
the recommended package was rejected.
Thus, the present era confronts union leaders with unprecedented 
challenges. Upon encountering a forcing strategy, union leaders must 
fashion a counterforcing approach that halts management's forcing 
without triggering an escalating "holy war." Upon encountering a fos 
tering strategy, union leaders must embrace changes that protect and 
expand jobs but at a pace and in a way that preserves their ability to 
serve as an independent check and balance in the system. Ultimately, 
the question not adequately answered by any of our cases concerns the 
ability of unions and their members to take the lead in fashioning their 
own effective change strategies.
Conclusion
This chapter has provided various perspectives on the terrain across 
which negotiated changes unfold. It is a terrain where small distinc 
tions can make a great deal of difference. For example, progress along 
the journey is facilitated by a compelling need to change. Yet this com 
pelling need does not have to be driven by a crisis. A clear vision for 
the direction of change provides guidance, but learning and adjustment 
along the way are perhaps more essential. The role of leadership is cru-
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cial, but the challenges are different within union and management 
organizations. Internal alignment is essential within both management 
and labor, but it is incredibly difficult to achieve and maintain. Ulti 
mately, a continuous learning stance is clearly necessary which is the 
only certain means for managing the many twists, turns, bumps, and 
barriers along the pathways of change.
NOTES
1. Personal conversation with Dale Brickner, East Lansing, Michigan, 1993.
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Learning to be a Strategic Negotiator
What have we learned from a close look at highly cooperative and 
highly conflictual negotiations? Each of the cases in this volume repre 
sents a different path toward fundamental change in employment rela 
tions. All of the paths involved twists and turns. Ultimately, some led to 
dead ends or at least took the parties on nonproductive detours. Others 
represented highly viable avenues for change. All of the paths offer 
valuable insights into the process of negotiating over change.
Indeed, some of the cases stand as unique parables about change. 
The story that unfolded at the DeRidder plant of Boise Cascade, for 
example, could be a parable for managers desiring both rapid change 
and high levels of employee commitment. It is also a story that raises 
some challenging questions for union leaders. By contrast, Anderson 
Pattern could be a parable about transformed employment relations via 
a sequence of successively farther-reaching fostering initiatives. In the 
railroad industry, the Guilford story assumes parable status because the 
hard forcing stands in contrast to long-standing railroad traditions of 
incremental change coordinated across multiple unions. The Interna 
tional Paper strike in Jay, Maine and the AP Parts strike in Toledo, 
Ohio are similarly significant in their respective industries. They have 
literally become touchstones that executives use as object lessons with 
their management staffs and the union leaders interpret to their mem 
bers often drawing contrasting lessons from the stories.
We hope we have presented these stories in a way that facilitates 
learning from individual cases. As our discussion at the end of the 
cases suggest, we feel that each teaches many valuable lessons. 
Beyond the individual stories, however, there are also common lessons 
that cut across the cases.
Lessons from the Cases
The first set of lessons from the cases concerns the use of tactics 
within a given strategy. There are many tactics that can serve a particu-
225
226 Learning to be a Strategic Negotiator
lar strategy, and we highlight the constructive and destructive potential 
inherent in various choices. Next, we highlight lessons specific to the 
forcing path, followed by lessons specific to the fostering path and les 
sons inherent in various combinations of forcing and fostering. Finally, 
we present a set of guidelines designed to support strategic negotia 
tions.
The Implications of Tactical Choices
The tactics deployed in support of a particular change strategy pro 
vide focus to the strategy. For example, tactics common to forcing 
involve making excessive opening demands, providing little supportive 
information, and threatening the institutional security of the other side. 
This set of tactics will typically engender a back-and-forth forcing con 
test where excessive demands are met with excessive counter proposals 
and institutional threats are met with counter threats. Similarly, a com 
mon set of fostering tactics involves the development of joint mission 
statements and ground rules that emphasize consensus decision mak 
ing and formal problem solving. This set of tactics will typically focus 
attention on the cooperative and problem solving processes wherein 
mutual concerns are identified and addressed.
Inevitably, tactics are double-edged. At the same time that a set of 
tactics provides a particular focus and direction to a strategy, the tactics 
also divert attention from other possibilities. Too often in our cases we 
find evidence of tactics providing a misleading focus for a given strat 
egy. The tactics are logical steps to take in service of the strategy, and 
they indeed often yield short-term advantages. In the long term, how 
ever, the strategies can be compromised by these tactics in fundamental 
ways.
In the forcing case, the tactical focus on winning the forcing contest 
risks winning the battle but losing the war. Some of the very tactics that 
are most helpful in winning a forcing contest such as overstated posi 
tions, little supportive information, and institutional threats can set in 
motion uncontrollable escalating conflict. Further, these tactics can 
compromise efforts to reestablish regular operations and relations after 
the forcing contest is over.
In this chapter we will challenge the conventional focus of forcing 
tactics. Instead of centering on the forcing contest, our research sug-
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gests that the most effective forcing tactics are focused on avoiding 
what we see as the two greatest risks along the forcing path. Attending 
to these "show stoppers" involves: (1) preventing uncontrollable esca 
lation, and (2) ensuring the reestablishment of regular operations at the 
conclusion of the forcing contest. Winning the forcing contest is 
important, but attention to the risks or downside possibilities is even 
more important which leads us to recommend a restrained form of 
forcing.
In the fostering case, the tactical focus on cooperative and problem 
solving processes may solve some immediate mutual problems, but 
may not build an enduring set of relationships. Indeed, some of the 
very tactics that are helpful in supporting cooperative and problem- 
solving processes such as consensus decision making and formal 
problem-solving procedures may constrain parties in surfacing con 
troversial and potentially divisive issues. Further, the tactics may exac 
erbate tensions within each party.
In this chapter we will also challenge the conventional focus of fos 
tering tactics. Instead of just focusing on cooperative and problem- 
solving processes, our research suggests that the most effective foster 
ing anticipates two potential "show stoppers" by: (1) enhancing the 
capacity of both parties to address controversial and divisive issues, 
and (2) increasing the ability of each party to manage internal confu 
sion and splits. Cooperative and problem-solving processes are impor 
tant, but that alone will not generate a robust form of fostering. 1
The table below summarizes the typical focus of tactics for forcing 
and fostering strategies. The table also lists what we term the show 
stoppers. These are the issues that we would argue should be the pri 
mary focus when implementing a given strategy.
Typical Focus and "Show Stoppers" that Should be the Focus
Strategy
Forcing
Fostering
Typical tactical focus
The forcing contest
Cooperative, problem- 
solving processes
Focus on potential 
"show stoppers"
Preventing uncontrolled escalation 
Reestablishing regular relationships
Anticipating divisive conflicts 
Managing internal differences
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Lessons Along the Forcing Path
The first three cases presented in this book all began with forcing 
strategies by management. In each case AP Parts, Jay, and Guil- 
ford the forcing was marked by strong union responses, escalation, 
and strikes. While management prevailed in each case, the costs were 
substantial. Looking across these cases, there are a number of impor 
tant lessons that emerge from travel along the forcing path. While other 
cases did not only involve forcing, nevertheless lessons about forcing 
can also be derived from the forcing periods contained in these addi 
tional cases.
Why would parties force change? Clearly they have concluded that 
their counterparts are unlikely to be receptive to the change. Yet, even 
where no alternative seems possible, the decision to force is never 
made lightly. Parties always explore to some degree what they see as 
the risks associated with forcing and the enactment of possible coun- 
termeasures on their part to minimize risks. For example, parties will 
often see a strike as a likely risk associated with forcing during collec 
tive bargaining, and strike contingency plans will be developed.
As we noted in discussion of the implications of tactical choices, 
however, parties are too often focused on preparing for and executing 
the forcing contest itself. They give much less attention to the process 
of setting the stage and framing the issues prior to forcing. Further, par 
ties typically give even less attention to the process of recovery after 
forcing. Ignoring these pre- and postforcing time periods leaves parties 
inadequately prepared for life on the forcing path. Counterforcing and 
other forms of direct conflict are not the greatest dangers along the 
forcing path. As we have suggested, the real show stoppers are uncon 
trollable, escalating conflict, and an inability to not only reestablish but 
also upgrade ongoing operations following the forcing initiative.
The following lessons are not necessarily aimed at the back-and- 
forth struggles during a forcing contest. We will not, for example, offer 
guidance for managers as to how best to deploy replacement workers 
or for union leaders as to how best to conduct a corporate campaign. 
Indeed, the successful execution of these provocative tactics is likely to 
increase the risk of either of our two show stoppers. Our advice will 
instead point toward a set of restrained tactics in the service of an 
effective forcing strategy.
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Forcing Lesson 1: Don't force without exploring other options. 
Given the big risks associated with forcing, the best course of action is 
not to force until the fostering options have been fully explored. If 
change can be achieved via fostering, it has many advantages relative 
to forcing when it comes to the generation of ideas and commitment to 
implement new agreements. However, it is not only for these reasons 
that we recommend exploring fostering options prior to the implemen 
tation of a forcing strategy. Even where a party has concluded that fos 
tering is unlikely to yield results, it is important to precede forcing with 
a good-faith exploration of fostering options. We make this recommen 
dation for two reasons. First, it is possible that, upon investigation, fos 
tering will prove more promising than it seems. Second, even if things 
go as predicted, the initial attempt at fostering yields important divi 
dends during and after the forcing episodes.
Consider, for example, the comments of the UAW in the AP Parts 
case. After the strike, union leaders stated that the company never had 
made a genuine effort to work with the union in achieving flexible 
work rules, benefit cost containment, or other apparent management 
concerns. In this case there was a prior employee involvement effort, 
though it was not targeted around the issues that management said 
were its priorities going into the negotiations. We will never know if 
the union would have been responsive to a well-designed fostering ini 
tiative. We will also never know if such an initiative would have been 
more likely to achieve what the company gained at the end of the 
strike. However, in the absence of a prior fostering, the union was able 
to elevate the dispute into a moral contest of right versus wrong  
which constrained the company's success in its forcing strategy.
Forcing Lesson 2: Pick issues carefully—be clear about your aim. 
That parties embarked upon forcing should pick their issues carefully 
may seem obvious. If a party is forcing, after all, shouldn't it be moti 
vated by particular issues to do so? The lesson, however, is that a forc 
ing party typically contemplates forcing when it perceives itself as 
having a power advantage.2 In this situation, it is often tempting to use 
the forcing occasion to accomplish multiple objectives. Or, more sim 
ply stated, parties sometimes get greedy.
When a party uses its power advantage to accomplish legitimate but 
unpopular objectives, it will engender a measure of resistance and
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resentment. But the level of resistance and resentment increases dra 
matically if the forcing party is seen as taking advantage of the 
moment and pushing for objectives that are not seen as legitimate. In 
such a case, the stage is set for an escalating conflict. Consider the con 
trast between the strike at the Jay, Maine papermill and the strike at the 
DeRidder, Louisiana papermill. In the case of the Jay strike, manage 
ment was seen as pushing for economic concessions at a time of record 
profits. This context was not seen as a legitimate basis for the power 
tactics utilized. At DeRidder, on the other hand, management only 
focused on work rules directly tied to data on low productivity levels in 
the plant. The workers at DeRidder did not like giving up hard-won 
contractual rights, but they were able to reconcile the loss subsequently 
when the strike settlement included a generous wage increase and 
when they came to see the new team-based work system as a viable 
alternative to the narrow job classifications that they had relinquished. 
A key point, then, is for the parties especially management to 
shape their agenda to what is reasonable. While management may feel 
its own needs for concessions are compelling and self-evident, labor 
will tend to focus on the way these concessions nullify decades of 
hard-won gains, threaten workers' standards of living, and undermine 
the union's strength and self-respect. Anticipating such reactions by the 
other party enables the negotiator to understand the hostility engen 
dered and to take steps to avoid reciprocating it.
When management's demands are not carefully delimited, the union 
often misinterprets management's intentions, inferring that the 
demands for concessions are more than just a straightforward desire to 
improve productivity and reduce costs. Unions, for their part, often 
conclude sometimes too quickly that management has set out on a 
purposeful path designed to get rid of the union. While getting rid of 
the union may well be what many managers would prefer, this reality 
does not mean that their forcing actions are necessarily a prelude to 
such a plan.
Thus one guideline for management in this regard is to avoid hiring 
permanent replacement workers. Permanent replacements are usually 
seen by unions as moving matters beyond the point of no return, with 
an all-out battle inevitable. Further, management can help contain the 
conflict by finding credible ways to demonstrate its acceptance of the
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union as an institution (e.g., by offers to consult with the union on mat 
ters previously handled unilaterally by management).
So what are the criteria that will enable a forcing party to pick issues 
carefully and limit its objectives? Simply put, a forcing party should be 
able to construct a persuasive business or institutional rationale for its 
choice. It may seem ironic that a party about to use its power advantage 
to force a change should struggle with the construction of a persuasive 
rationale. Our point is that this is exactly when it is most important to 
be able to make a strong case for the proposed change not because it 
is any more likely to make the other party agree, but because it reduces 
the odds of the kind of intense resentment that fuels escalation and 
because it increases the chances of being able to reestablish regular 
operations after the forcing initiative.
Forcing Lesson 3: Utilize forms of power that do not trigger escala 
tion. When it comes to the forcing contest itself, parties invariably 
make estimates of their own power capabilities. These estimates begin 
during planning stages and are continually revised during the contest. 
For management, these estimates typically take into account the degree 
of shared commitment and resolve within the ranks of supervisors and 
managers; current inventory levels and the criticality of the operations 
in question; the legal levers available to management; the employer's 
vulnerability to external pressure from customers, suppliers or politi 
cians; and other factors.
Sometimes the estimates of power capabilities are based on recent 
past experience. More often, however, the estimates are based on 
unchecked assumptions. It is these assumptions that can be dangerous 
in a forcing contest. For example, Guilford management embarked on 
the forcing path with certain assumptions about its rights under the 
Railway Labor Act and its vulnerability to decisions by arbitrators and 
courts. Given the way its efforts ultimately were stalled at so many crit 
ical junctures, it is quite likely that Guilford management was acting 
on the basis of overly optimistic assumptions. Also, given the history 
of labor relations in the railroad industry, it should have been possi 
ble with full investigation to check out assumptions about the 
potential actions of third parties that might impede the forcing efforts.
The type of power utilized also needs to be selected quite carefully. 
For example, too much reliance on attitudinal and intraorganizational
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tactics that seek to undermine the legitimacy of the other side may 
serve distributive bargaining well, but such tactics can so heighten the 
conflict associated with a forcing strategy that both sides end up in a 
prolonged battle that serves neither side's interests.
Hence our third lesson is for forcing parties to check out assump 
tions about their own power. Unrealistic assumptions may lead to 
overly aggressive forcing initiatives, which then set the stage for an 
escalating conflict and a dynamic where forcing takes on a life of its 
own, resulting in a legacy of bitterness and resentment.
Forcing Lesson 4: Check assumptions about your counterpart's 
power capabilities. This is the companion to Lesson 3, and it is as crit 
ical to learn about these assumptions as it is for each party to be clear 
about its own assumptions. For managers estimating labor's self-per 
ception, for example, it is important to estimate labor's perceptions of 
its own internal solidarity; its capacity to disrupt business operations; 
its links to the local, regional and national labor movement; and avail 
able forms of legal leverage.
Failing to assess the other side's self-perceptions can severely con 
strain forcing efforts. For example, management at AP Parts did not 
anticipate that labor would interpret their hard line in negotiations as 
setting a precedent for concessions in their region. They were sur 
prised, therefore, to find themselves the subject of a nationwide boy 
cott, with food and financial support for strikers flowing in from across 
the nation. Similarly, they probably did not anticipate that the UAW 
vice-presidents negotiating with Ford and General Motors (two key 
customers of AP Parts) would break off national negotiations to join 
the UAW's picket line at AP Parts in Ohio. This is not to say that it 
would have been easy for management to predict labor's self-percep 
tion, but this is clearly a case were they were far off the mark.
Attention to Lesson 4 has an interactive effect with attention to Les 
son 3. The worst-case scenario is one where the forcing party overesti 
mates its own power capabilities and underestimates the self- 
perceptions of its counterpart(s). In these cases, an escalating conflict 
is virtually assured. Indeed, all four forcing lessons are interactive. 
Ignoring the first two lessons no prior exploration of fostering 
options and overly aggressive aspirations not only fuels escalation,
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but it also seriously hampers postforcing efforts to reestablish regular 
operations.
Forcing Lesson 5: Communicate regularly regarding the tenor of 
negotiations. Sometimes it is not possible to avoid the use of power 
with its potential for escalating tensions. In this situation, the best 
course of action is to limit the side effects and consequences of distrib 
utive bargaining.
When adequate communication takes place, differences over issues 
still remain but each side understands the reasons for these differences. 
Indeed, the parties may simply "agree to disagree." This is essentially 
what happened in the case of Pensacola where the union, strongly 
opposed to losing premium pay for work on Sunday, granted that it 
understood the reasons motivating management to insist upon this 
change. In turn, the company recognized how difficult, in a political 
sense, it was for the union to do anything other than to oppose the 
change, and consequently the company attempted to make the pay loss 
as palatable as possible.
Experienced negotiators (often on a trial-and-error basis) learn how 
to signal to one another what is important and what is not important in 
the lineup of respective agenda items. Such competency in communi 
cations can go a long way in minimizing some of the most serious side 
effects of distributive bargaining.
Attending to these lessons generally produces what we have termed 
restrained forcing. The forcing is restrained in its scope (to issues that 
are justifiable), is deployed with the appropriate intensity (based on 
realistic assessments of available power), and is openly acknowledged 
in the negotiations. The best guideline to bear in mind is the overall 
aim, which is to achieve forcing objectives without inadvertent escala 
tion and with the capability for reestablishing regular operations after 
the forcing.
Lessons Along the Fostering Path
In contrast with forcing, the fostering path enjoys a certain moral 
legitimacy. In our society, it is considered highly appropriate for a 
party to reach out and work jointly with others in planning and imple-
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menting change. This does not, however, assure the success of foster 
ing initiatives.
Ironically, fostering overtures are not typically welcomed with 
enthusiasm. Rather, they are most often greeted with caution and skep 
ticism by other parties and even by individuals within the party mak 
ing the fostering initiative. Top management may announce a desire to 
foster employee involvement. This will be greeted with suspicion not 
just by the union, but also by first-line supervisors and middle manag 
ers.
The suspicions are rooted in a set of very real risks that lie along the 
fostering path. Most parties who travel down the fostering path concen 
trate their energy on cooperative processes. As a result, a great deal of 
time will be devoted to joint training in running effective meetings, 
making decisions by consensus, and utilizing problem-solving pro 
cesses. While these activities are all important, our research suggests 
that inadequate cooperative processes do not represent the greatest 
threat to fostering initiatives. Instead, the greatest risks arise from two 
show stoppers: not anticipating episodes of conflict and forcing while 
traveling down the fostering path, and not addressing the internal splits 
that emerge along the way.
The following lessons, therefore, do not center on the details of 
cooperative processes. We are not offering yet another multistep prob 
lem-solving model or method for process improvement. Some les 
sons such as our focus on making progress through small steps are 
consistent with common understandings about cooperative processes, 
but we come to these lessons for different reasons. In other cases, such 
as our focus on conflict in the fostering context, the lessons could be 
seen as constraining or even undermining cooperative processes. How 
ever, all the lessons reflect a key insight guiding this book, which is 
that fostering initiatives involve negotiated change.
Fostering Lesson 1: Progress is built through small steps. It is con 
ventional wisdom that parties engaged in fostering initially look for 
small successes before tackling larger, more contentious issues. This 
recommendation is based on the assumption that leaders need to build 
trust and learn to work together. We come to the same conclusion, but 
for different reasons.
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The need for small steps may initially be driven by issues of trust 
and interactive skill. However, even where leaders do have some mea 
sure of trust and experience working together, it is still essential to pro 
ceed through small steps. This is because fostering does not just 
involve a restructuring of relations between parties it also involves 
restructuring relations within each party.
Each cooperative success has a double-edged quality. It demon 
strates the capacity to generate joint gain but it also raises questions 
about the independence of each party. For example, the die transition 
teams at Budd represented a cooperative success in the way they fos 
tered cooperation among skilled trades, resulting in dramatic improve 
ments in the time required to change the dies on a stamping line. At the 
same time, the operation of the teams raised difficult questions for 
union leaders and managers. Union leaders had to answer questions 
about whether relaxing job classification increased the risk of manage 
rial abuse. Managers had to answer questions about whether the self- 
managing teams would be mature enough to wisely utilize their new 
autonomy.
Often the first small steps occur when the parties establish linkages 
across respective agendas. Consider several examples. The quest for 
greater flexibility in the development of the workforce (a management 
priority) usually can be constructively joined to enhanced employment 
security (a union priority). Similarly, the desire of the company to 
increase the union's sensitivity to competitive conditions can be real 
ized by giving the union increased access to key managers and key 
business decisions.
The first issues addressed along the fostering path are therefore 
important, not just for their substance but also as test events within 
each party. Each event is interpreted both for the substantive gains or 
losses and the underlying significance for political or power relations. 
Many small steps allow for learning not just across but also within each 
party.
The substantive quality of each small step is equally important. The 
successful instances of fostering, especially Pensacola, CSX, and 
Packard Electric, all were characterized by a process that ensured that 
substantive agenda items would be considered. Negotiations did not 
concentrate on just quality of worklife subjects, the participants were 
not just industrial relations types, and the process was not allowed to
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drift. The general point is that when subjects important to both sides 
are discussed, when key management officials participate, when vari 
ous levels of the union organization have input, and when deadlines are 
set, then the likelihood of the fostering strategy producing real move 
ment increases substantially.
Fostering Lesson 2: Constituent education and awareness is crucial. 
Education and awareness are always cited as important in fostering ini 
tiatives. However, most of the education is focused on cooperative 
problem-solving skills and other specifics of the fostering effort. It is 
presented as a useful support activity. In our research, we find that 
internal education and awareness need to be seen as much more than a 
supportive activity. We find that a breakdown in communications with 
constituents can be a major show stopper.
Internal education is not a one-way communications process, nor is 
it limited to cooperative problem-solving skills. A typical threshold 
issue concerns a very basic question: "Why change?" Leaders from 
labor and management may be acutely aware of the need for new coop 
erative initiatives, but their constituents need to be exposed to sufficient 
data and experience for them to come to the same conclusions. As the 
fostering efforts unfold, continuing education and awareness are 
equally essential especially as the consequences of fostering activi 
ties are not likely to be unambiguously positive for all concerned.
The collapse of the QWL effort in the Bidwell case can be directly 
traced to the parties' incomplete attention to constituent understanding. 
Management never fully brought its middle managers on board in rec 
ognizing either the importance of the initiative or the necessity of 
showing deference to union preferences for the timing of training. 
Consequently, there was no foundation of support for QWL to sustain 
it when a change in top corporate leadership occurred.
Similar dynamics can be found within labor, as is illustrated by the 
experiences at CSX. Here a sustained effort was made to attend to 
internal education and awareness. The company brought together the 
many unions representing its employees, and within each union efforts 
were made to educate middle-level union officials. This comprehensive 
effort still fell short. Splits across the unions and within one key union 
prevented a comprehensive fostering effort from moving forward.
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Internal political fears and power dynamics could not be overcome and 
proved debilitating to the fostering strategy.
We conclude that internal education and awareness are critical, and 
that they are far more than a one-way communications process. They 
involve a process of intraorganizational negotiations in which the very 
fate of the fostering initiative hangs in the balance (Walton and McKer- 
sie 1993). Consequently, parties pursuing a fostering strategy must 
anticipate supporting this internal dialogue within their own organi 
zation and within the other parties' organizations.
Fostering Lesson 3: Manage leadership turnover. Continuity of 
leadership is particularly important in a fostering initiative for three 
reasons. First, one of the jobs of a leader is to frame the issues. As 
such, union and management leaders provide the overall framework 
and logic that drives a fostering strategy something that is not easily 
recreated when new leaders arrive. Second, another job of a leader is to 
provide the necessary resources (tools, information, and skills) for peo 
ple to follow their lead. Fostering initiatives are particularly vulnerable 
in the absence of tangible support for suggestions and proposals that 
emerge from problem-solving efforts. Commitments of support and 
even ownership of the entire fostering initiative can be disrupted by the 
turnover of leaders. Third, many understandings reached among top 
leaders during fostering efforts are not recorded in contracts. Leader 
ship turnover requires the remaining parties to reconstruct these many 
informal understandings with new leaders when they arrive with the 
results often not fully apparent until a pivotal event emerges.
Even though leadership is central to fostering initiatives, our cases 
and other field experiences suggest that leadership turnover is a com 
mon and predictable event. Managers will often leave as a result of 
new assignments in the organization. Union leaders may turn over vol 
untarily through appointments to the international union or other posi 
tions at the local level. The turnover may also be involuntary as a result 
of local union elections.
The importance of leadership is well illustrated by many of our 
cases. The new plant manager at DeRidder was crucial to the realiza 
tion of positive outcomes, and the president of Anderson Pattern dem 
onstrated leadership in offering profit sharing without seeking anything 
in return framing the fostering efforts around mutual interests. The
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continued tenure of this individual proved essential for the incremental 
change process that has unfolded for nearly a decade.
At Adrian Manufacturers, by contrast, fostering efforts were con 
strained by a president who had a nonparticipative, unilateral manage 
ment style. It was only after this individual left the firm that a fostering 
strategy unfolded. This case illustrates that leadership turnover is not 
always negative in its implications.
Since it is rare within the time frame often required for a fostering 
effort not to encounter leadership turnover, the real challenge lies in 
managing the dynamics effectively. This means that critical decisions 
made in the fostering process need to be well documented. Transition 
procedures need to be developed to debrief departing leaders and to 
educate new leaders. Ultimately, however, increased ownership and 
leadership for the fostering process at multiple levels may be the best 
insurance against the disruption that arises with the inevitable turnover 
of key leaders.
Fostering Lesson 4: Anticipate forcing episodes. The emergence of 
divisive conflicts can be a major show stopper for a fostering initiative. 
Unfortunately, too many "experts" and leaders guiding fostering 
become preoccupied with joint activities. The focus is entirely on 
teamwork, cooperation and consensus. As a result, leaders are not ade 
quately prepared to handle the divisive conflicts that inevitably emerge 
in the context of a fostering initiative.
It is important to distinguish between two types of divisive issues 
that may emerge in the same context with fostering. First, there are 
divisive issues that are unrelated to the issues around which fostering is 
occurring. Second, there are divisive issues that are directly interwoven 
with the fostering effort. Our recommendations are very different in 
these two contrasting situations.
The Pensacola case provides a good illustration of a divisive issue 
unrelated to the fostering initiative. In this case, corporate management 
mandated that local management bargain for the elimination of Sunday 
premium pay in local collective bargaining negotiations. The corpora 
tion wanted to present a united front across all its plants. Initially, local 
management attempted to pursue a fostering approach with the union 
on this issue, but was told by the union that there was no "nice" way 
for them to agree to such a concession. In the end, management forced
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the issue and the union said to its members, in effect, "We don't like it, 
but we don't have a choice." In retrospect, separating the issue from the 
fostering efforts proved most constructive for both parties. Both man 
agement and labor were under less pressure to reconcile the forcing 
incident with their ongoing fostering activities.
By contrast, the layoffs at Packard Electric set the stage for union 
forcing that was completely interwoven with the fostering efforts. The 
union, in effect held the QWL and other joint activities hostage over 
the layoff issue. In this case, the union argued that a no-layoff pledge 
had been given by management as a precondition for the union's part 
nership in the fostering, and this pledge was in the process of being 
broken. The confrontation had many ramifications involving internal 
turnover within the union and extensive side-bar meetings between 
labor and management. Ultimately, however, the parties did reach a 
landmark agreement providing lifetime job security in exchange for 
substantial management flexibility and a multitier wage scale. In this 
case, both parties' interests were best served by linking the divisive 
issue with the fostering initiative.
How do we make sense of these two contrasting incidents? The 
answer lies in the substance of the issues. Where the issues are largely 
unrelated, it will serve all parties to keep them separate. It is unrealistic 
for management to expect a joint problem-solving dialogue on a dis 
tributive issue, and it is inappropriate for the union to hold fostering 
efforts hostage. On the other hand, where divisive issues involve prin 
ciples that are central to the fostering initiative it is appropriate and 
even essential to be explicit in attending to these linkages. In these 
cases, joint dialogue even if contentious must be undertaken. It 
would even be appropriate for either party, often labor, to hold joint 
activities hostage in order to compel such dialogue.
Unions must preserve their power to restrain work and their ability 
to force the resolution of issues when necessary. Concurrently, union 
leaders can derive influence from their participation in a fostering pro 
cess, assuming there are positive benefits (especially if workers deliver 
more value as a result of problem solving and involvement). Or to 
make the point more concretely, the payoffs from the successful nego 
tiation of commitment and cooperation in Champion Paper's Pensacola 
mill, Anderson Pattern, Packard Electric, and Conrail included not only 
increased competitiveness of the enterprise but also enhanced dignity
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and voice for labor. At the same time that unions draw strength from 
the process and results of fostering, they must also retain a degree of 
independence and freedom to challenge management on fundamental 
issues.
Lessons from Combinations of Forcing and Fostering
Inevitably, forcing and fostering strategies are combined. Some 
times they are concurrent, such as when Packard Electric pursued 
QWL activities concurrently with massive layoffs in the corporation. 
At other times the strategies are sequential, such as when Boise Cas 
cade shifted from forcing to fostering in its DeRidder mill. Forcing and 
fostering are complex on their own, but infinitely more challenging 
when they are pursued in combination. As we have suggested above, 
the strategies invariably become intertwined, which presents a chal 
lenge for all to share and to solve. The following lessons focus on the 
combinations of the two strategies.
Combined Lesson 1: Actions speak louder than words—so be sure 
that consistent actions are taken and sustained. While actions always 
speak louder than words, this lesson is particularly important in mak 
ing the transition from forcing to fostering. Even a restrained form of 
forcing will erode trust and raise larger questions about the other side's 
long-term commitment to the relationship. As a result, cooperative 
overtures following forcing will be treated with suspicion. A sustained 
pattern of actions that demonstrate a genuine concern for common 
interests will accomplish what words really cannot.
For example, in reestablishing relations after the strike at the DeRid 
der mill, the new management team concentrated for nearly a year on 
improving safety practices including disciplining a supervisor guilty 
of driving unsafe practices. While safety is an issue of common inter 
est, management helped shift from forcing to fostering by giving prior 
ity to safety over other issues, including managerial authority.
Combined Lesson 2: Roles become redefined—so anticipate a pro 
cess to guide the redefinition. In the shifting from forcing to fostering, 
the roles of labor and management become redefined. This occurs on a 
daily basis with small interactions and to a larger degree as well. Union
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and management representatives commonly find themselves shifting 
from contentious to common concerns countless times in a given day. 
Over a longer time period, within the context of a restrained forcing 
initiative, each party will ultimately engage in some activities designed 
to support concurrent or future fostering. Similarly, within the context 
of a robust fostering initiative, each party will inevitably engage in 
some activities designed to support concurrent or future forcing.
At the Budd Company, such role complexity was evident in the 
ascendant influence of line management over industrial relations staff. 
The issue of die transitions involved a combination of forcing and fos 
tering. On the one hand, management needed flexibility from the rigid 
lines of demarcation among skilled trades. On the other hand, 
employee commitment to any proposed solution was essential. 
Because line management was closer to the issues than the industrial 
relations staff, it was better able to target the forcing to just the level of 
flexibility it needed, and it was more willing to take the risk in trusting 
the employees to make the new arrangement work without detailed 
contractual rules. In the process, however, the roles of these depart 
ments within management shifted substantially.
Combined Lesson 3: Effective combinations of forcing and fostering 
transform the individual strategies—so build constituent expectations 
for a complex mix of forcing and fostering. Where forcing and foster 
ing are effectively combined, each strategy becomes transformed or 
it risks failure. Forcing needs to be restrained or it risks two show stop 
pers (escalating conflict and the inability to reestablish regular opera 
tions). Fostering needs to be robust or it risks two show stoppers 
(divisive conflicts and unmanageable internal differences). As each 
strategy attends to these interactions with the other strategy, it will 
change in form and focus.
For example, when the QWL effort at Packard Electric encountered 
the early test event of work being moved to Mexico, the joint steering 
committee proved an effective forum to discuss this divisive issue. The 
result was an agreement to build the branch plants, which had a differ 
ent wage scale and flexible work rules. If the divisive issue had not 
been successfully handled it would have undermined the success of the 
QWL effort. Yet, in addressing the issue, the focus of the joint activities
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expanded well beyond the off-line, group problem solving that had 
been the primary feature of the initiative.
Combined Lesson 4: The successful juxtaposition of forcing and fos 
tering drives changes in organizational structure and operations—so 
anticipate new organizational forms. Considering the various combi 
nations of forcing and fostering that are possible, the most challenging 
task is to create approaches and structures that allow distributive activ 
ities to take place within a fostering regime.
The resolution of differences in the context of a fostering strategy 
occurs at both interpersonal and institutional levels. At the interper 
sonal level, it is important to facilitate the clarification of core interests 
and the surfacing of underlying feelings and values. In this way, con 
flict is seen as legitimately deriving from the exploration of interests 
and hence appropriate even in the midst of joint brainstorming and 
other collaborative activities.
At the institutional level, management and union leaders can make 
available multiple avenues for surfacing and addressing complaints. 
These can include formal grievance procedures, open-door policies to 
reach top executives, regular skip-level meetings, confidential sugges 
tion/complaint boxes, and the offices of an ombudsperson. Within the 
union, the presence of a similar range of forums for meaningful debate 
among subgroups can be extremely important.
Combinations of forcing and fostering thus illustrate the dynamic 
nature of negotiated change. Not only are the negotiations over sub 
stantive change, but the process of discussing these issues also changes 
the relationship and the organizations involved. Ultimately, it is a chal 
lenge of never ending adaptation. Relations are either improved or 
compromised by the way the forcing and the fostering strategies are 
implemented there is no middle ground.
Since both forcing and fostering strategies are usually necessary to 
achieve both substantive and relationship changes, it is essential for the 
parties, especially management, to anticipate indeed plan for an 
effective sequence or combination of the key strategies.
It is interesting to note that management's planning seldom looked 
beyond the extant strategy. Even in our three forcing-followed-by-fos- 
tering cases, at least two of them developed along these lines based on
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a perceived need for fostering that developed only after the forcing epi 
sode was completed.
Similarly, in the cases where management used fostering as the first 
major change initiative, management seemed to suspend any idea it 
would also have to engage in forcing.
Simple Reminders to Guide Strategic Negotiations
As forcing and fostering become intertwined, the guidance neces 
sary for success becomes similar for each strategy. Certain tactics and 
behaviors turn out to be equally critical for both fostering and forcing. 
These insights are captured in the following table, which identifies 
helpful tactics and simple reminders for negotiators.
Useful Tactics and Simple Reminders
Useful tactics Simple reminders
Data collection and analysis: Do your homework
Interest-based assessment: Be realistic
Targeting the issues Don't be greedy—be constructive
Bargaining over how to bargain: Negotiate the "rules of the game" '
Education within and across: Explain why
Constancy of purpose: Don't give up on core values and principles
Feedback and adjustment: Learn from experience and celebrate success
To fully explain the logic underlying the recommendations in this 
table, each tactic and simple reminder is addressed below.
Data Collection and Analysis: Do your homework.
The first tactical move prior to either forcing or fostering is data 
collection and analysis. Initially, the data collection is wideranging so 
as to help guide the development of the change agenda. Here parties 
should refrain from just focusing on what they think are the issues, but 
instead develop many channels for input. This avoids centering forcing 
or fostering efforts on what may turn out to be symptoms, rather than 
root causes.
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As a forcing or fostering initiative unfolds, additional data collection 
and analysis is required. In these cases, the data are more narrowly 
focused on the particular issues that have emerged. While the early 
data collection and analysis serves to prevent overly rapid narrowing of 
focus, later data collection and analysis serves to ensure that negotia 
tions are not proceeding on unchecked assumptions.
Thus, our simple reminder is to "do your homework." We might also 
remind negotiators to "get your ducks in a row." The point seems obvi 
ous, but it is not possible to restrain forcing or to ensure robust forcing 
without adequate data collection and analysis.
Interest-Based Assessment: Be realistic.
Effective data collection and analysis begin to surface deeper under 
standings about priorities and those of the counterparts. We recom 
mend pushing those understandings further into a formal interest-based 
assessment (Fisher and Ury 1991). That is, any party contemplating a 
forcing or fostering change initiative should fully examine its own 
interests and those of the parties with whom it is negotiating.
Examining interests results in the parties becoming less focused on 
positions. Becoming too focused on positions and being inattentive to 
the other side's interests can lead to uncontrolled forcing. Similarly, in 
fostering, becoming too focused on positions can create unrealistic or 
rigid expectations on the part of principals and constituents, while 
being inattentive to the other side's interests makes it much harder to 
anticipate divisive conflicts.
Our advice, then, is to "be realistic." An interest-based analysis can 
help guide the establishment of realistic aspirations for both forcing 
and fostering.
Targeting the Issues: Don't be greedy—be constructive.
Prior data collection and analysis, combined with interest-based 
analysis, offers an effective foundation for formulating the objectives 
of a forcing or fostering initiative. We urge parties to be clear in the 
way they express their objectives. Management may want to increase 
machine up-time, for example, but the message is lost if forcing is cen 
tered on working "bell-to-bell."
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Targeting does not mean pressing a power advantage. Even if a forc 
ing contest reveals the other side as weaker than anticipated, pushing 
for more than originally requested creates a legacy of bitterness and 
mistrust. In fostering, the targeting serves primarily to pace progress 
and for the lead negotiators to remain aligned with their constituents.
The simple reminder is, "don't be greedy be constructive." If stra 
tegic negotiations go well, be satisfied.
Bargaining Over How to Bargain: Negotiate the "rules of the game."
Traditionally, the "rules of the game" in labor negotiations have 
been largely tacit. They would only be discussed in the context of per 
ceived inappropriate behavior. By contrast, the pursuit of forcing, fos 
tering, and combined strategies represents an intentional effort to 
change the way negotiations occur. Our recommendation is that such 
changes should not be made unilaterally. Instead, we urge parties to 
build their skills and capabilities to bargain effectively over how they 
want to bargain.
So much of our upbringing and early educational experiences teach 
the exact opposite message to follow the rules of the game and not 
question authority. Even when faced with unconstructive rules, it is not 
always natural or instinctive for parties to focus on the renegotiation of 
these rules. Further, negotiating over the rules of the game is a high- 
stakes process, since these new rules then provide a framework for sub 
sequent interactions. Difficult as it is, however, bargaining over how to 
bargain is preferable to the alternative which is trying to achieve 
desired ends via a bargaining process that is limited in its scope, focus, 
or structure.
Education Within and Across: Explain why
Being able to explain the reasons for a strategic initiative is critical 
for forcing or fostering. It may seem ironic that a forcing party would 
have to explain itself, but we have seen that such justifications can tem 
per an escalating conflict and aid the reestablishment of regular opera 
tions. Education in the fostering case is especially critical to help 
manage internal differences that might otherwise derail the initiative.
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Remembering to "explain why" is the key. Other parties may dis 
agree and oppose the proposals for change. However, the interaction 
may lead to reflection and adjustment. Even where adjustment is not 
required, however, explaining "why" helps to keep the forcing 
restrained, while ensuring that the fostering will be robust.
In several instances the prospect of losing a major chunk of business 
provided such a required justification. Merely promulgating informa 
tion about what management perceives as compelling circumstances 
for change, however, does not guarantee that the recipients of this 
information will accept the proposed changes as justifiable. In some 
cases, rational arguments appeared to fall on deaf ears. For example, 
AP Parts attempted to use the leverage of a new contract with Ford to 
secure important changes in operating practices. The explanations have 
to be believed by the stakeholders.
Education also serves the purpose of achieving internal alignment. 
Negotiations, of any variety, do not occur unconnected to constituents, 
who have important stakes in the outcomes. Consequently, it is espe 
cially important to ensure that the internal negotiations are coordinated 
with developments at the institutional level. To the extent that the par 
ties are able to reach agreement and bridge their respective interests, 
and possibly even enhance working relations as a result, then these 
accomplishments need to be shared with all concerned. Developing a 
track record wherein a combination of forcing and fostering strategies 
serves the needs of the parties for dealing with key agenda items can 
develop competencies and support for realizing change on a continuing 
basis.
Constancy of Purpose: Don't give up on core values and principles
Constancy of purpose has been highlighted by Dr. Deming (1986) in 
his recommendations for effective management. We extend this idea to 
the negotiations arena. Parties who are initiating either a forcing or a 
fostering campaign must be prepared to stay the course. It is essential, 
however, that the "course" be determined on the basis of data collec 
tion and analysis, interest-based assessment, targeted issues, and exten 
sive education (within and across the organizations).
In the absence of a proper foundation, the forcing or fostering activ 
ities may be poorly focused. The change efforts may be centered on
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positions that address symptoms, rather than root causes. In such cases, 
constancy of purpose can turn into debilitating inflexibility. Constancy 
of purpose thus involves being clear and firm regarding core values and 
principles, but being flexible in their application.
Thus, a key recommendation to the strategic negotiator is, "Don't 
give up on core values and principles." Half-hearted support for the ini 
tiative or shifting objectives will undermine both forcing and fostering 
strategies. Our caution here, however, is to ensure that the constancy of 
purpose is centered on core values and principles, linked to a well-con 
structed strategy.
Feedback and Adjustment: Learn from experience and celebrate 
success
Even with the best preparations, unanticipated or pivotal events arise 
in the course of a change initiative. Consequently, an effective process 
includes mechanisms for ongoing feedback and adjustment.
When there are shifts in either forcing or fostering initiatives, they 
should be guided by all of the above recommendations. That is, a shift 
in approach should be driven by data collection and analysis, be guided 
by an interest-based assessment, involve a retargeting of the issues, be 
accompanied by extensive education (within and across), and represent 
true constancy of purpose (rather than inflexible adherence to an early 
stance).
Celebrating success is a critical form of feedback. Such celebrations 
send powerful signals about the aims and outcomes that are valued. 
This, in turn, enables others to learn from the experience.
Conclusion
Clearly, negotiated change is a dynamic process. We have found that 
forcing strategies are most effective when they are restrained which 
requires constant attention and adjustment. We have also found that 
fostering strategies are most effective when they are robust which 
also requires constant attention and learning. A strategic negotiator 
may not anticipate every event that arises along the path of change, but
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it is essential to anticipate the inevitable interweaving of forcing and 
fostering strategies. Remember: Do your homework. Be realistic. 
Don't be greedy be constructive. Negotiate the "rules of the game." 
Explain why. Don't give up on core values and principles. Learn from 
experience and celebrate success.
NOTES
1 The concept of robust fostering is distinct from, but consistent with the Robust Unionism 
urged by Arthur Shostack
2 Alternatively, a party will force when it sees itself as having no other alternative though 
even here it is rare that forcing will be initiated by a party that expects to lose
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